Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Yu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, December 1946, 11 a.m.
| Also present: | Col. Caughey |
General Yu Ta-wei opened the meeting by handing a map (attached)89 to General Marshall explaining that it showed the places and dates of Communist attacks. There followed a brief discussion as to recent Communist attacks at various places indicated.
General Yu Ta-wei inquired if General Marshall had received any word as yet from the Communists regarding his question to General Chou. General Marshall replied that he had not. General Yu Ta-wei wished to know if the statement made by the Communist spokesman, Mei I, could be accepted as an answer. He said that this was mentioned in a Yenan broadcast and later an editorial on it was written in the Central News. General Marshall stated that he had noticed the statement but had paid little attention to it; he was still waiting for a formal reply from the Communists. He stated that Dr. Stuart had asked Mr. Tung Pi-wu the question of how long he (General Marshall) was expected to wait for their reply. Mr. Tung had disclaimed any knowledge of the matter. Dr. Stuart asked Mr. Tung, however, to transmit to Yenan the question of how long General Marshall should be expected to wait for an answer.
General Marshall told General Yu Ta-wei that Gerald Sampson, in an interview with him, told of several attacks made by Mao Tze Tung90 and others on General Marshall’s integrity.
General Marshall then stated that, along the line of publicity, the recent report by the Central News of the 4,000 word report of the conference between General Chou and General Marshall that was handed to General Yu Ta-wei was very unfavorable publicity to General Marshall as it put him in the position of being a reporter for the Government. He reminded General Yu that he had hesitated for four or five days before handing over this report as he had not asked—as he had always done before—General Chou’s permission. In this case, General Chou had already left for Yenan. It was not until General Yu Ta-wei brought the Generalissimo’s request that he be permitted to see pertinent portions of the latest meetings, that he turned them over to General Yu.
General Yu Ta-wei stated he was very sorry that this report had leaked out. It was an incorrect report, he stated, since General Marshall had not given him the full text of the minutes. As soon as General Yu Ta-wei received it, it was given to General Chen Cheng91 [Page 585] who, in turn, delivered it to the Generalissimo. General Yu said that he never gives press statements except in regard to communications. He did not know who the “authoritative sources” the press mentioned were.
General Marshall asked General Yu what was happening in the National Assembly. General Yu replied that, aside from the opening meeting, he has not attended the National Assembly but that from all reports everything was proceeding according to schedule. There seems to be some argument which Draft Constitution should be used as a basis for discussion but it is General Yu’s opinion that it would be the PCC draft. In reply to General Marshall’s question if there would be many amendments to the draft, General Yu remarked that it was a free discussion so anything could happen. He asked General Marshall what he believed the chances were of the Communists coming into the National Assembly.
General Marshall stated the only chance of the Communists coming into the National Assembly is for the Government to actually come through with some changes. For instance, if they adopt the present constitution without disrupting it by amendments and tricky phrases the Communists may come in. If a Constitution reasonably in accord with PCC agreements were adopted; the State Council reorganized—leaving vacant seats for the Communists and Democratic League; the reorganization of the Executive Yuan begun; then the Communists would be placed in a rather difficult position.
General Marshall commented that the National Assembly is much less of a “steam roller” procedure than was anticipated. Mr. Beal was favorably impressed and was quite surprised at the freedom of debate. Mr. Beal believes it is a true lesson in the democratic procedure. It originally lacked rules of procedure, but it gradually evolved a normal set of rules. The fact that the Generalissimo was contested personally was unheard of before in China. Now our only trouble lies in that we may find “steam roller” tactics used. General Marshall believed that if the actions of the Assembly could be above suspicion, then most of the criticisms of unilateral actions will cease to have importance. What the Assembly had done so far was what every liberal wanted it to do. General Marshall cited two brands of hope for the Assembly: First, that the Assembly is effective even with the Communists absent. Second, that the Communists be offered the opportunity to return to the Assembly. General Marshall thought it would be best to have the Assembly adopt a Constitution, leave seats open for the Communists in the State Council, begin the reorganization of the Executive Yuan. While that is being done, the Generalissimo should send a representative privately to Yenan to discuss with the Communists, ways of their coming into the National [Page 586] Assembly. That might do the trick. The Generalissimo would want to make a public statement but it was General Marshall’s belief that that would invite the usual Communist reaction of distrust and suspicion. General Marshall stated that the above mentioned actions must be accompanied by a cessation of aggressive actions on the part of the Government. The one trouble with that would be that the Government might resort to much abused “self-defensive” measures. It was General Marshall’s hope that the military leaders would not become involved in retaliation since that would dismiss all chances of the Communists’ participation in the Government.
