740.0011 P.W./5–2145

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)40

Dear Jim: I am enclosing herewith informally a brief study of our views with regard to the problem of the attitude we should take towards the future position and activities of Soviet Russia in the Far East. This paper is to be taken by Chip Bohlen41 to Moscow when he leaves the day after tomorrow for the guidance of Ambassador Harriman, and I shall be glad if you can let me know, if possible before Bohlen’s departure, whether this study is in accord with [Page 879] the views of the Navy Department. If you wish more time to go over it, we could cable any desired changes to Ambassador Harriman after his arrival in Moscow, but we would especially like to have the paper in his hands before his first talk with Stalin.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew
[Enclosure]

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Believing that the Soviet Union is as deeply and sincerely interested in the establishment and maintenance of peace, security and economic prosperity in the Far East as is the United States, it will be to the mutual advantage of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to reach a firm and definite understanding in regard to various problems affecting China and Korea.

China

I. The unification of China and the establishment of a strong, stable government representative of the wishes of the Chinese people and capable of effectively discharging its internal and international responsibilities is essential to the establishment and maintenance of peace and security in the Far East. A more immediate objective is the mobilization of China’s human and material resources in the vigorous and effective prosecution of the war against the Japanese.

In pursuance of these objectives, we are endeavoring and will continue our efforts to influence Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the leaders of the National Government to carry out the following political, military and economic measures:

Political

(a)
To resolve the long-standing differences between the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist parties. To achieve this very substantial concessions must be made by both parties. The Kuomintang must give up its exclusive and dominant control over the government, must give legal recognition to the Chinese Communist and other Chinese political parties, must permit the duly elected representatives of other parties to participate on a fully proportional basis in the government of China, and must work with all other parties to create a representative, strong and stable government. On the other hand the Chinese Communist party should be prepared to accept any sincere proposals made by the Kuomintang which will achieve unity and stability, must be prepared to merge with the united Chinese Government their local governments, and must be prepared to observe the laws and decrees of the united government.
(b)
To convene forthwith a conference of representatives of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and other political parties, as well as certain non-party leaders to decide upon interim measures for political and military unity pending convocation of the Peoples Assembly on November 12, 1945.
(c)
To insure that the Peoples Assembly shall be truly representative of the people and all political parties and that it shall agree upon and formally proclaim a constitution providing for representative government and guaranteeing to the people the rights of habeas corpus and freedom of speech, freedom of religion and freedom of assembly.
(d)
To proclaim formally that constitutional government will in fact be established not later than March 12, 1946, the anniversary of the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
(e)
To carry out without delay thorough-going administrative and judicial reforms.
(f)
To permit freedom of speech and of publication.
(g)
To release all purely political prisoners and to abolish the Kuomintang secret police.

Military

(a)
To bring about the unification of all Chinese military forces by:
(1)
The establishment of a military body in the nature of a supreme war council in which the Chinese Communists and other non-Kuomintang military groups would have fair representation and responsibility for the formulation and execution of a coordinated war program and strategy;
(2)
The placing of all Chinese forces, Kuomintang, Communist or other military groups during the period of military operations against the Japanese, under the operational command of an American commander who would be assisted by a staff composed of Chinese, Soviet and British officers;
(3)
The guaranteeing to such a unified Chinese military force of all possible supplies from the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the equitable distribution of such supplies to all units.

Economic

(a)
The immediate institution of fiscal and tax reforms.
(b)
The adoption of immediate and vigorous measures against hoarders and profiteers.
(c)
The immediate institution of measures to effect the more equitable distribution of foodstuffs and other necessities.
(d)
The coordination and integration of Chinese plans for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction with the assistance of technical advisers and experts from the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
(e)
The enactment of new commercial laws and regulations embodying liberal commercial and economic policies and principles and insuring the “open door” and equal commercial opportunity to all countries.

II. The United States desires the active cooperation and support of the Soviet Union not only to achieve the political and military unification of China but also to insure the development and recognition of China as one of the principal powers of the Pacific and a bulwark of peace and security in the Far East.

