Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume IX

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Meeting of the Acting Committee of Three at Hankow, May 5, 1946, 6 p.m.

Hankow, May 5, 1946, 6 p.m.

• The following were present:
  • National Government:
    • Gen. Hsu Yung-chang
    • Col. Peter Pee
  • Communist Party:
    • Gen. Chou En-lai
    • Mr. Chang
  • United States:
    • Gen. Henry A. Byroade
    • Capt. Jack T. Young

Gen. Byroade: “I am afraid I am rather junior to be a member of such a distinguished Committee. But I suppose to follow our custom and for smooth operation, I should act here as temporary chairman. I find that in the type work we are doing the American usually ends up in the undesirable position of being in the middle.

“This meeting today is a little different from anything we have had before because we are here to discuss a problem which has not been reported by the field team and of which the two gentlemen present know more, I am sure, than the Executive Headquarters does or than I do. It seems to me, though, that there are certain things here that we can logically discuss this afternoon. One is the general situation that brought this committee here. Another is the proper disposition of the field team that we brought, to make sure that it is used properly; and another is the schedule for this committee—what shall be our activities. So, from now on, I would like to listen and see if I can learn more of this situation myself. I would like to ask General Hsu if he would like to make the opening comments.”

(General Hsu declined and indicated that General Chou should speak first.)

Gen. Chou (CP): “The reports submitted by the field team here are based only on the information they have received and the problems they have had to undertake. However, they are sending more recent information they have received and we have also received certain information through General Lee and through Yenan. I would like to make a few comments on that. Regarding the Communist area to the north of Hankow, it is different from other areas in the sense that it is entirely surrounded by Govern[ment] troops on all sides. As General Hsu may not have familiarized himself with this situation, I have submitted two overlays to show the disposition.¹⁷ This overlay was prepared by the Communist Party Branch of the Executive Headquarters; and General Byroade has, I am sure, seen these charts.

“You can see the disposition of the troops that are surrounded. This situation was reported to the Committee of Three when it made the last trip. The field team has also conducted several investigations, particularly to the east of the railway. The field team has also inspected a part of the area to the west of the railway. Since the Communist area[s] are surrounded by the Government troops, which amount to 11 armies in the adjacent area of that territory, of course the Communist troops feel they are in constant danger, and it is an actual fact that such danger exists. The Government troops have repeatedly made advances and some places have been occupied by the Government troops. That is the reason for the fear.

“Of those 11 armies, only one is stationed rather far away in the southwest part of Honan. As to the rest, they are in the neighboring Communist area. This is, in general, the situation with respect to this area.

“Previous to the Cease Fire agreement, an agreement was reached between the Government and the Communist Party in October of last year, in which the Communist Party promised to evacuate their troops from this subject area and, even when the Cease Fire agreement was signed, the Communists again stated that they would lift their troops in that area. The Army Reorganization Plan was made accordingly. Because this is a big area—with about 60,000 Communist forces involved—of course, there is some difficulty involved in the evacuation of those troops.

“It has been pointed out that the personnel in this area have come down from the North. Since demobilization has to be carried out and because of political complications, it would not be possible for those northerners to stay in this area, and their families and dependents will have to go with them. So it would be best if those 60,000 people could evacuate at an early date; particularly as food is getting very scarce. Under the present circumstances, food is exceedingly scarce and there is a massing of troops, both on the Communist side (because they are all concentrated in this area) and also on the part of the Government troops that surround this area.

“At the time the Committee of Three came to Hankow, it was suggested that the Communist troops be evacuated from here to the north or to the east. However, the Government side feels that such evacuation would cause confusion among Government troops. Since it will take 80 days, many complications are involved. When the Committee of Three went back to Chungking, the question of evacuation was again discussed with General Chang, who replied that it can be done only during implementation of the Army Reorganization Program.

“Since the second plan discussed was not agreed upon, they arranged a third procedure—that is, to try to adjust the food problem. A loan has been made by the Government side of 400,000,000 to the Communists, which will be reimbursed in North China. The loan is not sufficient to solve the food problem, and the food problem still exists. Eventual evacuation seems indispensable. It has been reported recently by the Government side that the Communists have not used this money to buy food, but to buy munitions. In reply to this report, I can assure you that it is not true. Our troops are quite well equipped and they have enough weapons and munitions. Since they have to be demobilized there is no need for them to buy munitions. The population in this area are very poor, and in order to procure food, they have to pay for it. I can state definitely that that report is not true.

