740.00119 Control (Japan)/4–1546
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Secretary of State
[Washington,] April 19, 1946.
Mr. Secretary: There are three main points in General MacArthur’s telegram of April 1571 in regard to his relationship to the Far Eastern Commission:
- (1)
- General MacArthur defends his action in approving a draft Japanese constitution, stating that the approval was “personal”. At the same time he contends that he was acting in accordance with a directive implementing the requirement of the Potsdam Declaration that “the Japanese Government remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people”. There is general agreement among concerned American officials (a) that General MacArthur should not have approved the draft constitution; (b) that his defense is not to the point: (c) that in his address to the Allied Council in Tokyo on April 5,72 however, he carried out in a limited but sufficient measure the policy decision of the Far Eastern Commission of March 2073 by indicating that changes in form and detail might result from examination of the draft constitution; and (d) that, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by any further discussion of this matter.
- (2)
- General MacArthur points out that the Far Eastern Commission is a policy making body with no executive powers; that it is not empowered to require prior approval of any action either by the Supreme Commander or by the Japanese Government; and that approval or disapproval of acts of the Japanese Government as a prerequisite of their validity is a function wholly executive in character. General MacArthur makes these points in argument against the Far Eastern Commission’s March 20 policy decision requiring that the Commission “must be given an opportunity to pass upon the final [Page 212] draft of the constitution”. Quite apart from any hairsplitting over a definition between policy making and policy execution, it is believed to have been the clear intent of the Terms of Reference approved at Moscow to give the Far Eastern Commission the prerogative it has asserted to approve or disapprove a new Japanese constitution before final adoption. Otherwise the reservation with regard to changes in the Japanese constitutional structure seems to me to have no meaning. You stated at a press conference on March 12 that “before the Constitution becomes constitutionally effective, it will in some way or other come before the Far Eastern Commission.”
- General MacArthur has, “reluctantly” he states, complied with the Far Eastern Commission directive by indicating in his April 5 address that the final draft constitution would receive “ultimate consideration” by the Allied Powers (Far Eastern Commission), and it is therefore felt that no useful purpose would be served by debating the pros and cons of this situation further. Inevitably questions will rise with regard to the division between policy making and policy executing functions. It seems to me impossible to lay down in advance any broad rule covering cases that will come up and which will have to be decided on their merits. But it will be our intention in examining these cases to give the fullest protection to General MacArthur’s position as the executing authority.
- (3)
- In concluding his telegram General MacArthur argues for “the retention of American influence and American control which has been established in Japan”. General McCoy, I am sure, is as fully aware of his responsibilities in this connection as is General MacArthur. So am I. But we must at the same time bear in mind that the control of Japan is, by agreement, an Allied responsibility.
- General MacArthur’s telegram is a personal message to General McCoy. General McCoy plans to reply with a personal message which will be submitted to us before it is dispatched. In this message there will be no disposition to go into detail as to the merits or demerits of past action. General MacArthur should be assured that we are fully aware here of the need for protecting his position as executive authority and that we are also conscious of the importance of preserving American influence in the control of Japan. In short, concurrence should be expressed with General MacArthur’s general approach to the problem while indicating simply, without legalistic argument, that the Far Eastern Commission’s policy decision of March 20 is in accordance with the Terms of Reference adopted at Moscow and with the policy and position of the Government in the control of Japan.
J[ohn] C[arter] V[incent]