Office of the Historian

740.00119 Control(Japan)/10–2345

Memorandum by Colonel James McCormack, Jr., of the War Department to Dr. George H. Blakeslee of the United States Delegation, Far Eastern Advisory Commission
Washington, 23 October 1945.
1.
I have given some thought overnight to segregating the strictly military interests involved in the question of the degree of control the U.S. must retain in Japan. I have concluded that the primary military interest is served by one simple principle: the position of SCAP, as a military commander, must be kept neat. Speaking still from the strictly military point of view, I think this principle embraces two requirements:
a.
The command structure in Japan from SCAP down to all troop units, both U.S. and Allied, must not be cluttered by any subordinate occupying a dual position as commander of troops, and at the same time, political representative of his government. General MacArthur intends that the command structure be built on two corps areas. Allied troops will be under the two corps commanders. You can see how we would become involved if the commander of French forces under a U.S. corps commander tried simultaneously to sit on a council with MacArthur and discuss the directives to be issued to the corps commanders;
b.
If the military command channels down from General MacArthur are to be kept clean, I think the corollary is that the political [Page 776] channels should be cut off somewhere above General MacArthur. This is to say that MacArthur should receive directives, both political and military, from above, without joining in the negotiations leading to decision as to what these directives shall be. I think we all agree that the German model of the Control Council is in no way applicable to Japan, and may be eliminated from this discussion. I note, however, a tendency to compare the Russian position in the Balkan countries with a possible U.S. position in Japan. I think this comparison also leaves a gap in our reasoning. The Russian commanders in the Balkan countries do not command Allied forces as we intend MacArthur to do. The Russian military head of a Control Council can afford to be as unpleasant to his colleagues on the Control Council as may be necessary for Russian political reasons. He does not then have to enforce his arbitrary decisions through use of, for instance, U.S. troops.
2.
In summary, from the military point of view, I think General MacArthur, and therefore the U.S. position in Japan, is best protected if SCAP remains strictly and simply an implementing agent.
3.
To depart from strictly military considerations, I suggest you approach the question of Allied collaboration as being two problems: collaboration in the making of policy, and collaboration in its implementation in Japan. I see no objection to giving the Allies a good strong voice in the making of policy. On a consultative body such as the FEAC there would be no great harm done by an occasional argument in camera. On the other hand, I think we must keep the implementing agency in Japan as completely free from argument as possible, both from the military and national point of view.
J. McCormack

Colonel, GSC