The Embassy has been aware for some time, and has so reported to the
Department, that there is evidence of growing dissatisfaction within the
Chinese Army arising from the current accelerated deterioration of the
military and economic situation of the Central Government. The Embassy
does not consider, however, that the state of morale of the Chinese Army
has yet reached a point where large-scale organized disaffection is an
immediate danger. Furthermore, the Embassy does not share the confidence
placed by the Consul at Peiping in the second source mentioned in the
first paragraph of the despatch. Information available to the Embassy
reveals that this source is regarded by certain responsible American
officials as an unreliable person of dubious character.
The despatch is nonetheless of considerable interest as indicative of
growing deterioration of Chinese Army morale and decline in support for
the Generalissimo, which is becoming apparent not only in military, but
also in political, economic, and financial circles.
The Consul at Peiping appears to place more faith in the ability of the
purported organization of dissatisfied generals to head a democratic
movement than the background of these generals would ipso facto justify.
[Enclosure]
The Consul at Peiping (Freeman) to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)
No. 25
Peiping, July 1,
1947.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to recent
reports, which have undoubtedly come to the Embassy’s attention, of
the movement to form a Third Party in China, and to report
concerning developments of this movement in Peiping. The two
principal sources of these reports are both highly placed Government
officials—one a civilian in charge of the Planning Board of the
Paoting Pacification Headquarters and the other a Regular Army
Colonel who is head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the same
headquarters—and I firmly believe them to be of the highest
integrity. The Embassy is, however, in a far better position to
assess these reports and to judge the extent to which this movement
has advanced than is the Consulate.
Since the end of the Second World War, and particularly within the
last few months, the disaffection of the non-Whampoa generals (the
Tsa P’ai) has increased markedly even to the point that many of
them, it is reported, are anxious to be rid of the
Generalissimo5 in order that civil war may be brought to an
end and a coalition government in reality established. The practices
of the Generalissimo of transferring these generals away from the
troops which they have commanded and whose loyalty they hold; of
reducing their commands from an army to a division and from a
division to a regiment; and of throwing them in as expendable in the
most difficult assignments, have apparently alienated them from the
Generalissimo beyond any hope of reconciliation. They are now
waiting only for his downfall, and some rather impatiently.
Principal among these generals are the following: Fu Tso-yi, Sun
Lien-chung, Li Tsung-jen, Ma Hung-kuei, Ma Pu-fang, Yen Hsi-shan,
Pai Chung-hsi, Chang Fa-kuei, Liu Ju-ming, Feng Chih-an, and Hsia
Wei. Some of the above-named will play ball with Chiang Kai-shek
until his removal is an accomplished fact; others may be
instrumental in bringing about its accomplishment. They all are
reported to be sympathetic with the Third Party movement and are
lending their moral support to it. Moreover, they all are expected
to unite under the leadership of one man, General Feng
Yu-hsiang.
Feng is apparently the one person who combines the necessary
qualifications to lead a Third Party movement. First and most
important for the present, Feng holds the loyalty of sufficient
generals and groups to give the proposed party the necessary
military backing, it is stated.
[Page 219]
It is claimed, for example, that the following
generals with the forces indicated would be prepared to back Feng as
the leader of the new party: Yen Hsi-shan, 15 divisions; Fu Tso-yi,
6 divisions; Liu Ju-ming, 3 divisions; Feng Chih-an, 3 divisions;
Hsia Wei, 4 divisions; Chang Fa-kuei, 1 division; a total of 32
divisions. (Sun Lien-chung is not included in this list as he has
under his command hardly enough loyal troops to matter; his
influence, however, is counted on to draw others into the movement.)
Secondly, and scarcely of less importance, Feng, although by no
means pro-Communist in recent years, would probably not be
unacceptable to the Communists as a person in whom they could trust
and with whom they would be prepared to negotiate. And thirdly, Feng
is quite well and favorably known to the foreign world as “the
Christian General”, and as such might be expected to mitigate the
resentment which would undoubtedly be felt among foreign
missionary-influenced groups on the overthrow or resignation of the
Generalissimo.
For it is freely and rather openly stated among those who are
planning the movement that a third party with any real power would
be impossible as long as the Generalissimo and his satraps are in
the saddle. They also admit that it would be equally impossible in a
Communist-dominated China. Not only would the Generalissimo have to
be eliminated but also the Tai Li remnants, the CC Clique,6 the Soongs, and the Kungs. This thoroughgoing
housecleaning of the Kuomintang, they state, will be accomplished on
the collapse of the present Government by the young, energetic
Whampoa commanders of the rank of Major General and below who are
almost equally disgusted with the present regime and will form the
nucleus for a new Kuomintang—one that would be willing to negotiate
with the Third Party group and the Communists to form a coalition
government under the mutually acceptable 3–3–3 representation
basis.
