Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII

Nanking Embassay Files. Lot F–73—710 Sino–US

The Commercial Attaché in China (Calder) to the Chargé in China (Robertson)

Shanghai, December 27, 1945.

Dear Walter: The new pronouncements and directives are a bit startling as we don’t know exactly what is behind them, whence emanates the advice on which the ideas are based, and exactly their aim.

If the purpose is to smoke the Soviets out into the open and nip double dealing in full bloom, so to speak, then it seems to make sense. But we are seldom if ever so subtle in our approaches as to take an indirect method such as this.

If the purpose is to force the Chinese Communists to display their true colors as to whether they are independent or are functioning as a “fifth column” for Moscow, then it seems we are wasting our time, because the latter premise can well be accepted as axiomatic. (The background for this assumption was given in my memo written in Cairo last March, which I showed you here last week; a copy is appended.)

If the aim is to serve notice on the Soviets that we do not intend to pour billions of dollars of aid into China only to have the objectives vitiated by Soviet machinations, then it would seem we are on the right track, provided the Chungking authorities are “in” on this strategy. We did something similar in Italy when we blocked Soviet demands for reparations from that country, saying we would not pour hundreds of millions of dollars of relief into Italy only to have it siphoned off by the Soviets as reparations.

This tactic worked on that occasion but Italian reparations constituted a small or relatively unimportant matter compared with the grand but unsuccessful play which the Soviets made in the 1920’s to win China over and to convert it lock stock and barrel into an “Autonomous” Soviet Socialist Republic. The demand for reparations from Italy was an insignificant matter as compared with the bold strategy employed by the Soviets in recent weeks and just now in playing for really big stakes—by continuing to hold Manchuria in their clutches, by stripping the area of its war booty (machinery), by pulling the farce of a “unanimous” plebiscite in Mongolia, by inciting border troubles in Sinkiang, by virtually converting North Korea into a Soviet Socialist Republic, by shutting us out of all the affected regions, and by using their good old reliable nest egg, the Chinese Communists, to rob China of Peace.

If we are now seriously putting the Chiang Kai-shek regime on the spot and if we are blaming it solely for the chaotic conditions now extant in China, are we not failing to read the signs aright? In spite of the above array of evidence, are we deluding ourselves into thinking and believing that the Chinese Communists are dissociated from Moscow? If they are the tools of Moscow, if they do constitute the Soviet Trojan horse within the gates of China, is there any chance that the forcing or inducing of a coalition will solve China’s problems according to our lights? Is it not more likely that we shall simply be playing into the hands of the Soviets?

I have wondered at our policy in regard to China ever since I wrote my memo for the American Minister in Cairo. I could not understand why, just having completed the basis for the United Nations organization at San Francisco, we allowed T. V. Soong to rush off to Moscow (via Chungking) to try to work out a bilateral deal. It seemed to me that we were throwing China to the dogs. Later, when I read in the press that Dr. Soong was daily conferring with Ambassador Harriman in Moscow (first week in July 1945) and that the latter was keeping Washington advised, I assumed that this was a rather open way of trying to determine the Soviet “temper” with regard to the Far East prior to the scheduled Potsdam Conference. Then, when the boys returned from Potsdam and indicated that we had “talked tough” with the Soviets at Potsdam and had told them in so many words that the Far East was “our show” and that they were to “lay off” if they had in mind any similar performance in Asia to that which they had put on after V–E Day in Europe, I wondered whether we would really “act tough” in case of necessity. It seemed foregone by then that the Soviets would come into the Far Eastern War ninety days after V–E Day. I had seen the scores and scores of ships loading Lend-Lease for Vladivostok in West Coast ports. The atom bomb being timed two days ahead of the Soviet declaration of war seemed to have robbed the Soviets of most of the glory for ending the Pacific War. Since that event the developments have been about of the pattern which was roughly outlined in my Cairo memorandum written in March (before V–E Day, before V–J Day, without any comforting knowledge of the “Manhattan Project”).

That we then began to withdraw our forces from China, just as we had done in Europe, and tried to quiet public opinion at home by continuing to announce that we would not interfere in “China’s internal problem” seemed to me like throwing China to the dogs again.

