C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes
United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Eleventh Informal Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, June 21, 1946, 4 p.m.
Present
| U.K. | ||
| Mr. Bevin (Chairman) | ||
| Sir Oliver Harvey | ||
| Mr. Jebb | ||
| Interpreter | ||
| France | U.S.S.R. | |
| M. Bidault | M. Molotov | |
| M. Couve de Murville | M. Vyshinsky | |
| French Official | M. Gusev | |
| Interpreter | M. Pavlov | |
| U.S.A. | ||
| Mr. Byrnes | ||
| Senator Connally | ||
| Senator Vandenberg | ||
| Mr. Bohlen |
Trieste and the Yugoslav Frontier:
Mr. Bevin, the Chairman, said that the subject of discussion of the day was the Italian-Yugoslav frontier.
The Secretary said he had nothing to add in regard to the United States position to what he had already said on this subject.
Mr. Molotov stated the Soviet position had been fully set forth; that they thought that in a dispute between Yugoslavia, an allied country, and Italy, a non-allied country, the desires of the allied country should be satisfied, particularly since its claims were just.
Mr. Bidault said that they were confronted with two choices: either to repeat the old positions, or to make an attempt to find some new solution. If there was willingness to try the second, it might be worth while to explore new possibilities.
The Secretary said that he merely wished to point out that the United States had already receded from its original line and had agreed to accept the French line, and that he was prepared to stand by that concession.75a The French line involves the principle adopted at London and provides the best balance between the minorities. He said he hoped the Ministers could agree on the French line. He added that during the recess the President of the United States had received a letter from de Gasperi, one statement of which he wished to read:
“As for the all important problem of Venezia Giulia, Italy’s stand in favor of the ethical principle of the Wilson line75b is too well known [Page 571] and appreciated to insist on it here. I already had occasion to state that neither my Government nor any other popularly elected Italian Government in the future could sign a peace treaty that gave Trieste and the predominantly Italian part of Venezia Giulia to Yugoslavia. I only want to stress herein that, should the Four fail to reach an agreement on such a basis, Italy is willing to see the question deferred to the Conference of the 21 Powers or, if that fails, to a larger assembly as the U.N.”76
He said he thought events had borne out this statement and if a democratic Italy was forced to sign a peace treaty giving up Trieste, it would greatly strengthen the hands of the monarchist and fascist elements in Italy which no one of us wished to do.
Mr. Bevin said that the British Government had reviewed this question most carefully and there appeared to be only two choices: to leave Trieste to Italy; or give it to Yugoslavia. Like the United States, Great Britain was prepared to accept the French line, which would give the two ports of Pola and Fiume to Yugoslavia but leave Trieste in the northwest part of the peninsula to Italy. The port of Trieste was to be internationalized.
Mr. Molotov said that in regard to de Gasperi’s statement he had seen in the paper that de Gasperi had publicly announced that no Italian Government could accept a peace which did not give Italy Trieste and most of Venezia Giulia. Thus it would appear that neither the United States, British nor the French line would be acceptable to Italy. He felt that de Gasperi had said too much about what he could or could not do. He had a high regard for de Gasperi but the decision was not up to him. It is clear that the unjust decision after World War I must be corrected after World War II when Italy was in the opposite camp at the crucial moment of the war. It is not for de Gasperi to decide how or where, whether at a peace conference or elsewhere, this question is to be decided. De Gasperi’s views are interesting but they obviously could not be objective in this matter. He added that the Soviet delegation had made concessions in the common interest, such as in regard to the Italian colonies and the economic clauses. In regard to Trieste, the Soviet delegation must take the view that the rights and wishes of an allied government should be respected. He said he hoped that the other delegations would take into consideration the Yugoslavs’ services and sacrifices to our common cause during the war and also the fact that their claims were on a legitimate national basis.
The Secretary said he of course agreed with Mr. Molotov that de Gasperi could not be disinterested where his country was concerned. He said he had not read the public statements but he thought it would [Page 572] be interesting for the Conference to have de Gasperi’s views as communicated to the President of the United States, particularly since Mr. Molotov had recently on several occasions suggested consultation with Italy. He wished to point out that in this letter de Gasperi had only spoken of the parts of Venezia Giulia which were predominately Italian. He agreed that it was a difficult question but he felt that the French line was in accordance with the London decision and according to our calculations would leave only 128,000 Italians under Yugoslav rule and 115,000 Yugoslavs under Italian rule. The French line would give satisfaction to the greater part of Yugoslav claims and only leave to Italy the predominately Italian part of the territory.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that all around Trieste and particularly north of Trieste there was a Slavic population. He said that even Italian maps show that in the area of Duino, north of Trieste, there was a Slavic majority. He inquired where we would be if our allied Yugoslavs should refuse to sign a treaty which did not give her Trieste.
The Secretary pointed out that according to our statistics there were only 3,000 Yugoslavs in the Duino area but immediately north of that was an area 80% Italian.