General Marshall stated he had been informed that much of the pressure had been lifted from the press. He believed that was very encouraging. General Marshall added that, in the past, the Government made the serious mistake of bringing pressure against the highly educated people. These were people who were opposed to military domination and they had been under threat for quite some time. General Marshall believed that if the Assembly operates all right, the pressure is removed from the press, and if the Central News Agency takes a more dignified tone, more rapid approach to democratic procedures could be expected.
General Marshall told General Yu Ta-wei that handbills were scattered over the streets of Nanking yesterday, apparently by Communists. They stated that Generals Marshall and MacArthur92 were bringing Jap officers to Nanking to confer with the Generalissimo. It was General Marshall’s belief that this propaganda was strictly for local consumption. He stated that news of this propaganda abroad would do the Communists a great deal of harm. General Yu Ta-wei stated he had not heard of these handbills before.
General Marshall stressed once more that he believed if the Generalissimo made a public statement telling what the National Assembly was doing and inviting the Communists to participate, the Communists would take that as a speech for world consumption and would react against it. On the other hand, if a Government representative went to Yenan and talked over privately the arrangements whereby the Communists could participate then there might be some chance of success in the venture.
General Yu Ta-wei stated he saw the point of General Marshall’s remarks. He wished to know if General Marshall thought there was a 50–50 chance of the Communists accepting. General Marshall did not believe there was that much chance but it would all depend upon the future actions of the Assembly—together with a complete cessation of offensive military actions and statements.
[Page 587]In discussing the liberalization of the Government, General Marshall remarked that the Communists considered the Generalissimo’s appointment of General Yu Ta-wei to Minister of Communications was merely to fill up posts with respected non-party men which were wanted by the Communists.
General Marshall reported that the Generalissimo believed he could end the campaign against the Communists in 8 to 10 months now that he had better roads and communications, and he did not believe that the economic situation was too bad so long as the agrarian population could back him. General Marshall disagreed entirely with this view, stating that the Executive Yuan had now more than ever before pressed him for loans. In the past the agrarian population probably saved China from a complete collapse for several months but that could not continue indefinitely. General Marshall recently received word that two loans he had requested for China, the Canton–Hankow RR loan, and the Yellow River Bridge loan, had been turned down by the Eximbank.93 He stated that both he and the State Department had recommended approval of these loans but the bank had stated there was “not sufficient prospect of amortization” to justify the loan. General Marshall assured General Yu that he would investigate the reasons for its being turned down and try to have the loans reconsidered. He commented that this was the first time that the Bank had turned down a recommendation of his. He explained to General Yu Ta-wei that in the past he had had great difficulty in convincing the Bank that it should pass the general loan since they were up against great political pressure and were accountable to Congress for their actions and there was severe condemnation of the Kmt Government corruptions.
General Marshall cited examples of coal shortages to General Yu. He mentioned that this was a specific example of how hard it would be for the Government to eliminate the Communists in a few months. He cited figures from a detailed coal report on the Tientsin–Chinwangtao Railroad, illustrating the effect of Communist sabotage in a supposedly occupied region.
General Yu Ta-wei said he was quite troubled that the Eximbank had turned down the two loans recommended by General Marshall and did not understand the reason given. The two loans had nothing to do with present military campaigns, the Canton–Hankow RR being far to the south and needed to send rice to the Kiangsu area and supplies, such as salt, to the Canton area. The Yellow River Bridge is quite old and cannot stand up for many more years. If it should collapse, there would be no place to cross the Yellow River.
General Marshall explained that it was the character of the Kuomintang Government and the open corruption in it that was the [Page 588] trouble, as well as the militaristic policy of the Government. He was investigating the reasons behind the recent refusal of the Eximbank to grant loans but stated that in the past the National Advisory Council and the Bank had agreed to loan money only to a China that had achieved peace and evident reforms in the Government. In the meantime he believed General Yu should try to obtain from UNRRA some of the minor materials needed for communications, such as ties and rails. General Yu stated that UNRRA had already allocated nearly all of the money it was to expend in China, but that he would send a representative to talk to the UNRRA officials.