It did not seem to me to be too high a compliment to the Chinese to announce in mid-October that we were going to make China a bridge or a buffer between ourselves and the Soviets. The Chinese could scarcely interpret this in any other light than that we proposed to make China the goat for what is obviously developing as a basic clash between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A. as to which will dominate the future course of world affairs. When we heard of Sino-Soviet conferences at Chungking and Changchun, all secret, and then that a settlement had been reached, it seemed to me that by not participating in this we were again throwing China to the dogs, virtually forcing Chungking into bilateral adjustment to probably new and rapacious Soviet demands. It seemed to me that in this case there might naturally be resentful excuse and occasion on the part of Chungking to yield to Soviet terms of a secret nature of which we would not be apprised. The Hurley declarations¹⁰ publicly announced that there was apparently a section of our China service who favored the Chinese Communists at a time when he was sent to support and morally fortify the Chiang Kai-shek government in continuing its struggle against the Japanese. Now, with the Japanese menace out of the way, but with an equally sinister Soviet threat looming, we seemingly reverse ourselves to some degree, making it appear that both “parties” in China, (unmixable, opposed, elements) are guilty of failing to get together in a unity which would permit of the furtherance of American aims for and aid to China.

If this is just publicity strategy in a deeper game which has been well thought out in advance, then it is all right with me. But if it is an indication of what we really think at home in this matter, then it seems to me that we do not understand the situation well and may be acting on the wrong advice, and in a manner possibly to hasten defeat of our stated aims.

We apparently now realize full well that it will be useless to proceed with large loans for the industrialization of China and to attempt to make it a “buffer” unless the basis for the success of such procedure exists. But I’m wondering whether we have a proper understanding of the fundamentals. Thus, I feel it more or less a duty to present my views on the subject as of possible use at this strategic time. It seems that it is a time when we should all put our heads together. My experience and background is, I feel, unique, and it should be used. If I’m wrong I’m quite willing to be slapped down. If I’m wrong it’s because I do not know the “inside”. I have read the signs correctly and have “called the numbers” on many occasions, aside from the Cairo memorandum herewith.

Were we so naive as to think that the Soviets would sit quietly by and let us build up China to be a buffer? Japan struck (in 1937) in China when it thought China was progressing too rapidly toward unity and after we had announced resumption of financing. Would it not be natural to expect that the Soviets would and could call our hand in this situation sooner or later?

The Soviets began their work of making a buffer out of China some twenty-three or twenty-four years ago, and the present civil war is nothing less than a “flowering” of their effort. Their purposes were open in trying to destroy American and British prestige in China in those days. Borodin, now editor of the Moscow Daily News (only English language daily in the Soviet Union—published in Moscow for foreign diplomatic consumption) was here in China conducting the propaganda, daily anti-American and anti-British blasts. After Chiang Kai-shek chased the Soviets out in April, 1927 (realizing they were bringing harm instead of good to China, and to ward off foreign intervention) they went underground. I have no doubt whatever, however, but that they have kept their finger on China’s pulse ever since, that they are now guiding and aiding the Chinese Communists and using them as the tool to thwart U. S. objectives in this country. Again the Soviets have been carrying out a publicity policy in Shanghai designed to diminish American and British prestige in Chinese eyes. I say “again have been” for the reason that about one week ago (probably on instructions from Moscow) this campaign suddenly ceased and the propaganda machine switched to German matters and innocuous world and local news.

The uncertain situation in Manchuria is typical of how an agreement with the Soviets works out after it is made. Somehow the phraseology of the agreements always has two interpretations, (1) the construction the Soviets put upon it afterwards and (2) that understood by the opposite party to the negotiations at the time the agreement is signed.

