861.24/3–2045: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 21—10 a.m.]
823. ReDepts 622, March 16, midnight. I fully agree that the S–c offer should be withdrawn and that in connection with any new agreement most of the long range equipment should be eliminated. We now have ample proof that it takes very much longer than we had been led to believe for the Soviets to erect, install and get into operation new plants. This is due to the incompetence of the Soviet engineers, the shortage of qualified labor and to the loss and damage to components during shipment and storage. Also a number of the factors which led me to recommend a year ago that favorable consideration be given to some of this long range equipment are obviously no longer present. In addition the labor and material needed for our own accelerated war effort have now clearly a prior claim. There may be certain requirements for equipment for plants which are exceptional [Page 989] but these should not be accepted without prior consultation and approval of General Deane32 and the United States Military Mission in Moscow.
I would be much interested to learn of the present ideas of the terms of a new 3–c offer as suggested by the phrase “but agree to discuss a new agreement”. Unfortunately I believe the Soviet officials have gotten the idea that our motivation in making the original 3–c offer was primarily to assist American postwar economy rather than to be helpful to Russia. This is probably due to comments in our press, statements by our manufacturers and also certain public officials. Great care therefore should be exercised in connection with any negotiations to offset as far as possible this impression.
Unless agreement is reached before discussions begin regarding the Fifth Protocol requirements I believe we should make it plain to the Soviets that this lack of agreement will affect our Fifth Protocol offers. In other words, unless we know the Soviet Government is going to take and pay for, after the cessation of hostilities, goods put into production for them we must screen more carefully and reduce the quantities offered during the Fifth Protocol period. In any event I believe our interests can now be better served by giving greater consideration to the Lend-Lease requirements of our western Allies, rather than maintaining the high priority previously accorded to all Soviet requests. This principle should be taken into consideration not only in connection with the Fifth Protocol but also in connection with allocation of shipping and new Russian requests for the balance of the Fourth Protocol.
In connection with the Soviet Ambassador’s reference to the aide-mémoire handed me on January 3 regarding postwar financing, I feel that no commitment or implied commitment should be put in writing at this time in connection with the protocol but that we should give energetic and detailed consideration to the issues raised. Since this question was not discussed at Yalta, I have taken no action on Department’s cable 183, January 27, 10 p.m. I would appreciate further instructions in light of subsequent developments.
I am satisfied the Soviet Government places the highest importance on obtaining equipment from us for postwar reconstruction and we should continue to give them justifiable hopes that reasonable arrangements can be worked out.
- Maj. Gen. John R. Deane. Chief of the U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.↩