Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, July 17, 1946, 10:45 a.m.
| Also present: | Mr. Chang |
| Colonel Caughey | |
| Captain Soong |
General Marshall: I would like to ask you a question first. Are you going to Shanghai this afternoon?
General Chou: Yes.
General Marshall: At what time?
General Chou: Half past four.
General Marshall: Then are you going to Kaifeng?
General Chou: Yes, sir. This morning Mr. Todd, the Yellow River engineer, telephoned me saying he, Mr. Todd, had seen the chief of the Yellow River Conservancy Committee, Mr. Hsueh. Mr. Hsueh said the Government at this moment is not very interested in the diversion of the water since the Government does not want to wash out the railroad over the old bed. Therefore, Mr. Hsueh is afraid that he cannot do much. Mr. Todd asked me to tell you about this. He said Mr. Hsueh is afraid he cannot do much before three or four months. Mr. Todd asked me to tell you that because on the one hand we are afraid a diversion of the water will over-flood the Communist area, on the other hand the Government is afraid that the diversion of water will cut the railroad and interfere with troop movements. Mr. Todd is interested in the diversion from a technical standpoint. If we are still willing to help him along that line, I think I should further talk it over with Mr. Todd and Mr. Hsueh and maybe we will decide in Shanghai whether the trip to Honan is necessary or not.
Another question is whether the Government would accept the field team idea for the Yellow River. If such a field team could be set up the work of the Yellow River can be entirely divorced from political and military influences. I hope that this idea meets the approval of the Government. UNRRA seems to want the water diverted. As to the Government’s attitude, it is not yet very clear and I have to find out.
General Marshall: I was aware of the Government’s attitude—that the military had objected to turning the water into the old bed [Page 1372] because it might cut the railroad. This is now the only means of connection since the Yellow River Bridge is out. However, Mr. Todd proposed that they put only half the water in the old bed and half would remain in the present bed, which he felt would reduce the hazard to the Communist area and would reduce the hazard to the railroad crossing.
The civilian official on the Government side will have little authority in the matter. The military on the Government side has stated their opposition to approval. Now, I did not wish to take up with the Government their decision until I knew whether or not the Communists were going to oppose the same thing. If I found the Communists could go along with Mr. Todd, then I proposed to take up with the Government what I think is an unjustified military objection. In that matter I speak, not merely as a mediator, but as a representative of the people who are giving the money to do this thing—to increase the productivity of the Chinese farmers, to lessen the necessity of the United States sending food to China, to avoid the suffering of the people in the flooded areas. As the matter now stands the Government military authorities object, but nothing has been said to them with regard to their objection. I propose to say it, but only if I find that the Communist[s] are willing to proceed on the basis of half the water being turned back into the old bed.
In view of these circumstances I would like for General Chou to come to a decision, so that I can know whether or not I should see the Generalissimo on this subject.
General Chou: This question is rather a complex one because it forms a chain of factors, each depending on the other. You just asked me to make a decision, but my decision depends very much on the attitude and position of the Government. The reason why I have to make trips to Shanghai is just to try to get information on this matter. In order that the old bed will not suffer from any possible damage of overflooding, it is essential that the Government will provide the necessary money and supplies for the repair work. If the Government is not interested in the progress of this work then it can stop the issue of money and if possible all supplies. If the Executive Yuan stops paying the money then there would be no means to displace the hundreds of thousands of inhabitants in the old Yellow River bed. Therefore, as a prerequisite, the Government must also give a decision to carry out this project. We had hoped that all this could have been settled the day before yesterday, but since not all things have been solved another meeting will take place tomorrow. For that purpose Mr. Todd invited Mr. Hsueh of the Water Conservancy Commission to participate, but Mr. Hsueh’s reply indicates that he does not see any benefit from his own attendance. [Page 1373] The reason Mr. Todd invited Mr. Hsueh to attend was partially because, on day before yesterday, Dr. Tsiang of CNRRA stated that it is Mr. Hsueh’s responsibility to press the Government to pay the money. Now, you asked me to make a decision. My decision depends on many concrete factors and circumstances. I just learned last night that the work along the river in our area has already entered into the second phase. It depends now almost entirely on the rate of money and supplies to be sent in. If we can solve this question satisfactorily tomorrow and if definite assurance is given to the timely delivery of money and supplies, then I will certainly go up to Honan to inspect the field there in order to reach a decision. Mr. Green of UNRRA told me yesterday that a part of the population in the newly overflooded area comes under Communist control, which amounts to about one million people, and they have also reclaimed a part of the flooded area for farming. Therefore, if the new areas should be overflooded again that would certainly be against the interest of the Communist people. What we want to achieve now is that there will be no overflooding in the Shantung area and very little flooding in the new area. It is very complicated for me to make a decision. If the Government has full intent to cooperate and coordinate with the Communists, then everything can be worked out satisfactorily.
