840.50 Recovery/7–1147: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State
2413. For the Secretary and Matthews. The Czechoslovak reversal on the Paris Conference, on Soviet orders, is nothing less than a declaration of war by the Soviet Union on the immediate issue of the control of Europe.
The Kremlin’s assessment of the situation must be assumed to have convinced it of its ability to win, either by resignation and retirement of the West in face of their firm stand, as they hope, or in an open struggle, if necessary. With firm control of the continental bread basket in Eastern Europe and of important sectors of its industrial economy in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders must expect that Bevin and Bidault will be unable to secure enough US support to establish a viable regional reconstruction plan for the free countries of Europe. Even if a workable plan should emerge from the Paris meetings and sufficient American support be initially forthcoming, it would soon be cut off by the “inevitable” crisis in the United States—a basic postulate of Soviet politico-economic thinking.
In no previous instance has the Soviet Govt been so firm in handling its satellites. It seems clear that the Kremlin was surprised by the original Czechoslovak acceptance on July 8, presumably without prior consultation, but thereafter no other satellite ventured out of line. The seriousness of the Soviet purpose has now been strikingly demonstrated by making the Czechoslovaks eat crow publicly, even though the reserved nature of their original acceptance would have provided a face-saving exit at a later stage. The words of the Czechoslovak communiqué that Czechoslovak participation would be interpreted as an “act aimed against friendship with the USSR” indicate that there was plain speaking in the Kremlin when the Czechoslovak delegation was whisked into that sanctuary so shortly after its arrival here.
The lines are drawn. Our response is awaited. I do not need to point out to the Dept the repercussions of a failure to meet the Soviet challenge, in terms not only of the control of Europe, but of the impact which such a failure would have in the Middle and Far East and throughout the colonial world.
Dept please repeat Paris as Moscow’s 274; Berlin as 449; Praha as 15 and London as 277.