Manchuria, to the Chinese, is the difference between China operating at a profit or at a loss. It is, or was, the rich surplus producing area, agriculturally and industrially. It underwent a considerable industrial development under Japanese efforts to exploit “Manchoukuo” to the full. It thus strengthened Japan in its war against us. Obviously it has now been stripped of its major industrial equipment. Its agriculture has apparently undergone some deterioration under Japanese control. The Japanese drew upon the Chinese agricultural labor of Manchuria to build up industry and for military purposes as well. “Manchoukuo” troops (Chinese) fought against the Soviet attack in August this year. But, given encouragement, the Chinese farmers of Manchuria will again produce huge surpluses. It is a breadbasket out of which Japan drew plentifully. The bean crop is of enormous value to any country able to draw upon this agricultural wealth. The Japanese were trying to build Manchuria up to fifty million tons of agricultural production in grain, beans, and other main crops, but their stupidity in failing to make it attractive to the farmers caused them to fail in this objective.

It is obvious that the Soviets want to control this rich area, which, had it come into Chinese hands at the close of the war, would have provided China with much of the industrial equipment it needed. There was a ready made economy there. The equipment is now spirited off to Komsomolsk and other Soviet centers. To replace it, in its efforts to aid China, the United States must spend several hundred more millions than would have been the case had the Soviets not looted it. Instead of the Chinese realizing upon this war booty, it will be used to build up the war economy of the Soviet Far East. It sets the United States back immeasurably in any effort to aid China.

Communist doctrines cannot take root, or flourish, in an atmosphere of prosperity. The more railroads and other modern developments the Chinese Communists destroy in North China, the less resistance there will be to the Communist movement in the affected areas and the more costly it will be for America in efforts to rehabilitate China, once the Communist depredations may be stopped. The Soviets will have won something, in any case, out of all this.

One wonders what we are discussing at Moscow in the conference which has been going on for about a fortnight. Are we trying to buy peace by offering a six or ten billion dollar loan? We have apparently thought in recent months to keep the Soviets “in line” by withholding our magnanimity in this respect. While we have, so to speak, been rubbing our nickel against our dime, in the past few months, the Soviets by tricky diplomacy and aggressive acts have proceeded with taking unto themselves and will try to hold some hundreds of billions of dollars of new assets. They are well set up and do not need our aid. We owe them no moral obligation considering their moral shortcomings. I have steadfastly opposed our giving a postwar credit to the Soviets for the reason that it should be patent it would be used mainly and perhaps entirely to strengthen their war power, mayhap to use against us.

With our aid the Soviets participated in winning the war in Europe, acquiring and adding to the Soviet Union an area about one fifth the size of the United States and populated with 140,000,000. Reparations began to flow into the U. S. S. R. out of Rumania and Finland before the end of 1944. One can well imagine what has happened to industrial plants and other assets in the portions of Germany, Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, and Hungary occupied by the Soviets. Since V–J Day the Soviets have sought to add Manchuria (about the size of Germany—30,000,000 people), half of Korea (14,000,000 people), and Iranian Azerbaijan to the Soviet Union, not to mention demands for participation in the control of Japan. They may probably end by getting hold of Hokkaido, the less sparsely populated northern island of Japan, which is potentially a surplus producing region (for food) as compared with the other main islands of Japan which are normally over-populated food deficit areas. The technique is to demand something to which the U. S. S. R. is not entitled and upon retreating from the demand to secure something tangible in its place, i. e., to get something for nothing. We should rap down on tricky diplomacy as an imposition on our good faith.

Their position may be appraised about as follows: The Soviets now hold the vast Hungarian, Rumanian, and Ukrainian bread baskets, the surplus food areas in the five Central Asia Soviet Republics, the machine farmed surplus areas in Siberia, and now Manchuria (they have not yet let go of it).

Instead of our offering appeasement in the way of loans, we should be expecting the Soviets to give out of their enormous surplus areas a proper share of the food which will be required to feed the populations in the huge deficit areas which fall to our lot to aid. We are burdened with some 70,000,000 people in Japan, 420,000,000 in the vast deficit areas of China proper, 40,000,000 in France, and so on. I would think that the Soviets would be chortling in ghoulish glee at our predicament in the areas which we control or are obligated to aid. In fact they have been chortling quite consistently of late in their local press at every disadvantage they can see in the American and British position.

Isn’t it clear that the Soviets are out to create any kind of situation which will produce or continue a drain upon American economy and which will add to their own present and potential wealth and controlling position?