General Marshall: I understand your embarrassment in answering my question and I did not expect you to give me an answer now. I understand the number of factors that are related to your possible decision—money and food; but I did not wish to move in and press the Generalissimo to overthrow the army decision if I were then going to find that you would oppose the continuation of the project. I think that the civilian agencies, however much they might be interested in continuing the project, have no power whatsoever in the face of military objections: Therefore, unless they see some possibility of the military withdrawing its objections, there is no good purpose in their proceeding with their plans. At the same time I cannot inform them that I intend to try and overthrow the military decision. I would not try to do this unless I felt reasonably certain that there would be agreement on the Communist side. I think that explains my point of view, except I might emphasize a little more, the fact that the civilian agencies have to stand aside for the military decision at such times as these.
General Chou: I would like to ask whether you have heard about the latest report from Kunming concerning the assassination on July 11 of Mr. Li, a figure of the Democratic movement. That is not yet settled. On July 15 Professor Wen of the Chinghua University was assassinated and an attempt was made to assassinate his son. Professor [Page 1374] Wen was also a leader of the Democratic League in Kunming. He was instantly killed, while his son was very badly wounded.
Regarding the first case, Mr. Li was killed with a noiseless gun, apparently turned over to the Chinese at the time when the SACO35 organization was existing, so even the police did not hear any sound of the firing.
Professor Wen was an American-returned student and a poet, and an intimate friend of Dr. Hu Shih.36
Now, the Kuomintang has all the power within its hands, still they resort to the method of assassination in dealing with the democracy-minded people. That is most treacherous and the method is characteristic of fascist countries. All the Chinese people feel bitterly resentful of such action, and I feel completely speechless after hearing this news. Seeing that the Kuomintang is resorting to such methods, how can we continue the negotiations and talk about democracy? As you know, the Democratic League has nothing else except a few magazines and no papers.
According to the plan of the secret police that we learned, they will take up such methods in Chungking, Chengtu and Shanghai. Many Democratic Leaguers are put on the black list. When the Kuomintang is fighting the Communist[s] with force that is still comprehensible because both parties are armed, but the Democratic Leaguers are entirely unarmed. The rights of democratic movements are not only the desire of the Chinese people but also the desire of the Allied Nations, as expressed by President Truman.
This does not come within the scope of our negotiations, but it is of a serious nature. With such things going on there will be absolutely no assurance of the realization of the PCC decision. Right now the lives of all democracy-minded people are jeopardized, not only the lives of the Communist Party members.
General Marshall: I received a report of the assassination from the American Consul in Kunming, merely the fact of the assassination. Also a report that he had taken into the Consulate certain people who had appealed to him for protection, and he was giving them shelter in the American Consulate in Kunming. I had the Embassy working on the matter with the Government yesterday. The news of the second assassination I heard for the first time from General Chou, and I share with him the same shock and horror that he expresses. The action being taken by the American Embassy cannot bring those men back to life; however, I suspect that it will have a very forceable effect toward restraining repetitions because of the clamor that will be raised, and particularly because of the [Page 1375] inevitable reaction of the outside world. The Government does not have to be told what would be the result of the spread of such procedure. I can only hope that the assassinations are the result of local bitterness and of a local decision. As I have understood, there has been trouble of this kind in Kunming for a long time. Just as I came to China there were students killed there.
General Chou: I merely want to remind you of this, that since the PCC a series of incidents happened such as the bloodshed in the mass rally in Chungking, the destruction of the Shangwan newspaper, the assassinations in Si an and Nantung, and the railroad incident here. None of these incidents were properly handled by the judiciary organ or by the Government authorities. The Government did not even make sharp denunciation of these incidents. On the contrary sometimes the Government tried to evade the incidents with the result that the secret police are being encouraged with a free hand. On the other hand, the plan of the secret police is not only made for Kunming alone. Mr. Chen Li Fu is himself now in Shanghai organizing the secret police work. Now they have organized a group of assassins called the Po Lang Unit. This is an historical phrase. In the days of the old Ming Dynasty a Chinese scholar by the name of Po Lang, being a weak person, could not commit assassinations himself so he organized a group of husky fellows to assassinate for him. That is how it got its name. I am afraid that if the Kunming incident is not fairly and satisfactorily settled then similar incidents will take place in Shanghai, Chungking and other places.
I have learned that such people as Professor Teng Chu Ming, the woman lawyer Miss Shih Liang in Chungking, Mr. Shen Chun-ju, and Professor Lo Lung Chi in Shanghai are all being put on the blacklist. Now here the question arises as to who will render protection to the leading democratic minded people outside the Kuomintang and the Communist Parties. We are all aware that a strong and large group of democratic minded people in the middle between the Kuomintang and Communist Parties would greatly facilitate the achievement of unity and the settlement of the various issues.
Should such incidents as I refer to above continue to occur then the democratic minded individuals would either flee away to the Communist areas or they would give up their efforts. The only hope for some of them is that the United States would give them protection. It already happened, that in Kunming they have asked protection of the American consulate and somewhere else similar things will take place. It is a most tragic thing to China that the Chinese themselves cannot have protection of their lives. I am afraid that somebody [Page 1376] will propose that another Executive Headquarters be created to take care of the protection of the democratic movement.
General Marshall: In other words, as one agency dies, another must be created.
