033.1100/9–1545: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
[Received 7 p.m.]
3277. For the Under Secretary.44 Colmer group and Senator Pepper were received by Stalin yesterday evening.45 Interviews were separate, that of the Senator following immediately on that of the Congressmen. I was present at both interviews, made presentations and translated for Americans. Stalin had his own translator for his own statements. Vyshinski was present throughout.
Colmer conducted discussion on behalf of Congressional group. He began by referring to interest of committee in question of credits to Russia and in Russian foreign trade plans. Stalin recounted in detail 6 billion dollar proposal made to our Govt last winter and stated that no answer to this had yet been received. Somewhat illogically he added that our differences had so far been over interest rates. He himself thought that prices would be a greater difficulty and that if we [Page 882] could eventually agree on prices question of interest rates could be easily solved. He proceeded to recount items which were needed for reconstruction, mentioning 5 million tons of rails, 100,000 [10,000]46 locomotives, 100,000 to 150,000 railway cars, 40,000 to 50,000 machine tools, equipment for metallurgical plants, blast furnaces, etc. They could take about one million tons of grains and meat, he said, particularly for Far East. They might also be able to take large amounts of cotton. Finally there were surplus military materials in Europe, particularly transportation equipment, which they could use. If 6 billion figure was not sufficient to satisfy these needs it might be increased. As to form of repayment he mentioned various raw materials and gold. Colmer inquired as to proportion which each of these items, i.e. gold and raw materials, might assume. Stalin replied that it was premature to talk of this, that a decision in principle must first be reached about the loan, then experts could sit down and decide these other questions.
Colmer asked what assurances we could have that if Soviet Union eventually became economically self-sufficient, it would still be interested in conducting trade with other countries. Stalin replied that the greater the economic development of a country the greater its foreign trade potential. To import, a country had to be economically strong. Russia, for example, could import and absorb three times as much as China, despite China’s greater population because Russia was more developed. Russian internal market was boundless. Russia had work[ed] for 50 years to build up domestic economy. In answer to a question as to plans for development of Soviet export trade to China, Stalin said possibilities were not great. Russia had all it could do to develop its own Far Eastern districts. Soviet Far East was administratively connected with European Russia, but economically it still led its own existence. There were 50 cities to be built out there and 3,000 kilometers of railroads to be laid down. In these circumstances how could Russia spare much of anything for China?
Colmer referred to large demands of Soviet Union for export surpluses of eastern European countries and asked how in view of this factor we could expect to get paid for exports to those countries. Stalin said that actually Russia could not take much from these countries and had relatively little to give them. Demands made on them up to this time had been dictated by circumstances of military occupation. Troops would soon be removed. Then things would be different. They had found, for example, in case of Rumania that possibilities were not great. They did not object to participation of other countries in trade with those nations. In support of this he [Page 883] cited recent Soviet assent to proposed erection of new Dodge automobile plant in Rumania. (After Congressmen had completed their interview and left Stalin took me aside and said: “Tell your fellows not to worry about those eastern European countries. Our troops are going to get out of there and things will be all right.”)
Stalin declined to be drawn out on subject of Russia’s future participation in development of international civil aviation. They would do their part, he said, but he could not state at this time what form this would take.
Colmer asked what their plans were for utilization of labor of POWs,47 pointing out that we had common problem in this respect. Stalin said that as long as no peace treaty existed Russians would presumably go on using them as they were now being used: in mines, forests, construction work, etc. At the moment Soviet transportation system was terribly over-taxed with repatriation of 5 million civilian deportees, 2 million Soviet POWs and 3 million men being demobilized out of armed services, not to mention needs of forces in Far East. Until these people could be brought back Soviet labor force would remain disrupted. As soon as it was possible, however, to get Soviet citizens back into jobs now performed by German prisoners, labor of latter would be dispensed with. It was not very productive anyway.
To a question about publication of economic data, Stalin stated such publication would soon be resumed as before the war. To Colmer’s remark that some people at home feared that Russia intended to maintain large war economy Stalin said it would be suicidal for them not to reconvert.
With Senator Pepper, Stalin went over some of the same ground about Russia’s reconstruction needs. He said that Russia’s pig iron output, over 20 million tons before the war, was now only 8 to 9 million. Oil output had been over 30 million tons, was now about 18 million. They were now in process of demobilizing over 3 million men, close to 4 million. They would have as many again to demobilize. Eventually Red Army would be reduced to one-third its wartime strength.
Senator asked what to tell people at home who thought Russia had aggressive intentions with respect to border countries. Stalin scoffed at this suggestion. “Our people are tired”, he said, “they couldn’t be induced to make war on anybody any more.”
On the question of the foreign policies of Labor Government in England, Stalin said he had impression at Potsdam that Laborites were anxious nobody should think they were less zealous for protection of British imperial interests than Conservatives. He agreed with [Page 884] Senator that their policies would probably show some change as soon as they felt able to risk such a development.
Stalin spoke soberly and without either optimism or pessimism of difficulties in path of maintenance of big power collaboration in peacetime conditions. He acknowledged prime importance of American-Russian relations.48 As for England, there was not really much England could do for them or they could do for England. Asked if he was satisfied with American efforts to achieve postwar collaboration, he would only admit that the Americans are “seeking” means for such collaboration. To Senator’s statement that he was known affectionately among American public as “Uncle Joe”, Stalin replied that he did not know what he had done to deserve this. Senator concluded by asking whether there were any advice or suggestions Generalissimo could give him. In reply Stalin urged him to attempt to view Russia objectively, neither to praise it nor to scold it, and to make his judgements only on basis of facts and not of rumors.
Sent to Dept, repeated to London for the Secretary, and for Ambassador Harriman upon arrival, No. 454 to London.
- Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State. Secretary Byrnes was attending the Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting in London, September 11–October 2.↩
- Memoranda of several conversations by this group and by Senator Pepper with officials of the Soviet Government are filed under 861.50/9–2645 and 033.1100/10–245.↩
- Correction based on telegram 3614, October 20, 1945, 10 p.m., from Moscow, not printed.↩
- Prisoners of war.↩
- In the report written by Senator Pepper of his interview with Stalin, included as an enclosure in despatch 2162, October 2, 1945, from Moscow, this subject was more fully elaborated: “I said did the Generalissimo feel that the United States was collaborating with the Soviet Union in a satisfactory way in international collaboration. He said that the common interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in the war had brought the two nations very close together and the Soviet Union was very greatly indebted to the United States for the help which the Soviet Union had received from the United States. However, he said that tie which has held us together no longer exists and we shall have to find a new basis for our close relations in the future. That will not always be easy he said. He continued, ‘Christ said seek and ye shall find’.” (033.1100/10–245)↩