Now we are apparently out to force the Chungking Government to accept the Chinese Communist party into the Government on a coalition basis. Will it work, if achieved? Will not the Soviets move in and begin directing affairs, pulling the strings and operating their puppets once the latter are installed in the government of China? Isn’t it likely that they will make a pretense of harmonious relations until we sink our billions only then to find out that Chinese labor won’t work (goes on strike), that the plants are thus useless, or even that they will be sabotaged and destroyed and, thus, that our aims may be defeated?

We are, of course, wise to call a halt to our program until this situation is clarified. But it cannot be clarified until it is recognized that a basic conflict of aims exists, with the Soviets gaining ground quite rapidly, while we seem to be groping around in confusion.

In Japan we are apparently preparing to do away with the Emperor and the system which goes with it. We have nothing to replace it speedily but the Soviets have. They have Soviet ideology all ready to plant just as soon as we destroy the religion which the Japanese have. It seems that people must have something in which to believe. In the Soviet Union the revolution sought to destroy the church and belief in its tenets. The young generation had to be given some belief, so Leninism and Stalinism were given the people as a substitute for religion. So soon as we destroy the only belief to which the Japanese cling, if we do it before the people have achieved some better economy than they now possess, the vacuum will be readily filled with Soviet inspired and nurtured Communist propaganda, the infiltration for which has been well prepared in advance. It is not likely that our efforts to rule Japan as a conquered state and to lead its people to democratic beliefs and practices, a long and tortuous route, will be killed before birth? The Soviets will promise them everything,—are we promising them anything? Under the circumstances, how will it come out?

A sludge of Soviet literature in the Chinese language is now on sale in Shanghai, openly advertised in the local Soviet papers. Isn’t it likely that the doctrines are already being printed and circulated in Japan under cover, in the Japanese language, preparing the way for introduction of the Soviet religion to replace the Japanese religion? This is no plea to preserve the Japanese Emperor. But there is something in timing. We could fool the Soviets by keeping the Japanese Emperor for a while as a puppet as we have started to do. Of course, it would hold up our program, but at least it would not bring on with a rush defeat of our aims. His trial and speedy disposition as a war criminal would probably serve Soviet aims admirably.

It seems clear that the Soviets want to drive us out of Asia and to have it to themselves. We, if we are interested in Asia, as a field for our influence and trade, thus face the Soviet Union along an eight thousand or nine thousand mile front stretching from Hokkaido across Korea, North China, Sinkiang, Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey, and if Europe is an interest of ours, across Europe as well. That front is moving southward. The Soviets are making more gains out of outsmarting us in peacetime chicanery than if they were winning a third World War. The unsettled world situation thus created, serves another Soviet aim as well. It serves to keep their own people cowed and “in hand” and to hold their people’s respect for Moscow’s prowess in “diplomacy”. Unless the tension can be kept up, their people on the qui vive, the people might have a chance to dwell upon their own troubles.

The Soviets do not like our ways or plans for liberating peoples. The Soviet way is to permit the peoples to “join” the Soviet Union. Our method is to pave the way for real independence—witness our treatment of the Philippines. It seems clear that the Soviets do not want us to be successful in assisting any Asiatic peoples to our brand of freedom under our aegis. The Soviets are afraid that if this is carried too far, we may some day exhibit an interest in freeing the Soviet people from their bondage. It is thus necessary to preserve the position of the present nobility and upper crust, the party members, in the Soviet Union by obstructing our methods, aims and ambitions and by thwarting the spread of our ideology. Are we too dense to see all this?

The Soviets know that we are in no mood to fight, at present. As a result many things on which we did not count are falling into their laps. We seem to be losing out,—they seem to be gaining. Soviet citizens with whom I talked in Moscow, young people not long out of school, had been thoroughly taught that it was the United States which was to blame for the chaotic world conditions which resulted in World War II. These same individuals seemed equally grounded in the belief that, after the second World War was over, America would again recede into isolationism. Their present reading of world news must convince them of this trend and their mentor, the Soviet propaganda machine, can easily justify Soviet acts of aggression at present as necessary to insure peace in a precarious world. Despite our almost desperate efforts to organize a United Nations Organization to preserve peace, the Soviet schemers interpret our retirement militarily from the world scheme as “retreat into isolationism”, giving them the splendid opportunity to exercise aggressive peacetime aims netting them as great gains as if they were winning a war. The Soviet front, (literally boundary lines), moves forward even in peacetime. The Soviets are the winners of this war. Who else has won anything?

