811.24553B/11–2945

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

Mr. Byrnes’ Top Secret Aide-Mémoire of the 19th November set out a statement by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff of the rights which they desired the United States Government to obtain in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands for the operation of military bases in those Islands.

2. Mr. Bevin wishes to thank Mr. Byrnes for this information and to explain that, owing to the special problems which it presents, he [Page 218] thinks it would be best if the question of bases in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands were dealt with as a separate matter, apart from the other questions of bases which the United States Government have raised with His Majesty’s Government.

3. Mr. Bevin feels sure that Mr. Byrnes will understand that before he can express any opinion on the proposals set out in the Aide-Mémoire of November 19th, Mr. Bevin must consult the British Chiefs of Staff and His Majesty’s Ambassador at Lisbon. Mr. Byrnes can be assured, however, that in consulting the latter Mr. Bevin will only inform him of the proposals regarding Portuguese territory and not of the wider United States plans.

4. Mr. Byrnes will also appreciate that His Majesty’s Government will have to give serious consideration to the effect of the United States proposals on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the responsibilities which devolve on the United Kingdom therefrom. Consideration must also be given to the situation which might arise if the United States were neutral in a war in which Great Britain was engaged.

5. Before, however, Mr. Bevin can proceed to consult the British Chiefs of Staff, he would be glad for some clarification from the United States Government on the following points:

(a)
Are these bases in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands the only bases which the United States Government are seeking in that part of the Eastern Atlantic? Or are they also contemplating establishing bases at Dakar or elsewhere in French Colonial territory, or in Liberia, etc.?
(b)
In earlier conversations2 arising out of the desire of His Majesty’s Government to withdraw their forces from the Azores at the earliest possible moment, the United States Government had spoken of their desire to establish bases in the Azores either under tripartite Anglo-United States-Portuguese control or under the Security Council of the United Nations Organisation. The present proposals, however, seem to contemplate both in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands a predominantly United States base under joint United States-Portuguese control in which His Majesty’s Government would have no part. In conversations with Mr. Freeman Matthews3 it was made clear that in the event of it being decided to proceed with plans for a base on a short-term lease pending the entry into force of the World Security Organisation, His Majesty’s Government would wish to participate. It was subsequently suggested that the possibility of Brazilian participation should be carefully considered.

As regards the question of British participation, quite apart from His Majesty’s Government’s vital interest in this part of the world from the strategic angle, their long-standing and intimate connection with Portugal makes it politically essential from their point of view that, if any base is to be set up in the Azores and the Cape Verde [Page 219] Islands before the coming into force of the World Security Organisation, His Majesty’s Government should participate in it as an equal partner. Furthermore, in view of the previous attitude of the Portuguese Government over the negotiations for the establishment of wartime bases in the Azores, His Majesty’s Government cannot help feeling that if the United States Government were to press for a base with which His Majesty’s Government were not actively associated, they might well meet with a refusal from Portugal.

As regards the participation of Brazil, His Majesty’s Government believe that this would be likely to make the project considerably more acceptable to Portugal, more particularly if the Portuguese Government were allowed to take the initiative in approaching the Brazilians.

(c)
What action does the United States Government contemplate taking vis-à-vis the French Government in respect of their Cape Verde Islands proposals? These Islands are not far from Dakar and, apart from their general interest in the security arrangements for that part of the Eastern Atlantic, the French Government would, presumably, be particularly interested in any arrangements for the establishment of bases in the Cape Verde Islands. To ignore this interest might have embarrassing consequences.

6. Apart, however, from the foregoing considerations, His Majesty’s Government feel strongly that it would be wiser not to proceed with any plans for the establishment of bases in the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands now, but to await the coming into force of the World Security System, and the entry of Portugal into the United Nations Organisation. Apart from the obvious objections in principle to doing anything which might be regarded as implying a lack of confidence in the United Nations Organisation or which might encourage the U.S.S.R. to take unilateral action in respect of bases they desire, there would not seem to be any necessity from the military point of view for establishing bases in these Portuguese Islands in the immediate future. Nor is there the same need, as there is in the case of Iceland, to forestall the Russians. Furthermore, it is believed that the chances of Portugal agreeing to the setting up of a base in Portuguese territory would be very greatly increased if these bases were to form part of the general World Security System and if the Portuguese action could be represented as a valuable contribution from Portugal to international security. Mr. Bevin wishes therefore to represent to Mr. Byrnes the advantages of pursuing this matter on that basis.

If, however, the United States Government feel obliged to press on with the matter now, His Majesty’s Government will, of course, be very ready to consider to what extent they can assist. They would first, however, be glad to know the answers to the three points set out [Page 220] in paragraph 5 above. Mr. Bevin would also be grateful for assurances that,

(i)
the bases were being sought on a purely short-term basis pending the coming into force of the World Security Organisation,
(ii)
His Majesty’s Government would be associated in both projects as an equal partner,
(iii)
The United States Government would coordinate their representations to the Portuguese Government very closely with His Majesty’s Government.

8. Mr. Bevin hopes that the United States Government will not make any approach to the Portuguese Government until agreement has been reached between the United States Government and His Majesty’s Government as to the best method of proceeding. Mr. Byrnes will appreciate that, if approached unilaterally by the United States Government, the Portuguese Government might well consult His Majesty’s Government and make some appeal to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, which would place His Majesty’s Government in a highly embarrassing position.

9. Finally, Mr. Bevin desires to remind Mr. Byrnes that, at the request of the State Department, His Majesty’s Government some weeks ago postponed a communication they were about to make to the Portuguese Government notifying them of the date on which the British forces would evacuate the present British base in the Azores. The Portuguese Government had already, a little time before, been informed that His Majesty’s Government were giving consideration to this matter and would shortly be making a further communication to them on the subject. The delay in making the further communication is becoming increasingly embarrassing. Furthermore, the delay is also embarrassing to the British Service authorities who tire anxious to start making their plans for evacuating the base and cannot do so until the date has been agreed upon with the Portuguese Government.

  1. See p. 205.
  2. Director of the Office of European Affairs.