740.00119 Council/12–1345: Telegram
The United States Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 13—2:47 p.m.]
759. Dept’s 398, Dec 11. As you contemplate discussions with Soviet and British representatives during your stay in Moscow looking to solution of outstanding differences regarding Bulgarian and Rumanian situations, I am sure you will understand the motives that cause me to restate here much that you already know far better than I do.
My observations in this part of the world during past year have convinced me that public opinion throughout southeastern Europe, except for members of the Communist Party and other supporters of authoritarian political principles that place state above all human rights, holds that world events of past 6 years have thrust world democratic leadership on US.
It is the view of this body of opinion that all national and regional problems fade into insignificance before the great uncertainty as to whether US is going to accept this leadership and carry democratic peoples forward in their aspiration for free and productive life.
The alternative, as this opinion sees matters, is triumph again of those repressive and fearful governmental methods and practices to abolish which forever war just terminated was fought. To this body of opinion Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe has become much more than promise of peace and tranquility to come; it is a yardstick whereby to measure distant future, because if US does not defend that declaration and struggle for its implementation then it will be clear that US does not really mean to accept the responsibilities toward free men that the war has trust upon it.
All eyes in Bulgaria today are turned toward Moscow; this time not because Russia has become Bulgarian political Canossa but because of conviction of all that major decisions are about to be taken [Page 411] at Moscow with respect to political situation throughout southeastern Europe.
The Govt and its entourage profess conviction that you and Mr. Bevin are prepared to accept compromise with respect to Bulgarian affairs in connection with compromises elsewhere in world which will mean that Yalta Declaration will not be implemented here.
Those who are unhappy over existing Communist-dominated authoritarian state of affairs, and they represent vast majority of Bulgarians, cling to hope that democratic leadership will be firmly grasped at Moscow by US but they tremble before fear that govt’s assertions to contrary may be substantiated by decisions taken at Moscow.
Under these circumstances I feel obliged to telegraph in support of course of action along lines of formula suggested in paragraph 4 mytel 730, Dec 3 (repeated to Moscow as 331) and to urge that every effort possible be made to induce Russia to join in counselling return to constitution, limitation of legislative program, early administrative elections and new general elections.
While formula is not sugar coated, it is nevertheless minimum formula containing nothing that could prove distasteful to Russia—even local Communists—granted minimum of good faith on part of Russia and Communists. If good faith is entirely absent, then there is no peaceful way for time being of reaching agreement on such fundamental issues as those involved in disagreement between western democracies and Russia over situation now obtaining in southeastern Europe.
On the other hand loyal adherence to formula would in fairly near future, I believe, correct most of serious disabilities against which we complain in Bulgaria after which mere passage of time should correct less grave causes for our dissatisfaction.
In its telegram 363 of Nov 6 to Sofia46 “For Mr. Ethridge” Dept suggested that after informing Mr. Molotov of Ethridge’s findings it might be stated to Molotov that the US would welcome proposals from him but that if he, Molotov, was unwilling to make suggestions then Ethridge might reveal specific views.
Fact that Russian authorities had nothing to say to Ethridge but that his facts were wrong or at any rate that his estimate of situation in Bulgaria did not correspond with Russian view leads me to suggest that if something along lines of formula in mytel 730 is to be proposed at Moscow then there might be some merit in avoiding any preliminary discussion of reasons for our discontent with conditions here. My experience with Russians in the field (I realize that this may have no meaning in dealing with authorities in Moscow) leads me to believe [Page 412] that Russian authorities object far less to strong determined support of a positive course of action than to detailed and reasoned statements of what is wrong with a given situation. However, immediate foregoing is in realm of tactics and what I am really trying to do in this telegram is to convey last minute impressions. Summarized they are that hopes of southeastern Europe for realization of larger objectives of Second World War are based almost entirely on what you, supported by Mr. Bevin, may be able to do as spokesman for world democratic leadership.
Repeated to Dept as 759.