Some of our people argue that the Soviet Union cannot afford another war,—therefore that it must get in line with us. I ask—just why should they get in line with us so long as their present methods net them such a handsome return without danger of war? Isn’t it more likely that they will continue to pursue their advantage, to keep the world in turmoil so long as they can get something out of it and so long as they can thwart us? It is an old game. They are playing it for all that it is worth. The technique is well worked out. A democracy such as ours (with policies dictated by public opinion which can in turn be influenced by the potential enemy utilizing freedom of the press and free speech in our midst) is no match in diplomacy for a ruthless despotism such as the Soviet Union which can act on the instant without consulting or fearing public opinion at home. We could at least let our public know these facts and be credited with warning our people as to what possibly is in store. I feel that Americans in general have little appreciation of this whole matter and that this lack of understanding reaches into very high places. Thus, I trust these lines may be helpful, for the moment at least in understanding the situation, if not in offering the solution and answers. The only kind of answer we are looking for, it appears, is the one which is spelled PEACE, without further conflict. Yet the only attitude which the Soviets are likely to respect is one in which fighting power is backed by the intent to use it, if necessary.

I have now viewed the Soviet menace from the inside, in Petrograd before, during and after the Revolution, 1916 to 1918; from Moscow—two years, 1943–1944–1945; from Cairo, Feb.–June, 1945; from Washington, July, August, September 1945; and from Shanghai. I have put down in writing for the use of the Department the results of my observations from all but the first of these several locations. I reported extensively on the Soviet penetration from Shanghai in the 1920’s, in 1931, in 1940 and 1941, in October–December 1945, and now in this letter. The overhanging Soviet threat is obviously the principal influence which can affect adversely the efforts of an American Commercial Attaché in China.

I shall end this in the same way I ended the introduction to my report on the Soviet Union for 1944—“The Soviet Union is clearly in the ascendancy, aided by its allies, the United States and Great Britain.”

Sincerely yours,

A[lonzo] B. C[alder]

[Annex]

Memorandum by Mr. Alonzo B. Colder ¹¹ to the Minister in Egypt (Tuck)

Cairo, March 20, 1945.

Mr. Minister: You asked regarding the prospects or probabilities of The Soviet Union helping us in the Far Eastern War. Of course no one can answer that question exactly. We live in a world and times of surprises and we may get both surprises (pleasant or unpleasant) and some shocks before we are through with this melee.

Everyone asks what the Soviets will do when the European war is over. Views in Moscow non-Soviet circles at the time I left appeared to be about as follows and I have had intimations from recent arrivals from Washington that the thinking there is about the same. (However, my own views are included herein).

A. The Russians will not be likely to come into the Far Eastern conflict at any early date for the following reasons:

1. The Japanese Army is still strong, could put 2 million men in Manchuria and retain an adequate force in China to hold China for a considerable period. (This idea seems confirmed in Admiral Nimitz’s statements in Washington recently in the press—“Japan’s fleet must still be considered a threat—her army is scarcely damaged—our forces have come up against no more than 10 percent of Japan’s Army in the island fighting.” A Swedish official recently out of Japan stated in Moscow recently that Japan could easily mobilize 2 to 2½ million men additional to its present forces in the field.

2. Soviet war industry developments in the Far East of the Soviet Union are not yet capable of supplying a force (i. e. material) needed to fight 2 million Japanese in Manchuria. Indeed, the Japanese might be able to jump large forces into Manchuria and to cut the trans-Siberian railway and the alternative line north of it before the Soviets could transport any large force to the Far East.

3. It would thus take the Soviets some time to cope with such a situation as they would have to transport the major force, its equipment and even food supply a distance of 5,000 miles or more over the trans-Siberian railway, facing many of the same handicaps which thwarted the Czarist armies in 1904.

