Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

740.00119 Council/4–2247: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

Moscow, April 22, 1947—10 p.m.

1511. Delsec 1458. Personal eyes only for Acheson from Marshall. Please deliver the following message to only the President:¹⁰

“My Dear Mr. President: Midway in yesterday’s Monday afternoon meeting¹¹ at my suggestion, we went into closed session¹² and on my insistence took up the discussion of our fundamental differences over the Austrian treaty, (A) no change in Austrian boundary in favor of Yugoslavia, (B) no reparations from Austria to Yugoslavia in accordance with Potsdam Agreement, and (C) German assets in Austria. Molotov showed some indication of reconsidering Soviet position on (A) and (B), but no change on (C). This morning we went again into closed session without profitable discussion, Molotov stating that the Soviet delegation was not ready to discuss (A) and (B). Bevin and he had a prolonged and futile debate over (C), in which I declined to participate as it was merely time consuming.

Molotov had suggested possibility of agreeing to amendments of original Soviet proposal on those assets, but declined to submit any amendment. Soviet position since London had remained unchanged while Bevin and I had each submitted proposals amending our original proposals in an effort to secure Soviet concurrence. I stated that further discussions of other details would be unprofitable and were not justified.

At the session this afternoon and evening¹³ from which I have just returned, no progress was made towards the settlement of these questions to which I have just referred. Molotov stated that he was still not ready for further discussion on (A) and (B) as he had not yet been able to discuss these issues with the Yugoslav representatives now in Moscow. In our opinion, he is merely prolonging the meeting in an effort to either force us to a compromise or to put us in the position of initiating the termination of the conference.

As no progress was being made, I suggested as chairman that we meet tomorrow morning at 11:30 and discuss the handling of the various agreements and disagreements which had resulted from our discussion of the Allied Control Council report and our discussion of German treaty measures. Bevin raised the point as to whether this meant a termination of consideration of the Austrian treaty. I replied that if Mr. Molotov were ready to talk at 11:30 tomorrow on (A) and (B) the United States delegation would be glad to participate. Mr. Molotov replied as I have indicated.

Bidault thought that my proposal needed preliminary clarification by the deputies on all the various agreements and disagreements of the German discussion and suggested that the deputies reach an agreement on that before the next meeting of this conference. Bevin objected as it gave the deputies the authority to determine when the next meeting should be. I then proposed, and it was agreed, that the deputies should report at 4 p. m. tomorrow. No further reference was made to the Austrian question. It appears plainly evident to me and to my associates that Molotov’s purpose is as I indicated above. I have avoided a statement or actions which would enable Molotov to claim that I had terminated the conference, because it has been alleged in Soviet propaganda that I am determined that the conference shall not succeed.

Bidault stated, day before yesterday, that he had to leave Wednesday¹⁴ night, but he made no reference to that in today’s discussion. Bevin, I understand, also feels he must return home but he has made no reference at all of this nature. They evidently would prefer that I should take the lead in this matter, but I do not think that the proper action at this particular moment.

I am firmly of the opinion that the United States cannot afford to commit itself to a treaty which contains the Soviet claims to which we disagree, and which are referred to in (A), (B) and (C) above, and it is therefore my intention to stand on that view, though it may force the conclusion of the conference without an Austrian treaty.

The Four-Power Treaty has not again been mentioned but I intend to make a further statement regarding it before the adjournment of the conference. However, I think it is the Soviet intention by its method of amendment to prevent an agreement of this nature which would bring the United States officially or formally into the military picture of Europe in such a manner.

Signed George C. Marshall”

[

Marshall

]

10. In telegram 1039, Secdel 1484, April 23, to Moscow, Acting Secretary Acheson reported as follows:

    “Delsec 1458 was discussed with President this morning. He is entirely in agreement with the conclusions, policy and course of action you are taking. He emphasized he supports you thoroughly and has complete confidence in your judgement.” (740.00119 Council/4–2347)

11. The reference here is to the 39th Meeting of the Council, April 21; see supra.
12. This informal meeting, the 2nd Informal Meeting of the Council session, began at 6 p.m., April 21.
13. The 3rd Informal Meeting of the Council was at 11:45 a.m., April 22 and the 4th Informal Meeting was at 6 p.m., April 22. Regarding these informal meetings, see also telegram 1545, Delsec 1470, April 24, from Moscow, p. 377.
14. April 23.