740.00119 Control (Germany)/10–1345
The United States Political Adviser for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 2.]
Sir: …
. . . . . . .
On arriving in Munich on September 25 I immediately contacted Dr. Dorn21 and Colonel Roy Dalferes, head of the Military Government Detachment for Bavaria. On the subject of de-Nazification they told me frankly that sixteen individuals in the Department of Food and Agriculture, Ministry of Economics, and four in the Ministry of Finance who were in the automatic removal category had been allowed to continue in office, but that this had been done on the authority of American officers of the Military Government Detachment and not as a result of concealment on the part of the responsible German officials. They also informed me of the recent removal of Ministerial [Page 983] Director Karl Fischer who had been retained in office for some time although he was in the automatic removal category. It also appeared that former Minister President Fritz Schaeffer had retained as a private consultant Herr Gessler after Gessler’s removal from public office, although the latter also was in the automatic removal category.
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It was immediately obvious that public confidence in the Bavarian administration was at an extremely low ebb and that the administration possessed only shadow authority and was ineffective. It is not my opinion that this is entirely the fault of the German officials involved. It should be said in their behalf that they are dealing with American officers, many of whom possessed no knowledge of Germany or the German language and in some cases little knowledge of government. Liaison between the top Military Government officers and the higher German officials was exceedingly tenuous. Herr Schaeffer complained bitterly that he had seen no one in authority for a period of many weeks. There was also obvious a tendency on the part of our Military Government to undertake far too much in the way of direct administration and not by any means an organized effort to place responsibility on the German administration. No real effort had been made to support the organization of a broad based administration. At the time of my arrival in Munich only three Ministers were in office. The result was inevitable that blame for faulty administration and error fell directly on the Military Government Detachment, whereas the responsibility often should in the first place have rested with the German officials.
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It should be remembered that throughout this period the Army had the tremendous responsibility of the repatriation of millions of displaced persons, vast redeployment problems, and the necessity of acquainting itself with conditions in a foreign country which many officers had never before visited. Another feature which I believe will grow in importance as time goes on is the number of intrigues among competing German officials which are difficult at times for the inexperienced foreigner to gauge and understand. It is my opinion that we will observe an increasing amount of subtle denunciation of officials who will be described as unreliable, reactionary, fascist, pro-Nazi and the like by political opponents eager for office. For example, in the present instance former Minister President Schaeffer has been variously described as a black reactionary and pro-Nazi. Remembering that Schaeffer was himself incarcerated by the Nazis in Dachau and that even his most extreme opponents could not say that he had ever been a member of the Nazi party, I found that Schaeffer could at the worst be described as an old time conservative whose [Page 984] prototype may be frequently found in American public office. There is heavy evidence of his anti-Nazi record throughout the years. However, it was obvious that his usefulness was at an end, due to public criticism.
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Reference should also be made to the numerous comments made in the American press regarding the intervention of Cardinal Faulhaber22 in Bavarian state politics. I believe that it is true that in the early days of the occupation, Cardinal Faulhaber did make a number of recommendations to our Military Government authorities but it is clear also that our Military Government authorities took the initiative in this matter and sought his advice and counsel. I believe they were justified in this at the beginning because it was necessary for them to gain a knowledge of the personalities in the field and there was no doubt regarding Cardinal Faulhaber’s long-continued opposition to National Socialism, which he fought as best he could under the circumstances. As has been pointed out before, approximately 1400 Catholic priests were interned at one time or another in concentration camps and a number of them died there. Discussion of this phase of the matter with Cardinal Faulhaber leaves no doubt in one’s mind regarding the latter’s views of National Socialism. As a result of my inquiries at Munich I am also convinced that Cardinal Faulhaber will carefully refrain in future from political activity of any sort. I believe that he will be quite content to devote his remaining strength and effort to religious welfare and activity, in which he is of course primarily interested. I believe also that he deserves credit for having honestly cooperated with our Military Government authorities.
Two additional items emerged from these conversations:
- 1.
- A doubt which may be entirely honest in the minds of some regarding the wisdom of our present policy of de-Nazification which removes from office by classes public officials and members of trade and industry, leaving to them only the possibility of gaining a livelihood as day laborers. The suggestion was made that eventually we must come to a more individual treatment of this question and that the individual should have some kind of hearing, on the ground that the broad and sweeping classification now used overlooks individual circumstances and causes grave injuries.
- 2.
- Recruiting by the Communist party of former members of the National Socialist party. Munich is full of current rumors to the effect that inducements are being offered to former Nazis to join the Communist party. The explanation is given that the Communists hope to acquire as members selected Nazis who will provide a nucleus of ability and brains and who are blocked under present circumstances [Page 985] from entry into any of the other parties and are only able to obtain work as day laborers.
Mr. Beam,23 who accompanied me on the visit to Munich, pointed out quite correctly that there seemed to be an undue amount of activity on the part of would-be political leaders and not enough on a popular basis. We considered it unfortunate that in the time that has elapsed since the Potsdam Conference and since the telegraphic instruction of August 6 permitting democratic political parties to form,24 not a single party has been established in Munich nor have any political rallies been allowed. The Military Government Office of Munich mentioned that applications had been received from seven or eight political parties but had not been acted upon pending the issuance of detailed instructions by Third Army Headquarters. We saw these instructions in draft form and we objected that they were too restrictive, particularly in that they require all members of a particular party to submit Fragebogen. What our Military Government officers fear most is that Nazis will infiltrate the new parties. We explained, and I believe our officers now understand the point, that the sponsors can be held accountable for the democratic nature of their parties and that in any event active competition between the parties will induce them to present a clear record on de-Nazification.
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Respectfully yours,
- The information contained in this report on the Bavarian political situation was designed primarily to supplement that in telegram 680, October 3, 7 p.m., from Berlin, p. 971. The portions of the despatch here printed present mainly material not touched upon in telegram 680.↩
- Mr. Murphy had previously stated that Walter L. Dorn “of G–5 USFET, a specialist on German government, had been detailed to Munich to investigate the application of our de-Nazification policy in that area.”↩
- Michael Cardinal Faulhaber, Archbishop of Munich.↩
- Jacob D. Beam, on the staff of the United States Political Adviser for Germany.↩
- Reference is presumably to War Department telegram SC–6037, August 7, from General Eisenhower, p. 954.↩