Working hand in glove with Feng in leading the new Third Party will
be that inveterate insurgent, Li Chi-shen, who is now on the brink
of being expelled from the Kuomintang for the second time and is
living in “retirement” in Hong Kong. Li, it is planned, will assume
the political leadership of the Party while Feng will be the
military leader. Li is also considered as a possible successor to
the Generalissimo, and it is reported that Feng Yu-hsiang and his
followers would accede to such a move. Feng, it should be
remembered, was associated with Li in the abortive “People’s
Government” of Foochow in 1933–34, of which Li was Chairman and in
which Feng had his representatives. Between the two of them, they
will have considerable influence among
[Page 220]
the Tsa P’ai generals: Feng will have direct
influence over Sun Lien-chung, Liu Ju-ming, and Feng Chih-an, all of
whom are his old subordinates; he is expected to have influence over
Yen Hsi-shan by virtue of their former association against the
Generalissimo and over Fu Tso-yi through Yen; Li Chi-shen can be
expected to rally the support of Li Tsung-jen and Chang Fa-kuei when
the time is ripe.
It is understood that tenuous channels of communication between the
persons organizing the new Third Party and the Communists have
already been established and that a request has already gone forward
for the Communists to send a delegate to Peiping for direct parleys.
It is the intention of the persons concerned to keep the Communists
informed of general plans for the Third Party movement so that they
may be forewarned and prepared to cooperate when those plans are
realized. These same sources state that they have the assurance of
the Communists that the latter are far from prepared to take over
the administration of China on the inevitable collapse of Chiang
Kai-shek and the Central Government as trained, experienced
personnel are in far too short supply. On the contrary, they state
that the Communists would much prefer to participate on a 3–3–3
basis with a liberal third party and a re-vitalized Kuomintang.
The Democratic League, it is expected, would become an integral part
of the proposed Third Party, membership in which would be open to
all liberals and progressives.
When asked exactly what procedure might be expected in effecting the
removal of the Generalissimo, one source stated that in his opinion
it might be brought about in any one of the following three ways:
(1) A declaration of independence from the Central Government by one
of the above-named generals with sufficient troops to support his
action. This would be the “first bombshell” which would be followed
successively by similar action on the part of other generals. Fu
Tso-yi might conceivably be the first to take this step. Under these
conditions the Generalissimo’s resignation and probable withdrawal
from China would, it was felt, be inevitable. (2) A second “Double
Twelfth”. This, of course, alludes to a repetition of the Sian
incident in 1937.7 The object this time, however, would
not be to convince the Generalissimo to take any particular course
of action other than to depart from the country peaceably. Precisely
who might be in a position to carry out such a plan was not
disclosed. (3) Strong attacks by Communist forces on the
Shanghai–Nanking railroad and defense sector which might seriously
threaten the capital itself. It was felt that in the face of such an
eventuality the Generalissimo would voluntarily
[Page 221]
withdraw for reasons of safety and
thus give the signal for the return to China of General Feng and Li
Chi-shen. The source further stated that he personally favored the
first of these three procedures and thought that it was the most
likely to occur. With regard to the time factor, it was felt that
the overthrow of the Generalissimo would take place sometime before
the end of the year at the outside, but that such factors as
additional Communist victories might considerably shorten that
period.
It should be pointed out that the overtures which led to several
thorough discussions of this matter were made entirely by the
Chinese officials concerned, with the reported concurrence (or at
least tacit consent) of their superiors in what would appear to be a
bid for approval by the American Government of their plans. Their
stated desires of our Government were three in number: first, moral
support for their aims, even though such moral support were in the
form only of secret, verbal assurances to the concerned parties that
the United States Government was in sympathy with their declared
objectives; second, the withholding of all military and financial
aid to the Central Government, the granting of which might postpone
action to form the Third Party as well as serve as a temporary prop
to a regime which is destined to fall; and third, forthright and
public assurances of support by our Government on the actual
emergence of the Third Party.
It is my opinion that the Third Party movement as outlined above
offers the first gleam of hope in a perilously dark situation. If it
actually has the support (both positive and passive) which its
advocates claim, it is believed that it would offer the one course
of action which would receive the wholehearted acclamation of the
American people and provide the basis for a China which might in
reality assume its place as one of the “Big Five” as well as bolster
the democratic form of government throughout the world. The
realization of such a movement would also provide our Government
with a workable and mutually beneficial solution to the present
dilemma—that is, by indicating a course to be steered between the
extremes of withholding assistance from the Central Government and
allowing China to fall prey to the Communists or of supporting a
corrupt, intransigent, fascist-type government which makes a
practice of suppressing the very liberties for which the Second
World War was fought.
As was suggested in the opening paragraph of this despatch, it is
almost impossible for the Consulate locally to corroborate the
statements made with regard to the extent to which the Third Party
movement has progressed. It is strongly recommended, however, if the
Embassy finds that the movement has actually advanced to the point
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indicated and that
there exists a real possibility of fruition, that immediate and
serious consideration be given to the question of extending some
form of official encouragement to those concerned in the movement.
For if, as it would appear, this movement carries with it the
promise of the establishment in China of the type of democratic
government which we have long been advocating, it would be criminal
if it should fail for want of the blessing of the American
Government.
Respectfully yours,