4. The Soviets would fear that we would leave it to the Red Army to reduce the strength of the Japanese Army hence would not want to enter into the Far Eastern conflict until we more nearly complete the job ourselves.

5. The Soviets will want to keep a fairly large force in Europe to hold their hard won gains there, will also want to give the Russian people, who are suffering from war fatigue, a breathing spell.

6. In the Soviet Far East, east of China, there are probably no more than 4 million people, and very few of them would be mobilizable at this time. Hence the whole force (aside from border troops) for a conflict in the Far East would have to be transported from European U. S. S. R.

These factors are considered sufficient to restrain the Soviets from getting into the Far Eastern conflict at any early date—that is to say it does not seem likely that they would enter the conflict immediately after German surrender.

B. It is considered, however, that the Soviets will look at the Far Eastern situation fully as realistically and as opportunistically as they have dealt with the European situation, and that when they consider the time “ripe”—possibly a year from now—they will be likely to jump in for the killing near the end of the Pacific war. It is to be assumed that the Soviet assertive and aggressive performance in Eastern Europe will be repeated in the Far East and that when Japan is put out of business the Soviets will automatically succeed to and will partially supplant Japan in the Pacific arena, coming face to face with ourselves and the British, or maybe only with ourselves, since British forces are not likely to be as far north as ours (their interests being to the South).

The Soviets have an old score to pay off in their relations with Chiang Kai-shek, who shook off Soviet (Moscow) influence in April, 1927, and later began to attack the Chinese Communist forces. The Chungking Chinese are now convinced that the Soviets are directly encouraging the Chinese Communists at Yenan and that the latter will play their advantage at this strategic time in hopes of riding to power in China. There are some corrupt elements possibly in the Chungking set-up which should be cleaned out but Chungking will naturally endeavor to use our help in this embarrassing situation just as long as possible and to as great an extent as possible. They will contend, with possible truth and justification that the Soviets will not only want to gain wider influence in Asia by aiding the Chinese Communists but will want back all Czarist holdings in Manchuria. There seem to be some grounds for belief that the Soviets have trained a large number (some thousands) of Koreans in the arts of conducting a Soviet Socialist Republic and that Korea, so soon as it gains its independence, will shortly find itself thus organized. The force of Koreans so trained, it appears, have been undergoing tutelage at various Siberian centers for some years with this in prospect.

The only thing which would be likely to restrain the Soviets from carrying out aggressive policies both in Europe and in the Far East would be the fear of united British-American strength and the likelihood of its being used. That is apparently why the Moscow press apparently loses no opportunity to show up and elaborate any symptoms of disharmony between ourselves and the British. Thus, it may be expected that the Soviets will make various experiments to see whether we are really going to “follow through” in carrying out our stated war objectives and their underlying principles, or whether we are likely to waver.

It is clear that we are going to extremes in trying to get the Soviets into line with us. I am wondering what we shall really do when and if we discover that they are not going along with us but are determined to pattern the post war world according to their own concepts. I feel that by now we should have seen more encouraging signs that the Soviets visualize the advantage to themselves of going along with us. That those signs have not been more in evidence is discouraging.

Thus, our really big transcendent problem would appear to be the matter of our future relations with the Soviet Union and, more particularly, how firm and positive we are prepared to be in dealing with the tests to which Ave shall most certainly be put in this situation. Public thinking (in the United States) is naturally still directed to and absorbed with the questions and problems as to what we are going to do with Germany and with methods of preventing Germany and Japan from again developing war power to threaten world peace, and scarcely considers the really big issue as to how we shall deal with the Soviet Colossus once we have subdued and put its enemies out of business. However, I think this is understood in Washington and that it is not time, as yet, to do anything except what we are doing.

The question of bases in Siberia from which to bomb Japan is no longer a problem since we have Iwojima, and in my opinion the less help we expect or receive from the Soviets in the Far East, the less they will have right to demand by way of recompense. The difficulty will rather be how we can keep the Soviets out of the Far Eastern conflict when they get ready to come in. They will be almost certain to come in, in their own good time, when it costs them the least and will net them the biggest return for the effort expended.

10. See pp. 722 ff.
11. Foreign Service officer temporarily assigned to the Legation in Egypt.