Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall, Mr. Carsun Chang, and Dr. Lo Lung-chi at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, October 28, 1946, 10:30 a.m.
| Also present: | Col. Hutchin |
Mr. Carsun Chang, referring to the meeting yesterday afternoon in which Mr. Lo Lung Chi had participated, said that he considered it most important for the Third Party to obtain a list of Communist delegates to the National Assembly to present to the Government. He felt this was essential if they are going to be able to make their three-article proposal acceptable to both sides. However, the Third Party is confronted with a situation where the Government does not wish to make any further concessions than already enunciated in the eight-point statement of the Generalissimo, the night of 16 October. Mr. Chang said that if the Government does not make any political concessions, the suggestions of the Third Party will be considerably less acceptable to the Communists. The Communists felt that they must insist upon the reorganization of the Executive Yuan prior to designating their delegates to the National Assembly.
Dr. Lo Lung Chi also thought that the Government attitude was rather stiff and formal; that the Government was unwilling to make any concessions on the political side. If the Government expects the [Page 442] Communists to give up their army, which is the basis of present day Communist power, then the Government must make some political concessions which would insure broadening the basis of the Government and participation therein by representatives of other parties.
General Marshall reiterated that the Communists maintain a position to the effect that they do not dispute the provisions of 25 February Agreement though a modification in Manchuria is required. The Government is asking for more changes. The Communists claim that they were excused from not complying with the 25 February Agreement, insofar as furnishing the list of their military units and their locations is concerned, because of the fighting in Manchuria. The Communists maintain that they wish to stop the fighting and that they wish to adhere, generally, to the 25 February Agreement.
The Communists make a strong demand that both sides adhere to the 10 January agreement. Since May, they have demanded unconditional cessation of hostilities, but according to the Communists, the Government always makes conditions. That is, the Government states certain conditions precedent to a cessation of hostilities. This encourages the Communists to counter with other conditions or arguments, usually of a political nature.
At first, the Government conditions or provisos were relative [ly] simple, but they served to complicate getting a cessation of hostilities order issued. Except for the locations and dispositions of troops, which are always more or less complicated, the Generalissimo’s demand that in all cases of dispute or disagreement, which formerly required unanimous vote, the American should cast the deciding vote. Later there came the local government issue in northern Kiangsu, concerning Chengteh, the Tsingtao–Tsinan Railroad, and Antung.
Now the Government brings to the front the demands of late August and September for the designation by the Communists of their delegates to the National Assembly as a condition precedent to an armistice. That brought up the Communists’ insistence on the convening of the Constitutional Draft Committee. It looked like it was going to be impossible to get any of the agreements finalized, but if we could turn to one thing and get that one thing agreed to, perhaps then other items or issues such as the cessation of hostilities could be settled. It was then that General Marshall and Dr. Stuart brought up the proposal for the informal Five Man Committee to meet and settle issues pertaining to the organization of the State Council. They then got more and more into the political situation, always keeping in the back of their minds the Communist demand for unconditional cessation of hostilities. The designation of the Communist delegates to the National Assembly and the local government problem in Manchuria remained as unsettled issues.
[Page 443]Carsun Chang considered that it might be possible for local government issues to be settled by the State Council. He thought that it would even be possible to settle the Manchurian army problem insofar as the Communists were concerned, if the Communists could participate in local governments.
Dr. Lo Lung Chi emphasized that the Communists’ main wish was to carry out the PCC resolutions in accordance with PCC procedure and to afford protection to the PCC resolutions so as to not permit unacceptable revisions.
General Marshall emphasized that was exactly what he talked about yesterday, i. e., procedure. He emphasized that avoidable delays in proceeding to the business of the National Assembly would be fatal to the continuance of an armistice. It was an impractical proposition to assume that the Government could be reorganized in a few weeks time. In addition, the Third Party must be extremely careful to avoid submerging the crux of the issues in a mass of details or allowing themselves to be side-tracked in the matter of getting agreement on a particular detail.
Dr. Lo Lung Chi felt that what the Generalissimo wanted most was the National Assembly to meet as scheduled. Dr. Lo felt that the Communists had broken many of their promises, but that the Generalissimo had broken even more. This made the Third Party possibility of success remote. The Third Party wanted a democracy, at least an elementary stage of democracy.
General Marshall then explained again for the benefit of Carsun Chang and Lo Lung Chi what was meant by “a coalition government”. Mr. Chang considered that a democracy would best give protection to principles for which the Third Party stood. He wanted protection for the liberal press and freedom of speech. It seems that the more military power the Kuomintang Party acquired or the stronger its army became, the less democratic the government was. The Generalissimo was a dictator and had been a dictator for almost 20 years. He was accustomed to complete and unquestioned authority. Even if the State Council were established, and according to protocol allowed a meeting once every two weeks, it would be very easy for the Generalissimo to set the State Council aside and ignore it.
Dr. Lo Lung Chi said he was tired of the corruption which existed now in the Executive Yuan. He thought probably some new man should take over the job of running the Government; a new man with a new psychology. The Executive Yuan was the only real power in the Government and it should be reorganized. The State Council in itself would not be strong enough to rid the Executive Yuan of its incompetence and corruption. It took seven years alone to get rid [Page 444] of H. H. Kung.25 Maybe it is because the Soviet Union and the United States are not on such good terms that the Generalissimo felt he will always have the support of the United States Government through thick and thin.
General Marshall stated that the Government officials had been disillusioned and discouraged considerably in that belief. He realized there was this feeling that the United States would have to go along with the Kuomintang Party government, but it had been stated that this was a decided misconception. He felt that they had been disabused by virtue of the fact that they haven’t been receiving military supplies or munitions from the United States for many months.
Dr. Lo Lung Chi thought that the reorganization of the Executive Yuan must come first, even before the National Assembly. The time between now and 12 November was inadequate. However, if the Executive Yuan were reorganized and the National Assembly convened, the stage would be set to have a fair election. There would be little use in having an election which could be controlled by one party. It was important to reorganize the Executive Yuan if the other parties were to have a chance. Right now, the Minister of the Interior controls the police, gestapo, secret service, etc. There would be no one in the Executive Yuan to check on the elections until such time as the Government would be reorganized.
Mr. Carsun Chang had told some of the Government leaders that they must slow down their military campaign; that they are only making the situation worse. The chances of success in Third-Party mediation were very limited. It might even be necessary for the Third Party delegates to go on back to Shanghai. It was of great importance that they get some political concessions from the Government; that the Government should give up their attitude of being the victor over the vanquished. He again said that the people think the United States is forced to support the Government because of Soviet foreign policy.
Dr. Lo Lung Chi told General Marshall that he could never realize what China and the Chinese people thought of him and his influence. It was tremendous. It was felt that General Marshall and the influence of the United States could help China become democratic. As to reorganization of the Executive Yuan, the Government should give up seven or eight seats, three to five of which could be ministers without portfolio. The Communists want two ministers, the Democratic League wants one, and possibly the non-party group should have one, making a total of four non-Kuomintang ministers with portfolio which, added to four ministers without portfolio, makes the total of eight.
- Former Vice President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Finance.↩