Confidentially, I am going to have Dr. Stuart and Mr. Butterworth to lunch—first, in order to get the last reports from Kunming and next to see what we might do with the situation.
Has General Chou any comments concerning my proposal for a possible adjustment of the local administrative problem based on localities occupied as of V. J. day? Does he see any possibility in such an approach?
General Chou: Once the political question is touched upon, it is very difficult for me to think of any likely possibility. Yesterday I did not have time to comment on that. The reason I think that there is little possibility is due to the fact that the political protection is getting less and less while the armed hostilities are enlarging day by day. Therefore I confront greater and greater difficulty in convincing my people with regard to the North Kiangsu formula. The Kuomintang has also made some proposal along the line of your suggestion. They brought it up as far back as before the PCC. Touching such a formula immediately gets the whole thing involved. You may recall that after VJ day the Kuomintang, with the assistance of American air transport and sea transport, entered many cities besieged by the Communist troops. Of course there are also other cities which they did not succeed in entering. Due to this fact, a civil war broke out in the fall of last year. After your arrival, because you advocated unconditional cease fire and you also supported democracy, we dropped the subject of arguing about the right to participate in accepting surrenders. You will recall that in our first few talks I still mentioned the Communist rights to participate in surrender and you also mentioned that that question should be settled sometime. Later on, since the PCC concluded successfully, I dropped entirely that subject on our own accord because I thought that as soon as the political machinery is democratized, I could voluntarily restore our claims in this matter. As the matter now stands however the hope for political democracy is getting dimmer and dimmer. Adoption of the Kuomintang’s point of view on the acceptance of surrender would mean that all areas taken over by the Communists after VJ day should be turned over to the Kuomintang. This would arouse bitter resentment among the Communist people. So, I do not find it wise to bring up this subject to them.
There is also this consideration which makes that proposal impracticable. As a matter of fact, before the Japanese surrender the [Page 1377] Japanese only occupied a part of the Kiangsu cities and a few communication lines, while the outskirts and the villages were occupied by Communists’ regular and guerrilla forces. The Communists have now established their own civil administration in places evacuated by the Japs. That not only refers to the places presently under Communist control but also to many places now being occupied by Nationalist troops, including south of the Yangtze River and Che-kiang. But we voluntarily evacuated the area south of the Yangtze River. Now, should the places then occupied by the Japanese be turned over to the Nationalist forces we would have a similar situation as in Shantung in relation to the puppet troops—that is the Nationalist and Communist troops would be in very close contact with each other and fighting is bound to occur all the time. Therefore, that seems not to make a practicable solution.
Another point which is even more important is that since the Communist evacuation of Changchun you may have noticed that the military formula worked out by you was almost completely acceptable to the Communists after I made efforts to persuade our own people. This was sufficient to constitute a basis for the issuance of a cease-fire order. Of course, that was not the wish of the Generalissimo. He tried to achieve his aims by force and intimidations and to force the Communists to make further concessions. Being placed in such a cornered position, the Communists would rather resist attack than to capitulate because if they capitulate to the demands of the Generalissimo, then his demands would go higher and higher.
General Marshall: As to the situation in Kiangsu, General Yu had no additional information this morning. Later, he will give me a complete disposition and as much information as they have on the Communists. The important aspect in this is that the Government is firmly convinced that the Communists consolidated their troops in a powerful effort to destroy its troops. In other words, the Communists by an aggressive action have precipitated general hostilities in Kiangsu. On the other side you have presented your view that the Government was about to launch a heavy attack and, as I understood you to say, the Communists acted in order to disorganize that attack. Here is a situation, as I see it, where each side accuses the other of exactly the same thing.
General Chou: General Chou said that after going back yesterday he checked on the place, Hsuanchiapao, upon which General Yu had said the main Communist attack was centered. General Chou found that that was under Communist control previously and if fighting took place that means the Government forces have driven out the Communist forces. Of course he has received no information about fighting in that particular place.
[Page 1378]General Marshall: You referred yesterday to General Tang En-po’s order which provided that the troops should be in position on July 14 for an attack on the 15th. Did you see such an order or do you care to tell me.
General Chou: I said that I know for certain that there is such an order. I received a copy of that order, although I didn’t see the original. I said that the copy is correct because the designations that were used are all based on the new designations. For example, the 49th division was originally the 49th army; 105th brigade was originally the 105th division; 25th division was originally the 25th army; 21st division was originally the 21st army; 69th division was originally the 69th army; the 74th division was originally the 74th army. The one exception is the 83rd division which was originally the 100th army. The change is due to the fact that after the reorganization there will only be 90 Nationalist divisions so the 100th division will most probably be a Communist division. This is the first time they used the new designations in operations. The 74th division was originally used to garrison Nanking city, but now most of it has been sent across the river while the 18th army which is now called the 18th division will be sent from Wuhan down to Nanking. The 18th division being under the command of General Chen. In the same order they also referred to the deployment of the 5th air force group and the naval vessels. This order is the first operation order of the First Pacification Area which is under the command of General Tung.
General Marshall: I would appreciate your sending me a copy of that order to use as I see fit.