The General called yesterday afternoon. He was accompanied by his private
secretary, who acted as interpreter (Chinese-French). Our conversation
fell short of being satisfactory, at least insofar as I was concerned,
for the reason that the secretary’s knowledge of French is far from
adequate, and I was unable to avail myself of the services of one of the
Consulate General’s competent interpreters for the reason that the
General’s secretary had stated specifically that in the absence of an
American interpreter the General desired that he (the secretary) serve
as interpreter.
Our conversation turned to affairs in Manchuria. The General forthwith
deplored the present state of these affairs, placing the blame therefor
on Soviet support of the Chinese communists and the failure of
Nationalist officials to carry out the directives and uphold the ideals
of the Generalissimo. He was warm (if not perhaps too effusive) in his
tributes to the Generalissimo. He was unrestrained in his condemnation
of the professional ability of the Nationalist military command in the
Northeast Provinces and of the rapacity with which the Nationalist
non-Manchurian military and civil officials in Manchuria have been
exploiting the Northeast. He prophesied that, unless corrective measures
are taken, Manchuria will soon be lost to China and will become a puppet
of the Soviet Union. He stated
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that the only effective way to save Manchuria to China is to replace the
present Nationalist regime in the Northeastern Provinces with one made
up of native Northeasterners (the General being a native son), and to
support such new regime with sufficient funds and munitions to enable it
to cast out the communists and to establish itself firmly.
The General handed me a cover bearing an address in Chinese, and
requested that I send it to The Honorable George C. Marshall, Secretary
of State. He expressed his admiration of General Marshall. I gathered
from the secretary’s remarks that the General enjoys the acquaintance of
General Marshall. The cover and its enclosure, together with an English
translation of the latter, are transmitted herewith.
. . . . . . .
[Enclosure—Translation]
General Ma
Chan-shan to the Secretary of
State
My Dear General Marshall: The continuous
expansion of Communism has brought the world to the brink of a
crisis. It now requires that peace-loving countries and possessors
of righteousness join together and take careful and effective
preventive measures. United States support to the Chinese Government
comes, therefore, not only as help in saving the Chinese people from
the depths of a whirlpool of red terrorism, but as a step necessary
to the maintenance of order in the Far East and peace in the world.
It is a great pity that after one year’s civil strife nothing
concrete has been achieved militarily by the Chinese Government,
while, on the contrary, the influence of the Communist army is daily
expanding and is not [now?] taking an active,
instead of a passive, role. The process of change is, of course, a
complicated one but the main reason is due to a few stubborn
elements on the Government side failing to grasp the general
situation and coordinate military activities with politics. They can
only pin their hopes on the limited army they have and fail to
mobilize the great mass of the people, thus leaving the Communists a
wonderful opportunity for expansion, which has resulted in the
present critical situation.
The National Government is the only legal Government of China and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek the only wise leader, without whom
China will lose her central leadership, sink into confusion, and
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the communists can hope to
succeed, which will prove a great misfortune not only to China but
to the people of the whole world. We must give him complete support
for the completion of the herculean task of national reconstruction.
We also need real help from your Government. This need not
necessarily be in the form of materials, but may be in the form of
an effective measure to rid the Chinese Government of its erroneous,
narrowminded policy. To settle her internal strife, the Government
of China must place confidence in its people, and the people must be
armed to cooperate with the Government forces. Otherwise, your
economic help, if not strictly designated, will tend to isolate the
Government and will bear no fruit, as has been proved by the events
of the past year. (It is suggested that two-thirds of the
appropriations for military use should go to equip the Government,
while one-third should go to the people’s militia.)
Three months have elapsed since my arrival in the Northeast, and,
viewing from different angles, I feel the present situation is
extremely dangerous. The number of Government troops here is small.
The locally recruited troops are unwilling to fight, due to
discriminatory treatment. This explains why the communists have
taken many cities with comparative ease. We enjoy peace temporarily
with the siege of Ssupingkai lifted at great sacrifice, but when the
farm crops grow high in August and September it is almost certain
that the communists will inaugurate another offensive on a much
larger scale. At that time, if our military and political
authorities have no better means of meeting the situation, it is
feared that they will have to give up the Northeast, as they planned
during the early stages of the recent military operations when the
situation turned against their favor. However, in view of the
geographic importance of the Northeast, we can not afford to see
this piece of land lost, for this will endanger not only the whole
of China but will affect world security. The Government forces here
in the Northeast possess at this stage insufficient strength to cope
single-handedly with the situation. It is therefore imperative and
urgent that the people be organized and armed to assist the national
troops. Two-thirds of the Northeast are now in the hands of the
communists, while Government troops hold only one-third. Although
the areas held by the Government are comparatively rich and more
densely populated, the future is fraught with danger if timely
efforts are not made.
The Manchurians were for the Government, but they have gained
extremely bad impressions from the actions of the occupying
officials during the past year. This, coupled with the people’s
traditional regional prejudices, is the root of misunderstanding and
the cause for change of psychology. Manchuria is my native country,
and I cannot
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not afford to
see the Government continue its policy of procrastination.
Furthermore, I am unwilling to hear the severe criticisms and
denunciations levelled against the Government, as this will merely
create loopholes for the communists.
With my past record and reputation, I hope to rally the people around
the Government to improve the situation in the Northeast, but with
my present “empty” title and position, how can I exercise the power
which I used to have? Therefore, I sincerely hope that you, as a
great and faithful friend of China, will command a clear view of the
problems of the Northeast, which have great bearing on international
relationships, and render us effective help while the opportunity is
still present.
If you can designate for the people part of the money and arms
supplied to China by your Government, I can organize a powerful
people’s militia of two or three hundred thousand men and deal a
decisive blow to the communists. And if a third world war should be
unavoidable, I believe that I could recruit another two million
Manchurian youths to form the first line of defense against the
communist attack. I am a person of action, not of lip service. For
the welfare of the country and of the people, as well as for the
protection of world peace, I wish to offer my entire self.
It is high time to make a decision. The United States Government’s
policy toward China must be pushed vigorously, but is [it] should not follow the old pattern of
giving everything to the Chinese Government without even questioning
the manner in which such aid was used. The correct method would be
to make, under strict limitations, a reasonable distribution between
the Government and the people and to enable the Central Government
to have confidence in its people so as to form one solid body in the
struggle for final victory.
This, and this only, will expedite the unification of China, enhance
security in the Far East and lay a firm foundation for world
peace.
This will be the highest success of human wisdom, and I am confident
that only you, sagacious and superior, can bear this great task of
historic significance, and may my humble opinion be accepted.
The entire people in distress of the Northeast are eagerly looking
forward to you for help. We hold fast to you.
With all best wishes [etc.]