“Furthermore, this area differs from the other areas in the respect that an effort has been made to determine the disposition of the troops on both sides. For example, the American representative has reported that statements have been made where each regiment is stationed or where its unit is. In this area, we have a definite picture of the disposition of troops. In case there is some trouble, however, it is very difficult to establish the true fact.

“After the latest developments, the situation has been aggravated due to the fact that toward the end of April the following has been reported: First, in certain places the Government troops have been massed or moved so that the Communist forces feel themselves to be in danger. For example, the 72nd Army has massed two divisions in the neighborhood of Macheng, and it has also been reported this afternoon that some hostilities have taken place in that area. In addition to that, the 80th Army has massed its troops around Ho Kou. The American representative has also reported that hostilities ceased after the trip by the Committee of Three. But right now, the hostilities have again been resumed. The people who came back yesterday from Communist headquarters reported that they also heard gun fire on the way back, so this is proof that some fighting is still taking place. As we know, to the west of that place, the 80th Nationalist Division is stationed. The 50th division of the 72nd Army is stationed to the North. We know that some concentration of troops has taken place there. Coming to the second part of the railroad, we also found some massing of troops and we heard about troop movements. For example, the 6th division of the 71st Army has undertaken movement toward Hankow. It was also reported that in the last few days troops have been sent to the northward from Hankow. No report has been given to the field team about those movements, despite the fact that the field teams are supposed to be notified of troop movements and the approval of the field teams obtained. We find, in general, toward the end of April, movement of troops and concentration of troops, as well as attacks.

“Regarding the attacks made toward the end of April, we received reports from several sides that the Government has made advances. For example, the 72nd Army has occupied Ho Kou and surrounded the Communist troops to the south of Ho Kou. It had been determined by the field team previously that the area was under Communist control. Furthermore, it has been reported that attacks have been launched from Hsin Yang eastward and that an attack was undertaken by the 72nd division of the 66th Army. Other fighting to the west of the railroad has also been reported.

“In addition to the attacks made by the regular troops, there are also disturbances caused by the bandits. If those bandits have entered the Communist area and have been annihilated then, of course, there will be no further consequences. Sometimes the bandits were repelled, but the Communists could not go beyond their boundary lines, so that the bandits continue to make repeated provocations against the Communists. Sometimes it has been determined that these “bandits” were disguised Government troops. Another problem is the purchase of food. Since it is not possible to buy all the necessary food within the Communist area, certain places have been designated where the Communists may go out to buy food. The number of persons sent out for that purpose is very small and they are clothed in civilian clothes. Still they have been arrested by Government troops or mishandled so it was not possible for them to carry out their mission. Those instances have been reported to the field team as well as to the local authorities.

“Another point which the American representative reported is the agreed deportation of about 1,000 Communist sick and wounded to the North. Arrangements have been set up for their deportation because those sick and wounded cannot be well taken care of under the present situation. The date of departure has been fixed for the first days of May. Now on account of the repatriation of the Japanese, that matter has to be delayed. This delay has increased the uneasiness of the Communists.

“In view of these circumstances, the Communist troops are afraid that a general offensive will be launched against them, and, in addition, we know that the situation in Manchuria is serious and the situation in China proper is also not stable.