Mr. Bidault said that they all understood that this was the chief question of the Conference. Naturally he thought that the French line was a good proposal but he thought even better than their own line would be an agreement. He therefore said he would suggest without enthusiasm, but nevertheless would suggest, an alternative. He said his friend de Gasperi had stated it would be impossible to sign a treaty giving Trieste to Yugoslavia and that apparently Marshal Tito would not sign a treaty leaving it to Italy. What then was the solution? One possibility, that of a plebiscite suggested by Mr. Bevin and which had run into difficulties which might be insurmountable, but nevertheless that was one possibility. He had an idea, which he put forward without enthusiasm as he had said, namely to follow the precedent of their decision on the Italian colonies and set up an international regime for a designated area including Trieste for a specified period of time. He said he made this suggestion because they were in Paris and it was up to the French to try and bring about unity. He said it might not be a good suggestion but at least it would be good if it formed a basis of agreement. He said it might be possible to set up an international regime under the United Nations for, say, ten years, at the end of which in a calmer atmosphere a plebiscite might be held to allow the population to determine its fate. He repeated that this was not a preferred solution but we should think of the consequences of a failure to agree on this question.
Mr. Molotov said he doubted the wisdom of a temporary solution. The precedent of the Italian colonies was not stable since the colonies [Page 573] had not yet reached a status of independence and equality. In this case the areas concerned which had formerly been part of Austria and then Italy were advanced economically and politically. It seemed to him that a temporary solution would not satisfy either party and would give rise to bad consequences.
The Secretary said he appreciated the effort of Mr. Bidault to reach an agreement. He said the United States had accepted the French line because it followed the ethnic principle and avoided merely repeating the mistake made after the last war of putting large minorities under alien rule. He wondered whether the French representative would not circulate a memorandum setting forth the details of this suggestion, particularly as to area, character of administration, police force, etc.
Mr. Bevin believed, like Mr. Molotov, he was doubtful as to the advisability of a temporary regime which would merely permit agitation on both sides. On the other hand if Trieste were given to Yugoslavia we would only store up serious trouble for ourselves in the future. He asked Mr. Molotov to believe him when he said that in trying to get agreement on the French line they were trying to achieve as nearly just a solution as possible. There was admittedly always great difficulty in dealing with areas of mixed population. The British Government was primarily interested in a durable solution which had not been the case after the last war. He said that happily in this question none of the Four Powers had a direct interest and it only affected the Italian and Yugoslav people. Like Mr. Byrnes he could not give an opinion on Mr. Bidault’s suggestion until he had an opportunity to examine it objectively and he did not reject it out of hand.
Mr. Molotov stated that at London they had agreed on the ethnic principle but subsequently had decided to take economic considerations into account. He pointed out that even Italian maps show a Slav majority north and east of Trieste. It was clear that in tracing any boundary certain modifications on ethnic grounds would have to be made. The main question, however, was Trieste. The Soviet Government had had large experience in dealing with national problems in its own country. Similar difficulties had frequently arisen in drawing the boundaries of the national republics in the Soviet Union. For example, in Azerbaijan although the surrounding country was inhabited by Azerbaijanians, the City of Baku had a majority of other races. The decision had been to treat the area as a whole and make Baku the capital. The same problem had arisen in the Tartar republic where Kazan, the capital, had a non-tartar population. He felt the question of Trieste should be decided on the basis of the population of the surrounding area. This would be the only durable and good decision which would be welcomed eventually by all concerned despite [Page 574] momentary difficulties. It would be a permanent and not a transitory solution.
Mr. Bidault said that it was because the Conference desired a durable solution that they had suggested their line. He said he was quite prepared to circulate a memorandum if there was any chance of its being accepted by his colleagues but that he felt it would be a waste of time if there was no chance of any agreement on that basis.
The Secretary said that if he thought they were unable to agree today, they might defer until another session the discussion. He said he did not blame Mr. Bidault for not wishing to put forward a formal proposal in a memorandum unless there was some chance of success.
Mr. Bidault said he was prepared to submit as many memoranda as were necessary but he would prefer to have any such documents represent the views of the Council rather than those just of the French delegation. He said in closing that he wished to quote a French proverb “not a word to the Queen Mother” and request his colleagues to keep secret the suggestion he had put forward. He said that if this idea found favor they would not deny its origin, but if it was not to be accepted it was best to say nothing about it. The Ministers agreed to say nothing about Mr. Bidault’s suggestion and particularly to avoid any indication to the press.
Mr. Molotov said that he appreciated the good will which had prompted Mr. Bidault’s suggestion, that his doubts were due to the fact that it would be unsatisfactory to both sides and that he did not see that a temporary solution which would increase tension would form an adequate basis to dispose of this question. He added that possibly he had not fully understood Mr. Bidault’s idea.
Mr. Bidault said that if it was meant, as appeared to be the case, to satisfy both sides, justice might be served if a solution was found on the basis of equal satisfaction to both parties.
It was agreed that the Ministers would reassemble in restricted session tomorrow, June 22nd, at four o’clock, p.m.
- The lines proposed for the Italo-Yugoslav boundary by the American, British, French and Soviet experts on the Italo-Yugoslav Boundary Commission were set forth in Annexes (pp. 149–152) to the Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of the Commission, April 28, 1946, and are depicted on the map facing p. 152.↩
- See footnote 2c, p. 78.↩
- For the full text of de Gasperi’s letter of May 23, 1946, to President Truman, see p. 442.↩