868.014/11–446

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

secret
Participants: Mr. Acheson
Mr. Baxter (NE)
Greek Ambassador

The Greek Ambassador called today to ask for clarification of two points relating to Greek territorial claims which he had discussed last week with officers of the Department. In connection with recent instructions to Ambassador MacVeagh to inform the Greek Government that in the interest of peaceful settlements in the Balkans the US Government would be unable to support the Greek claim for Northern Epirus, the Ambassador wished to know whether this represented any change in the attitude of the Secretary, who, in Paris, according to the Ambassador’s understanding, had assured the Greek Prime Minister that he would see to it that a lack of unanimity among the Council of Foreign Ministers would prevent any final rejection of the Greek claim to Northern Epirus. The Ambassador also wished to know whether the vote on Article One of the Bulgarian Peace Treaty in the plenary session of the Peace Conference would modify in any way the US attitude on the Greek-Bulgarian frontier question.

Discussing the second question, Mr. Acheson said our position in the Council of Foreign Ministers will be the same as in Paris—in other words, this Government will vote in favor of Article One of the Bulgarian Treaty, which provides for no rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier.

On the matter of the Albanian frontier, Mr. Acheson read to the Ambassador an excerpt from a memorandum of conversation30 in Paris in which Mr. Dragoumis, after the Greek claim against Albania had been voluntarily withdrawn by the Greek delegation from the agenda of the Peace Conference, asked the Secretary “merely to leave the matter open on the Council of Foreign Ministers agenda and neither raise it in the near future nor agree to its definite exclusion.” Mr. Acheson explained that he thought the Secretary had meant by this simply that, since the Albanian question had been presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers as long ago as last April, the Greeks wished him to take no initiative in having the matter discussed now, when the atmosphere is unfavorable, but that at the same time he would prevent anyone else from trying to remove the matter from the agenda. Mr. Acheson explained that, though he could not state definitely what the Secretary had in mind, it seemed to him that [Page 259] the Secretary was making no promises about the indefinite future but was referring to his attitude in the near future. Furthermore, if agitation for a discussion of this was continued by the Greeks and they desired it to be discussed soon, as indicated by a recent communication addressed to the Council of Foreign Ministers,31 he did not consider that the Secretary had given any assurances of what his attitude might be under these new circumstances.

The Ambassador said that he had clearly understood from the Secretary that the matter of Northern Epirus would not be discussed for some months, as it needed to await the German and Austrian settlements. However, he reiterated his belief that the Secretary had given assurances that when the question is eventually discussed, he will see to it that Greek claims are not unanimously rejected but the way left open for future decision. He therefore hoped that Mr. Acheson would discuss this matter with the Secretary and inform him of his attitude.

In conclusion the Ambassador said that officers of the Department had recently assured him, in discussing the US attitude towards Greek territorial claims, that the territorial integrity of Greece is of great importance to the US. He wished to know just what that would mean in the event of any possible outside attempt to cut off a part of northern Greece to form a so-called “democratic” unit. Mr. Acheson said that we are pledged to resist strongly any aggressive actions against the territorial integrity of any of the United Nations. There are prescribed methods and procedures of taking action under the United Nations Charter in the case of any such actions and he thought that the immediate steps which we had taken in the case of Azerbaijan,32 and were continuing to take, made clear our attitude on this question.

  1. Incorporated in Mr. Baxter’s memorandum of November 1 to Mr. Henderson, not printed.
  2. By the Greek Ambassador in memorandum 5833, October 30, not printed, but see footnote 22, vol. ii, p. 956.
  3. For documentation on the situation in Iran, see pp. 289 ff. In telegram 9081, November 22, 1946, noon, London reported that the British Foreign Office took a very serious view of the situation along Greece’s northern frontier, fearing particularly a joining of ELAS contingents with Greek and Yugoslav Macedonian bands to form an “Azerbaijan area” (868.014/11–2246).