“Toward the end of April, we received information, both from General Lee and from other sources that a certain representative of the National Military Council was making preparations to annihilate the Communist troops in this area. According to this plan, disguised bandits and staged civilian disturbances will be organized in that area and cause great confusion. In any case, the Communist troops will try to resist and to force a way out of the encirclement. This information has been received both in this area as well as in Hsuchow and was further confirmed by Yenan, which learned that orders to this effect have been issued to the Nationalist troops. In addition, we have evidence of a troop movement so that everything indicates that the situation in this area has become serious. I immediately approached General Hsu and he told me he was not aware of this situation, but that he would report it to the Generalissimo. I wired General Marshall and he inquired about this matter. This was the situation yesterday morning. Therefore, when I saw General Marshall yesterday, I told him that I felt much worried about this area, because we have learned that an offensive would be launched between May 4th and May 9th, and I hoped that such an unfortunate incident would not occur, because these would cause undesirable consequences for both parties if such an unfortunate incident took place. Since our area is very small, we would have to take defensive measures. We would lose many troops and then our troops in other areas would deem this to be a start of a new large-scale civil war. It would affect the situation in North China. On the other hand, when we are fighting with the bandits, the Government may deem that we have endeavored to try to force our way out of this area. They would try to stop the Communist troops. This would also affect other areas. So far as I have learned, preparations have already been made on the Lunghai railway to stop any eventual movements of Communist troops. In that case, the fighting would become very fierce. In either case, it would be bad and therefore it appears to me that the best way is for the situation here to be stabilized. On our side, if we really intended to force our way out of this area, then I would not need to take care of this. I would just leave it alone. Since I have come to try to solve this matter, it shows that we still intend to solve the problem of the movement of the Communist troops by negotiation. On the Government side, if they will send a representative down here to solve the matter, it will appear that the Government desires that no such incident should happen.

“After talking with General Marshall, he told me that General Hsu was prepared to come down with me. I appreciate it. As we know General Hsu is very able, and is quite an old man. He nevertheless takes the trouble to come down here, and I appreciate it. Since we are now in Hankow I hope we will take effective measures to stabilize the situation here, as it is rather complicated. We can hear the report of the field teams as well as the local military authorities. I further propose that we go north to the Communist headquarters. We can come back to Hankow to work out some arrangement for this area. Of course, it is a rather bad trip if we go by truck, but in my opinion that is the best way to do. We should decide later as to the arrangements. Of course, both sides should make no attacks. Places occupied since January 13 should be evacuated. The most important thing, of course, is that the field team should not permanently stay in Hankow but should inspect all points of conflict. This committee cannot proceed to all those places, so we hope the field teams will inspect those areas, determine the disposition of the troops and investigate the hostilities, as well as the complications involved in the purchase of food, so that the whole situation can be stabilized.

“I think it might be advisable to have 3 field teams in this area: one in Hankow; the second in the Hsuan Hwa Tien area; and the third one in Hsin Yang. After another month, I think, when the Army Reorganization plan is going to be implemented, of course, the Communist troops in this area can be moved away so that the problem will no longer exist.”

Gen. Byroade: “I would like here, for purposes of the record, to correct what is most likely a misunderstanding in the presentation today. The fighting northeast of Hankow that was reported by the American member of the team was sent in as a Communist report. It was not a team report, or an American report, because the team has not gotten out there. Also, when General Chou refers to reports of violations here in the last few days, I assume he means reports through his own channels and not through the field team. Is that correct?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Regarding this area, the reports were furnished by the Communist side. Regarding the Ho Kou area, the American member has just reported that some hostilities have taken place and a meeting was held in that area. But because of bad feeling, the problem was not resolved. As to the area west of the railway, information has been submitted by the Communist member but was not brought out in discussion among the field team members.”

Gen. Byroade: “I would like to ask General Hsu if he has any comments.”

Gen. Hsu (NG): “I summarize General Chou’s speech. First, the concentration and movement of Government troops; second, the purchasing of food; third, the disposition of sick and wounded; and fourth, the so-called plan of annihilation. I would like to deal with the first thing first.

“Regarding the alleged accusation that the Government has attacked the Communists. The local commander has provided data to the field team repeatedly regarding Communist attacks on the Government troops from one to seventeen times. The furthest distance for the Communist troops to advance and occupy some places is over 100 kilometers from the original position held on January 13. We have figures and dates and we can make a survey of these, and, regarding the alleged Government troop movement and concentrations, we can also make a survey in different places to see if this is a fact. Right now it may be advisable to ask General Ko (Deputy Director, Wuhan Headquarters of the Generalissimo) to report the disposition of the Government troops. But I would like to point out that those accusations made by General Chou are totally groundless.

