893.0011/12–2946: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 29—6:10 a.m.]
2198. National Assembly on December 25 adopted the new constitution of China in substantially the same form as it was originally presented to it. There were no changes which alter the theory or substance of the form of government as constituted, though there were several minor changes in the wording of certain articles and some articles were omitted, such as those referring to the location of the capital and making the United Nations Charter an integral part of the constitution.
The Assembly further passed resolutions providing that the new constitution will be enforced on December 25, 1947; that the Government during the next 3 months’ period will draw up election laws and will abrogate all laws now on the statute books which are in violation of the constitution; and that elections themselves must be completed within 9 months. Meanwhile the present Assembly will continue in power until the new one takes office.
It is assumed that the Government will proceed shortly to the reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Yuan for the interim period, and it is not unlikely that an attempt will be made to send emissaries to Yenan to seek Communist cooperation, though recent Communist statements do not suggest there is much hope of success.
In retrospect, the Assembly now seems to have started with very considerable enthusiasm on the part of most delegates who believed that they would, in fact, have a free opportunity of changing the Government-sponsored draft constitution. As it became increasingly apparent that this would not be so, interest flagged in many delegates [Page 666] and many sessions drew less than 50 percent attendance. In the earlier stages of the Assembly there were definite and formidable attempts by certain groups to alter the draft as proposed. The greatest revolt came from the C–C clique and for a time there were indications that it might prove successful. In the end, however, the Generalissimo imposed his will, assisted by almost all other groups and individuals other than the C–C clique, who all joined to oppose the extreme right. The Assembly ended with the Generalissimo in full and confident control of the situation, thus perhaps making it one of his greatest political victories. He now has an opportunity of proving his avowed intention of taking the preliminary steps toward the establishment of a multi-party government for the interim period.
An interesting sidelight on the Assembly was cast by Dr. Sun Fo in a conversation with Nathaniel Peffer. About 2 months ago, Dr. Sun Fo had said that he had come to the conclusion that the Kuomintang was “incorrigible” because its leadership was incorrigible. He was at that time also hopeful about the Communists and their intentions. Peffer saw Sun Fo again a few days ago and the latter’s attitude had changed considerably. He said that what the Assembly had demonstrated was that the party machine controlled by the C–C clique was not the all-powerful organization that it was supposed to be, that Assembly delegates had been shocked into political life by the fact that the revolt came from within the party and not from the outsiders as had previously been assumed would be the case—that even party members could not be trusted to stand without hitching. Dr. Sun felt this was indeed a hopeful sign. He also thought it had taught the Generalissimo the utility and even the necessity of at least listening to minority groups and perhaps even of making substantial concessions to them in order to secure and maintain their support for the purpose of keeping the party machine in line. Dr. Sun had also lost all faith in the Communists because of his negotiations with them in recent weeks, during the course of which he felt that they had completely demonstrated their lack of sincerity and honesty.