893.00/10–2947
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 10.]
Sir: I have the honor to comment on political trends in China perhaps more as a record of my present impressions than because [Page 344] of any substantial objective changes. Most of this may therefore be mere repetition of what is already familiar.
Communist Party. There is no evidence of any weakening either in fighting power or in morale. Rather the opposite. They seem to be relatively well supplied with ammunition, money and other material necessities, and to be confident of their ability to carry on for the two or three years which they estimate as the time required to get control of the territory north of the Yang-tse River. They are steadily improving their organization and discipline. Officers and men share the same hardships and have the enthusiasm of those who are devotedly fighting for a cause which transcends all thought of selfish ambition or enjoyment. There is little if any evidence of material assistance from Moscow but there is undoubtedly very close and conscious affinity in aims, methods and objectives. This will probably become more apparent as the rift widens between the United States and the Soviet Union. The hatred against America is said to be more vocal now than even against Chiang Kai-shek. Reports indicate that the younger student type is more unreservedly pro-Russian or international in its sympathies than the older leaders with whom the nationalistic loyalties aroused by foreign aggression still linger. The younger people argue that if America can help the Kmt31 why should not Russia be allowed to help them. On the other hand the official pronouncements have always been at pains to disavow any such aid or connection realizing the unfavorable effects of this upon the general public. There are numerous and well-authenticated reports of the merciless cruelty of the Communists especially in newly occupied areas, and of the terrorism this inspires. There is no slightest question but that they intend to carry on their destructive tactics until the present Government succumbs. They will then agree to any temporary compromise or coalition that will enable them to extend their control until they achieve their goal of a thoroughly communized China. Nor is there any doubt in my mind but that their control will follow the invariable Communist pattern of a police-state, with no freedom of thought or action and with brutal slaughter or expropriation of all who seem to be in their way.
Kuomintang. The corruption and the reactionary forces pervading the Kuomintang are too familiar to call for further emphasis. It should be kept in mind, however, that single-party control always tends to be corrupt, that the period during which this Party has been in power has been one of incessant conflict, that the mounting costs of living have greatly aggravated an age-long tradition in China, and that the mood of defeatism in an increasingly hopeless outlook has [Page 345] caused a creeping paralysis upon all creative effort. Even so the men at the very top are of high integrity and continue to struggle bravely against terrific difficulties. There are many more like them within and outside of the Government.
Other Parties. The minority parties are rather disappointing. Those now absorbed into the Government are contributing but little and are busily seeking office for their members. The Democratic League continues to arouse suspicion of its communistic proclivities and offers little prospect of serving as a nucleus for liberal action. My chief concern at present is that the Government through ill-advised persecution will discredit itself further for high-handed oppression thus winning sympathy for the League from those who stand for enlightened constitutional procedure, while the League members will be driven further leftist and to underground activities.
Another factor which is becoming more apparent is the infiltration of Communists not only into bodies like the League but also into the Government itself. The seizures in Peiping following the discovery of a Communist headquarters are grim evidence of this. But of the arrests in other cities because of documents found there all but two have been Government employees. With a revitalized program, supported alike by their colleagues and the public, such men could be largely immunized. Otherwise their members and their sinister influence will tend to increase.
The best hope of the country seems to be in her educated youth. This group should be broadened so as to include those who once were ardently patriotic students, have become more or less cynical or discouraged in their depressing environment, but might be expected under better conditions to recover much of their lost enthusiasm. Assuming American aid of the nature which has in general been under consideration, these young people could be enlisted as “shock troops”. If we can manage to sublimate our military and monetary aid into a movement to bring peace, freedom from oppression and economic recovery under democratic principles, including the responsibility of the people to take a part in reforming their government, this can win the allegiance of youth and neutralize their suspicions of American imperialism, reliance on force, strengthening an effete regime as an anti-Soviet policy, et cetera. The student class is intensely nationalistic and now thoroughly alarmed. The genius of the Chinese people is naturally democratic rather than communistic. By making our objectives; transparently clear we can help toward a resurgent moral awakening aiming at government reform and a better livelihood for all, with students past and present as the animating heart of it. This is what actually happened in the Revolution of 1911 and in the anti-Japanese [Page 346] resistance. It can come again. The convictions of democratic youth will thus match those of communist youth and which of those of the present generation wins will largely determine the destiny of China. Nor need we fear this if we really believe in the democratic way of life and in its ability to win over its greatest rival in our time when the contest is out in the open as this would be. If this process cannot conquer Communist ideology and machinations nothing else will. But a challenge on this high plane ought to have far-reaching consequences in other parts of Asia.
When I stopped off in Nanking in May of last year to pay my respects to the Generalissimo on my return from the United States, he asked me what I thought of the situation. I replied that it was worse than I had reason to expect from press reports in America but that I believed it could be changed if he would lead whole-heartedly in a new revolutionary movement with the adventurous and unselfish zeal of the Kuomintang when he first joined it, rallying present-day youth as it had done when he was one of them. The rallying cry might well be that of patriotic loyalty expressed now in reforming, unifying and constructive effort, and of treason as consisting in all that hinders these. It would be less easy for him now but with our help I still think of this somewhat visionary solution as in the end the most practical one.
Respectfully yours,
- Kuomintang.↩