“Regarding the second point, the purchasing of food, General Chou said that the Communist personnel, when they come out of their areas are arrested by the Government troops. Regarding that point, General Ko just mentioned the fact that the Communists fail to send designated personnel to the designated area to purchase food, so that the case is just a technical point. General Ko assures me that he will do everything to help the Communists get food. If better liaison can be maintained it will cease to be a problem. If a central market is designated as the place to buy food, the Communists can wire to Hankow, and they can send orders to the local commanders for them to do the purchasing. The purchase of food is connected with the relations between the troops and the civilians. General Ko has showed frankness and sincerity in wanting to help the Communists purchase food, and I will discuss again with him the making of arrangements to prevent further arrests in the future.

“Regarding the sick and wounded, General Ko mentioned to me that he proposed to organize a field hospital to be sent to the Communists but General Lee turned this offer down. Prior to the departure from Nanking, the Generalissimo told me that if the Communists would like to send their sick and wounded to Hankow, we can designate a very good hospital to treat those personnel. With the presence of American medical personnel and personnel from UNRRA in Hankow, the execution of that proposal will relieve the suffering of the sick and wounded personnel of the Communists to a great extent.

“Regarding the fourth thing, the alleged intention of the Government to concentrate over 20 divisions with the idea of annihilating the Communist troops in this area, I had a talk with General Chou on the evening of 1 May. I then assured General Chou that, as I am director of operations, such a movement of troops cannot happen without my knowledge, and I have no information of such movement. I tried to convince General Chou that this alleged report is entirely without foundation. Both sides state their own points of view so that the talk comes to an impasse. The Communists are making the pretext that it is a violation and that the Communists would never do a thing like that. I believe in General Chou’s sincerity and frankness. I propose to General Chou that facts will prove in the next 10 days whether the report [be] true. If it is not true, then that will constitute a proof that I am a trustworthy man and do not intend to cheat. General Chou is still concerned over that report. I know it is not true. I am the Government representative and I have to wire to the Generalissimo about this although I know it is not true, because my counterpart asked me to do something, I must do it. So I did wire to the Generalissimo on that. I hope that we won’t work ourselves up too much or get excited over this false alarm. It seems very unnecessary for the Committee of Three to proceed to the field, so I suggest that we let the field team brought in by General Byroade proceed to observe whether there is any troop movement. I think that will be enough assurance to General Chou.”

Gen. Byroade: “We have heard the very serious situation and charge here presented by General Chou En-lai and a very reassuring answer presented by General Hsu. I would like, in order to expedite our business, to take up the points one by one and see which ones we can readily deal with and get an agreement.

“Taking the specific comments as I have them here, one by one, General Chou’s first point was that all present conflict should be stopped. This, of course, has been agreed to in Chungking and ordered many times in Executive Headquarters. I am confident of sincerity of the two gentlemen here and that they will contact their commanders in this area and enforce the decision to stop all this local conflict that may spread.

“The second point was a suggested move back to the January 13 positions. I would like to raise for your consideration the fact that we have an unusual situation in this area in that respect. On January 23, what we called the Loshan Agreement was signed which fixed the position as of January 23.¹⁸ That was a local agreement made here and has many other provisions. It has been a very satisfactory agreement. This agreement was made here on the ground, before the Executive Headquarters had published its Directive to fix the January 13 positions. The matter came up to the Three Commissioners of Executive Headquarters as to whether we should throw overboard the Loshan Agreement, in view of the instructions then being drafted by Executive Headquarters. In both of these cases, the Executive Headquarters decided that considering all the good points of this agreement and since there was a difference of only 10 days the Loshan Agreement should be left in effect and in this area we should stick to the January 23 position. I would like to ask, therefore, if it is agreeable that we retain that agreement and that in this area, we speak of the January 23 Agreement instead of the January 13 Agreement. Would that be agreeable to General Chou En-lai?”

(Gen. Hsu (NG) spoke first when prompted by General Chou.)

Gen. Hsu (NG): “As the Loshan Agreement was agreed to by both parties, it is suitable and advisable to retain the positions as of January 23.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Directive Number 2¹⁹ was originated before we reached the Loshan Agreement.”