(a)
In our efforts to effect the political and military unification of China we seek the active cooperation of the Soviet Government by agreement to the following:
(1)
Undertaking to persuade the Chinese Communists to accept reasonable Kuomintang proposals for a genuinely representative and unified Chinese Government and to continue the very commendable efforts made through negotiation with the Kuomintang to achieve such unity.
(2)
Undertaking to persuade the Chinese Communists to agree to the incorporation of their forces into a unified Chinese army under the operational command of an American officer assisted by Chinese, Soviet and British staff officers and other military personnel.
(3)
Undertaking only to utilize units of the unified Chinese army in military operations carried out by the Soviet Government against the Japanese in Manchuria, North China and Korea.
(4)
Undertaking, in common with the United States and Great Britain to withdraw all forces, including air and naval forces from Manchuria and North China and to terminate such temporary administration as may have been established in liberated areas during the period of military operations, within three months after the cessation of hostilities in China, Japan and Korea, and furthermore, undertaking to return, at that time, such liberated areas to the full control of the Chinese National Government.
(5)
Agree to the designation of Soviet officers to serve on the military staff (referred to under Section I, Military) to be set up to command the unified Chinese army.
(6)
Agree to the designation of Soviet economic and technical advisers to assist the Chinese Government in the formulation and integration of its plans for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction.
(7)
Agree to supply such military equipment and supplies as the Soviet Government may have available, to the unified Chinese army.
(b)
To ensure the development and recognition of China as one of the principal powers of the Pacific we seek the agreement of the Soviet Government to the following:
(1)
Full and continuing respect for China’s territorial integrity, including such territories as Manchuria, Sinkiang and Tibet. (However, we would not oppose any agreement respecting the exact delimitation of Sino-Soviet boundaries reached by processes of amicable [Page 882] negotiation between China and the Soviet Union or through the medium of an impartial boundary commission.)
(2)
That there should be full acceptance of the Cairo Declaration which provided that Formosa and the Pescadores Islands should be returned to China, and that the sovereignty of China over these islands should be formally established at the conclusion of the war against Japan.
(3)
That the present prestige and influence enjoyed by the Chinese National Government in international affairs should be maintained.

Korea

I.
By the terms of the Cairo Declaration the United States and Great Britain are unequivocally committed to the complete independence and freedom of Korea “in due course”.
II.
The liberation of Korea may be effected solely by the forces of the United States or the Soviet Union or jointly by the forces of the United States, China, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Irrespective of whether such liberation is effected by the forces of one of the powers mentioned or by all four powers, it is agreed:
(a)
that the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain shall participate in the administration of civil affairs in the liberated areas of Korea and furthermore, that the four powers in question shall be equally represented in such civil affairs administration.
(b)
that reliable and capable local Koreans shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the joint administration for civil affairs established during the period of military operations.
III.
Upon the termination of hostilities in Korea which may occur either as the result of the destruction or unconditional surrender of Japanese forces in Korea, there shall be established a trusteeship for a period of five years. The composition and functions of such trusteeship shall be as follows:
(a)
Composition: The United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain shall establish a trusteeship over Korea and shall be equally represented in all military, administrative and judicial bureaus, departments or other organizations which may be established by the Governments of the four trustee powers to administer Korea during interim period prior to the establishment of a sovereign and independent Korean government.
(b)
Functions:
(1)
To perform the administrative, fiscal, judicial, educational, economic and social functions usually exercised by an independent government.
(2)
To utilize to the fullest extent reliable and capable local Koreans in the execution of the various governmental functions mentioned above and to give increasing responsibility and authority during [Page 883] the period of trusteeship to Koreans showing special ability, honesty and reliability.
(3)
To train reliable and capable local Koreans in the performance of various governmental and technical duties.
(c)
Period of Trusteeship: The period of trusteeship shall be for five years following the formal conclusion of hostilities against Japan.
IV.
Upon the establishment of Trusteeship Administration by the four powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain will withdraw all their respective armed forces, including ground forces, air forces and naval forces from the territories or territorial waters of Korea, except for a token force not to exceed 5,000 men from each of the four powers above named.
V.
Upon termination of the five-year period of trusteeship, the complete independence and freedom of Korea shall be reaffirmed formally and publicly by the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Great Britain.
(a)
There shall be established a free, sovereign and independent Korean government. The Korean people, without any interference whatsoever from other countries, shall have complete political freedom to establish such a sovereign and independent government, the composition and form of which shall represent the freely expressed wishes and desires of the Korean people.
(b)
There shall be scrupulous respect by all foreign countries of the territory comprising the nation of Korea, the boundaries of which shall, if in dispute, be settled by an impartial commission appointed by the International Security Organization.
(c)
Strict observance by countries interested in trading with Korea of the principle of the “open door” and equality of commercial and economic opportunity.
VI.
The Security Council of the proposed International Security Organization shall consider and decide in the light of security considerations in the Far East, whether the establishment of military or naval bases on Korean territory is necessary and desirable. If the decision is affirmative, such bases shall be established by agreement with the Korean government and without impairment of Korean sovereignty.
  1. A similar letter was addressed by the Acting Secretary of State on the same date to the Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy).
  2. Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State for White House liaison, who was to accompany Harry L. Hopkins on his special mission to the Soviet Union.