893.00/12–247
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 10.]
Sir: I have the honor to forward the enclosed communication from Dr. Lin Tung-hai72 as requested. It is a touching description of the plight in which liberals find themselves. Another Chinese friend has called on me (December 1) to report a trip to Manchuria and North China from which he has just returned. His description of the physical suffering of the population and of their dejection, accentuates the gravity of the situation. He told me that certain nonpartisans in the north are attempting again to effect a resumption of peace talks with some hope of success. I feel, however, very dubious. The Communists would certainly make stiffer demands than hitherto and the Government would regard any consideration of these as in effect appeasement or surrender to which any other fate would seem to them to be preferable.
Within the Government the CC Clique has been steadily gaining in power since last September and now controls most of the Government economic and financial agencies. Although President Chiang had indicated to me in early September his readiness to have Dr. Chen Li-fu go abroad yet he has apparently succumbed to the strong pressure constantly on him which fits in too well with his own earlier predilections. Premier Chang was too much involved with other members of the Political Science Clique in joining with the CC Clique against T. V. Soong and in other deals to be able to oppose them openly. In fact he is largely responsible for allowing them to have their men in the leading Government financial institutions. In a certain sense there is no CC Clique, but rather a permeation of the whole Party machinery by the Chen brothers whose control of patronage and of the secret police gives them immense power. They are fanatical in their conviction that the Communist Party must be crushed and that its agents, often disguised as Kmt members or as liberals, are everywhere carrying on subversive activities. There is enough evidence of this to justify their fears if not their methods. The liberals themselves, while anxious to be of use, are thwarted or intimidated, and are only feebly organized, if at all. In the prevalent [Page 383] dispirited mood and the more rapid drift toward catastrophe the reactionaries are even hostile to the liberals as such. This is perhaps due in part to the reckless folly that is bred by a sense of impending disaster—“whom the Gods destroy they first make mad”—in part also to the illusion that, with American aid to be counted on because of our fear of Soviet aggression, they can use this to their own advantage without being hampered by what they regard as the visionary ideas of the liberals. This large and potentially very influential class are likely therefore to suffer almost equally whether the extreme reactionaries or the extreme radicals win.
As you are considering the possibilities of aid to China I venture to comment once more on the place of advisers in this program. Civilian advisers for the specialized functions Mr. Blandford73 might help to determine, appointed by us at the request of the Chinese Government, would be able to recommend to you such concrete assistance as would from time to time seem wise as well as to ensure that this was being used as intended. President Chiang has already renewed his request for such a group so that from that standpoint there need be no delay. The same holds true of the Civil Aeronautics Adviser recommended in the memorandum prepared by General McConnell74 last winter. In this connection would it be desirable to broaden the directive for his successor, General Thomas,75 so as to include some of those functions? It seems to me quite worth-while also to arrange for three or four agricultural experts to advise that Ministry as to how to put into effect the more immediately needed items in the Report of the Sino-American Commission of a year ago.76 This might well include a modest amount in any future loans. This should be of value in helping distracted Government leaders to fight Communism at the grass-roots. I hope to forward more specific suggestions on this matter but am now raising the question in principle.
I hope that these thoughts of mine may be of some slight help as you are pondering a problem the perplexities of which I can to some extent imagine. My heartiest sympathy as you pass from other baffling issues to this one.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed; it was a lengthy exposition of the political situation from the point of view of one of the splinter-group “liberal” parties, the National Liberal Party, of which Dr. Lin was one of the chief spokesmen.↩
- John B. Blandford, American financial adviser to the Chinese Government.↩
- Brig. Gen. John P. McConnell, then Commanding General, Air Division, Nanking Headquarters Command.↩
- Brig. Gen. Charles E. Thomas.↩
- Entitled Report of the China–United States Agricultural Mission, published by the Department of Agriculture as International Agricultural Collaboration Report No. 2, May 1947. For correspondence on this mission, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. x, pp. 1268 ff.↩