Gen. Byroade: “I think, as a matter of fact, they crossed in the mail.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “With respect to the relation between the Loshan Agreement and Directive 6,²⁰ that is not the crucial problem in this area, because the Communist personnel in this area will be removed to some other place. The present day problem is this—the fighting should be stopped, and reorganization of the Communist troops should be effected. The legal position should be the basis of the disposition of the troops. I realize that it is hard to carry that out. What concerns us at the present moment is whether the fighting is stopped. When we are evacuated, the whole problem will be removed. Regarding any controversy over the January 13 or January 23, I have not received any report.”

Gen. Byroade: “I hope you will explain to General Chou that it is past our dinner time and I am tempted to go through the minor points now, leaving only the big issue for our next meeting, and please remind him that the minutes here become our working Bible for the future. We can bring up the Loshan Agreement at the next meeting or dismiss the matter to be handled by Executive Headquarters.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “I agree.”

Gen. Byroade: “Would General Chou care to have it presented tomorrow or let the Executive Headquarters make a decision?”

Gen. Chou (CP): “Regarding the legal position, I do not deem it so important and I would like to leave it to Executive Headquarters to settle.”

Gen. Byroade: “I can have a list made of the points presented today on which no agreement was reached and we can take them up at another meeting or I can run through the remaining minor points before we have dinner. I would like to leave that up to the other two gentlemen.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “It all depends on the program for tomorrow whether we can continue discussing it.”

Gen. Byroade: “I propose, therefore, that we take up those two matters right now and discuss whether this Committee shall make a trip as proposed by General Chou En-lai. I do not as yet have all the details as to the travel involved. I think we can land a small airplane at Hsin Yang. I am not informed about the condition of travel here, but I understand it is quite difficult because there has been considerable rain. However, I will continue to gather the data for that trip if it is agreed here that it is desirable that this Committee goes. On the matter of the trip, I am certainly agreeable to any agreement that is reached here between General Hsu and General Chou En-lai.”

Gen. Hsu (NG): “I believe there is no necessity for us to make the field trip. I think that since General Chou is concerned over the report of a big Government troop concentration for the purpose of annihilating the Communists troops in this area, it will serve no purpose for us to go to this spot. In any single spot, you can’t find out whether there is a concentration of troops on all four sides. I have assured General Chou that the report is a false alarm. What we need is mutual trust. Then that will facilitate the settlement for this controversy. I share the point of view that teams should travel around in order that both sides will get assurance from the teams that the opposite side is not moving to attack and will feel at ease. By having more than one team to go around on regular schedule, it will clarify all these false alarms.”

Gen. Byroade: “I would like also to say that anywhere that the two generals here may decide that I personally should go, I will be very glad to go. Both of our field teams here are mobile and I have two more American officers coming down Thursday. I say this to give you a picture of what we have available.”

Gen. Chou (CP): “General Hsu says the situation seems not to be serious. But from our people’s point of view, the situation is rather complicated and concerns over 60,000 men. If the situation had not been complicated here, the Army Reorganization plan should have been implemented long ago. This delay shows that there are actually difficulties. Because of the complications involved, there is constant fear on the part of our people that they might be attacked. I believe all General Hsu has told me. We have also to keep in mind that he has received his information from one side and it has been pieced together to give a certain impression. If the Government representative can go himself to the Communist area and reassure them and tell them about the actual outside conditions, that would let the people feel easy in their minds. When we made the previous trip, we traveled mostly to the places under Government control, with the exception of two places under the Communist control. Our people have very poor contact with the outside. If we can go this time, they will have a better picture of what is happening outside. The difficulties involved are in transportation and, so far as the technical side is involved, we should consider again what is the best arrangement to be made, so I suggest that maybe after dinner we have a short meeting to solve that problem.”

Gen. Byroade: “Is that agreeable to General Hsu?”

Gen. Hsu (NG): “We will resume studying the situation afterwards.”

Gen. Byroade: “The Committee of Three was always late for the dinners that were given for them.”

17. Not found attached to file copy.
18. See memorandum by Colonel Caughey, January 26, p. 382.
19. Dated January 20, not printed, but see telegram No. 4, January 25, from Mr. Walter S. Robertson, p. 378.
20. Dated March 22, not printed; it re-emphasized the need to observe the January 10 cease-fire agreement. For text of agreement, see Memorandum by the Committee of Three to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, January 10, p. 125.