Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

Bohlen Collection

Memorandum of Conversation,^41a by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen

[Extracts]

Kremlin, May 28, 1945—8 p.m.

Present:	Mr. Harry L. Hopkins
	Ambassador W. A. Harriman
	Mr. Charles E. Bohlen
	Marshal Stalin
	Mr. V. M. Molotov
	Mr. Pavlov42

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Mr. Hopkins then said that he thought they might begin today by exploring the Far Eastern questions and the war against Japan. He said that the other night he had indicated to Marshal Stalin that General Marshall⁴³ and Admiral King⁴⁴ would find it most helpful if they could know the approximate time of Soviet entry into the Pacific War.

Marshal Stalin repied that it had been agreed at Yalta that the Soviet armies would be ready within two to three months after the surrender of Germany. He said that in the main the Soviet armies would be in a sufficient state of preparedness and in position by August 8, 1945. However, as to the actual date of operation he felt that would depend on the execution of the agreement made at Yalta concerning Soviet desires.⁴⁵ He said it was necessary to have these agreements in order to justify entry into the Pacific War in the eyes of the Soviet people. Therefore, if China should agree to these desires the Soviet Union would be ready to commence operations in August.

Mr. Hopkins stated that as he recalled it the understanding at Yalta was that President Roosevelt, and of course now President Truman, would await word from Marshal Stalin before making any approach to the Chinese.

Marshal Stalin replied that this was correct since they had wished to postpone discussions with the Chinese while the principal movements of Soviet troops were proceeding to the Far East. He said he thought that they could perhaps raise the question directly with T. V. Soong when he made his expected visit to Moscow.

Mr. Hopkins said he thought that it would be better to raise the question here in Moscow directly with the Chinese. He added that we must bear in mind that Chinese discretion was not of the highest order.

Marshal Stalin agreed and he said that possibly the first part of July would be the best time to raise the question since it would obviously be impossible to conceal from the Japanese very much longer the movement of Soviet troops.

In reply to Marshal Stalin’s question Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Soong expected to come to Moscow immediately after the San Francisco Conference.

Mr. Hopkins said that we are then in agreement that the question of the Yalta Agreement should be raised by the Soviet Government with T. V. Soong during his visit here and at the same time Ambassador Hurley could discuss it in Chungking, but we would await Soong’s visit to Moscow before doing anything.

In reply to Mr. Hopkins’ question Marshal Stalin said that the weather in the Far East undoubtedly had a bearing on the time of the military operations since he thought that in the Autumn fogs set in which made operations difficult. He was not sure of the exact month of these fogs.

Mr. Hopkins then said that at Yalta there had been some discussions of other Far Eastern problems, such as the question of Chinese unity and others.

Marshal Stalin replied that it will be necessary to have serious talks in regard to the Far Eastern problems, particularly in regard to Japan, including such questions as the zone of operations for the armies and zones of occupation in Japan. He said it would also be necessary to discuss the question of unconditional surrender in regard to Japan.

Mr. Hopkins said he thoroughly agreed and in regard to the question of Chinese unity he knew his Government was most interested in seeing that accomplished but that he, personally, did not know of any specific plan. Ambassador Hurley had been making some attempts in that direction as the Marshal was aware and he would like to know of the Marshal’s views on the prospect of Chinese unity and how it could be done.

Marshal Stalin replied he had no specific plan but he felt that all were agreed on the desirability of the unification of China so that China could become an integrated and stable state and not a conglomeration of separate states as had been the case in nineteenth century Germany. He then said it would be possible to develop a real policy towards China and to give her the economic help she would need, which could only come from the United States. He added that we should all occupy ourselves with helping China to achieve unity.

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Ambassador Harriman said he would like to continue the discussions on Far Eastern problems, particularly the desires of the Soviet Union. He said Marshal Stalin undoubtedly knew that President Truman had told Mr. Molotov in Washington that it was his intention to carry out the commitments undertaken by President Roosevelt at the Crimea.

Marshal Stalin said he understood and appreciated that but it also depended on the Chinese.

Ambassador Harriman continued that it was obvious that the Soviet Union would re-assume Russia’s historic position in the Far East and that it was important that both political and economic matters be settled by mutual agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in relation to the Far East as elsewhere. For example, he mentioned that of our traditional policy of the open door in China and inquired whether the Marshal thought China would soon become an industrial nation in a reasonable period of time.

Marshal Stalin replied that he did not believe that China would soon become industrialized since they lacked the necessary experience and industrial personnel. He said the United States must play the largest part in helping China to get on their feet; the Soviet Union would be occupied with its own internal reconstruction and Great Britain would be occupied elsewhere.

Mr. Hopkins said he hoped the Marshal understood that we had no exclusive interest in China or the Far East and that we did not wish to see any other nation kept out.

Marshal Stalin replied he fully understood that but what he had meant was that the United States was the only country that had sufficient capital and personnel to be really of assistance to China in the immediate post-war period.

Ambassador Harriman then said what would be the attitude of the Soviet Union if Ambassador Hurley’s efforts to help in the unification of China were not successful at the time the Soviet troops entered Manchuria. Would the Marshal consider it would be possible under those circumstances to make the necessary arrangements with the Generalissimo.

Marshal Stalin replied that they did not propose to alter the sovereignty of the Chinese over Manchuria or any other part of China. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had no territorial claims in regard to China, either in Sinkiang or elsewhere. He said that in regard to Outer Mongolia it had been agreed at Yalta that that republic would remain in the same status it was now, namely not a part of the USSR and open to all. He said the Soviet system was not in existence in Mongolia. He added that the Soviet people would not be a factor in any way hindering Chinese unity but on the contrary would help the Chinese to achieve it. In regard to the Generalissimo the Marshal said he knew little of any Chinese leader but that he felt that Chiang Kai-shek was the best of the lot and would be the one to undertake the unification of China. He said he saw no other possible leader and that for example he did not believe that the Chinese Communist leaders were as good or would be able to bring about the unification of China.

Ambassador Harriman inquired when the Soviet troops entered Manchuria if the Marshal intended to ask Chiang to organize the civil administration.

Marshal Stalin replied that he would and that in Manchuria as in any part of China where Soviet troops went the Chinese administration would be set up by Chiang. That Chiang could send his representatives to set up the Kuomintang regime in any areas where the Red Army were.

Mr. Hopkins said lie thought that Chiang would have to take certain steps and make certain reforms if he was to bring about the unification of China.

Marshal Stalin agreed provided Chiang understood the necessity of these reforms. If not he did not feel they could be fixed upon from without. He repeated that the Soviet Government was prepared to talk with the Chinese and if they wanted representatives in the areas where the Red Army would be they would be quite prepared to accept them.

Ambassador Harriman said the Marshal had been most kind to answer so clearly and frankly the questions which had been put to him and he wished to state in regard to Japan that President Roosevelt had adopted the principle of unconditional surrender and that there was no intention on our part as far as he knew to change this principle.

Marshal Stalin said he was glad to hear that and he agreed with it.

Mr. Hopkins said he thought at the next meeting of the three heads of Government all these matters should be discussed.

Marshal Stalin agreed.

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1. For cabled summary, see Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History (Harper and Brothers, N. Y., 1948), pp. 902, 903.
42. Soviet interpreter.
43. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
44. Fleet Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
45. Signed February 11, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984; see also Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 498 or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1823.