893.00/11–147: Telegram
The Vice Consul at Changchun (Siebens) to the Secretary of State
247. Indications are culmination Communist sixth offensive taking place in present battle for Kirin which has increased in intensity for past 10 days. General Wen Shiao-shang, Commander 30th Division New First Army presently in charge Changchun garrison in absence New First commander Pan Yu-kun, told me in interview today that Commies now have 19 divisions of which 9 are up to strength (average full Communist division 7000 to 8000 men) concentrated at Kirin and that reinforcements still coming from troops withdrawing from southern areas. He further stated defenders presently outnumbered 6 to 1.
ReContel 433, 31st to Embassy, press review military situation.41
Wen stated, however, that to date defenders had not lost one strong point in outer defense periphery and professed that situation well in hand. Core of Kirin defense force is National 60th Army, a force which Assistant Military Attaché reports as about 10,000 supported [Page 357] by 10,000 miscellaneous PPC42 and other militia. 60th Army previously reported by Assistant Military Attaché as possibly poorest in Manchu[ria] and equipped with only moderate amount American equipment.
Decisive factor in battle to date has been National Air Force based at Mukden which has been reported and observed from here to be making comparatively large number sorties to Kirin. Both General Wen and mayor of Changchun, who knows Kirin well and states he has been in communication with mayor Kirin, admit that without air force situation Kirin would be extremely grave. Both also admitted that should 2 consecutive days’ bad weather keep air force grounded, outcome of defense might well be disastrous. Chief function air force reputed to be prevention Commies concentrating, hampering of daylight movements and attacks on artillery.
Commies by all reports have been making considerable use artillery against Kirin. General Wen stated they had three regular artillery [units?] there (Military Attaché and I agree this exaggeration and that probably Communists have no more than 20 or 30 guns of 70 mm caliber) but discounted effect this force since major targets few and hard to locate. He further opined chief effect artillery was on civilian morale.
General opinion in military circles here supported by all appearances is that Kirin is sixth offensive equivalent of Ssuping in fifth offensive. Though Kirin is poorer defensive strategy possibly than Ssuping from point view nearness National Air Base, Mukden and sources relief forces, and though situation there subject to possible rapid change for worse, believe city’s chances holding out reasonably good in view following factors:
- (1)
- Natural defenses city good. Location west bank Sungari River in a bend and with facilities adjacent to Communists can be attacked only in limited section comprising west 180 degrees compass.
- (2)
- Air force which was decisive factor at Ssuping continues by all reports to be very effective, and generally good weather this time year makes possibility slim that force will be grounded for any length time.
- (3)
- Morale defenders which reputed initially low is rising with successful defense.
- (4)
- 38th and 50th Divisions returning Changchun and main strength that force scheduled be in Changchun 2nd when Commanding Officer New First Army scheduled return. As intimated by General Wen in interview, present main disposition Communist forces to east in Manchu would permit elements New First Army proceed to relief Kirin.
- (5)
- Communists have been in campaign for past month covering considerable territory and cannot be considered to be as effective as they would be fresh.
- (6)
- Communist tactics in past still of guerilla type as necessitated by nature their forces indicates that if they anticipate cost of continued attack on Kirin to be excessively high they will break off engagement even though sustained offensive might result in capture of city.
Repeated to Embassy, Nanking, Peiping as 12 and Mukden by mail.