871.00/8–2145: Telegram
The Acting American Representative in Rumania (Melbourne) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:50 p.m.]
575. The King’s decision to make no further comment to Premier Groza when the latter three times refused his formal request to resign has [was] prompted by his desire to present to the three Allied Governments the issue of an unconstitutional force impeding him in the normal discharge of his constitutional function, without desiring to widen the gap further than necessary between the opposition and the Communists. He was induced to this careful course by three main factors: (1) strong Soviet displeasure and possible serious reactions, (2) uncertainty as to the British views on it (my telegram 563 of August 1947), (3) apparent inability of the US and Great Britain to exert any pressure upon Russia except at the conference table.
Although the King’s advisers knew the United States did not favor any present Communist attacks upon the King (my telegram 563 of August 19) yet they and the opposition knew this Mission had no instructions as to American reaction if arrests or threats were made by NDF (National Democratic Front) or Soviet officials.
Local American instructions were stronger than the British since it was possible to state definitely the US did not intend establishing diplomatic relations with the NDF Cabinet; it was known the US supported the King and that the American attitude toward the NDF had been expressed locally to both the Government and the Russians.
The political opposition naturally is jubilant at the step taken by the King. But at an interview General Schuyler and myself had with Dinu Bratianu this morning, I took the occasion to emphasize that the opposition should take extra precautions to remain calm, avoiding all demonstrations, assemblies, and any pretexts that might be seized upon by the NDF or the Red Army to intervene. Also I remarked that responsible [Page 584] opposition leagues should not seek to interpret the King’s action as hostile to the Soviet Union, since it would be foolhardy in the present delicate situation to arouse Russian hostility when it is vital to secure Soviet cooperation at any joint conference upon Rumania. Through two responsible sources I have communicated this message to Julius Maniu.
Through an emissary Maniu stated to this Mission his conviction Groza must resign since he could not maintain a provocative attitude toward the Anglo-Americans. He has postponed a party meeting scheduled for yesterday until the King’s appeal to the Three Powers is known. It is reliably reported that Mihalache Vice President of National Peasant Party has informed the King personally that he also is in complete accord with Maniu’s views.
Last evening Communist Secretary General of the NDF48 convoked a meeting which unsuccessfully attempted to draft a statement to be published saying that information received in Rumania as to the American and British attitude toward the regime was invalid because it was not written and because it was transmitted to the Government by “an inferior functionary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. (My telegram 568 of August 21). Reportedly Tatarescu informed his dissident National Liberals that nothing was changed in the makeup of the Government.
No authoritative word has been received from Petrescu and the Socialists as to the party’s intention to resign from the NDF Government.
The ideas advanced in my telegram 558 of August 1749 as to the desirability of a technical government for Rumania as the only possible government under present conditions with a fighting chance for survival remains unchanged.
Even this government would be subjected to the most severe strains if a dissatisfied Soviet Union sought to provoke internal disorder and political agitation, to capitalize upon its serious agricultural and economic difficulties and to denounce its execution of the armistice convention.
Repeated to Moscow as 170.
- Not printed; it reported, inter alia, that the King had been informed by the British Political Representative that the British Government did not wish to give any advice or encouragement to the King since it would be impossible to protect him from the consequences of an overthrow of the government; the British Government did not, however, consider the National Democratic Front a democratic or representative regime (871.00/8–1945).↩
- Vasile Luca.↩
- Not printed; it recommended that an alternative to the current Rumanian regime, in the event of an appeal by the King to the three Allied Powers under the Yalta Declaration, would be the decision by the armistice signatories to prescribe a cabinet of technicians, envisaging the nominal participation of the four major Rumanian political parties under the terms of a political truce, to implement a program prescribed by the Three Powers (871.00/8–1745).↩