741.83/1–947: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

confidential

162. 1. Scrivener, head Egyptian Department,2 informed Embassy today that on January 4 British Ambassador Cairo3 was instructed to inform Nokrashy4 “in no uncertain terms” that British Government stands by Bevin–Sidky Agreement5 but that British Government cannot accept Sidky interpretation of Sudan protocol namely that at no time in future could Sudanese, if they elect to do so, become independent of Egypt. Bevin who had a hand in drafting, pointed out in instruction that acceptance of Sidky interpretation would amount to two parties agreeing to deprive a third party of its rights to be exercised at some future date.

2. British Ambassador was instructed to offer Nokrashy following alternatives:

(a)
British Government is ready to sign present treaty text and evacuation protocol and to attend a Sudan Conference at which Britains [sic], Egyptians and Sudanese would be represented. Such a conference would be arranged on understanding that present Sudan Treaty arrangements would remain in force for time being.
(b)
British Government is ready to sign texts as initialled by Sidky on understanding that Sudan’s right to choose their form of Government at an appropriate time in future will be unfettered. It being [Page 762] further understood that whatever choice Sudanese people may make Egypt’s vital interest in Sudan, i.e. water, defense, trade, etc., will be fully protected.

3. Scrivener said that several conversations have taken place between British Ambassador and Nokrashy since above statement of British position was delivered to latter. He said that reaction of Nokrashy had been neither entirely negative nor to any degree positive. He preferred not to speculate on course Egyptians would follow. Talks are continuing.6

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 4 to 6, dealing primarily with the replacement of a retiring Egyptian Cadi in the Sudan by a qualified Sudanese and the appointment of Mr. Scrivener as British Minister to Syria.]

Gallman
  1. In the British Foreign Office.
  2. Sir Ronald Ian Campbell.
  3. Mahmud Fahmy el-Nokrashy, Egyptian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs.
  4. For information concerning the agreement, initialled at London on October 25 by Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Ismail Sidky, the then Egyptian Prime Minister, see bracketed note, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, p. 77.
  5. According to telegram 317, January 16, from London, the Egyptian Prime Minister informed Ambassador Campbell on January 12 that neither British alternative was acceptable; alternative b because it implied eventual Sudanese right to ask for independence and alternative a because Egypt insisted on prior British acceptance of the permanent unity of the Nile Valley. A spokesman for the Egyptian Department of the Foreign Office concluded that the stalemate was virtually complete (741.83/1–1647).

    Telegrams 102 and 103, January 26, from Cairo, reported that, in a final effort to salvage negotiations, the British Government submitted an amendment “playing down” the right of the Sudanese to decide their future status. Following a lengthy cabinet meeting on the evening of January 25, the Egyptian Prime Minister handed an official statement to the British Ambassador informing him that the latest proposal was unacceptable. (741.83/1–2647)