Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 Control (Germany)/6–2245: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

San Francisco, June 22, 1945.
[Received June 22—11:26 p.m.]

18. My immediately preceding telegram in regard to the proposal to demilitarize Germany. Thompson’s memorandum reads as follows:

“The conclusion of such a treaty would have two great advantages. In the first place it would greatly reduce Soviet fears that Germany will one day be allowed to regain her strength and be used by the western powers in an anti-Soviet combination. With Germany demilitarized, no combination of European powers could effectively threaten the Soviet Union and the latter could afford to adopt a more liberal policy, particularly in eastern Europe. This would make it possible to break the vicious circle in which Soviet moves to insure her security tends to bring about the very combination of powers against her which she seeks to avoid.

In the second place, such a treaty would strengthen the influence of the United States in European affairs, generally, as it would go far to remove the fear of European states that we may within a few years turn our back on Europe and return to the policy of isolation.

The chief arguments against such a treaty are the following:

1. The conclusion of the treaty might be interpreted as showing lack of faith in the efficacy of the United Nations organization. It would undoubtedly detract from the charter of the United Nations if such a treaty were submitted to the Senate at about the same time as the charter.

2. There is great risk in proposing a treaty of this kind unless it is virtually certain that the Senate would accept it. A Senate debate on the subject, which might rally isolationist and anti-Soviet forces would probably be bitter and would not strengthen our international position at this critical time.

3. The chief argument against our proposing at the Big Three meeting the immediate conclusion of such a treaty relates to the question of timing. Germany is already effectively being demilitarized and will remain so as long as it is occupied by Allied troops. For the treaty to be fully effective, it should contain provisions, or be related to other arrangements, which cannot be determined at this time, it would be difficult, for example, to agree upon specific provisions covering inspection and enforcement measures until it is definitely known whether or not Germany is to be dismembered. It would appear more appropriate to conclude a treaty on this subject at such time as our troops are withdrawn from Germany and/or the Allied control machinery ceases to function. At that time we could take advantage of the experience gained in the operation of the control machinery; the United Nations organization would presumably have come into operation and we could better judge to what extent the treaty should be related to it. The development of the post-war political situation in Europe should by then have become sufficiently clear as to enable us to conclude a more effective treaty than would be the case at this time. Moreover, at that time we could propose the simultaneous conclusion of a similar treaty with respect to Japan. There could be little doubt but that this would facilitate approval of the arrangement concerning Germany.

In view of the foregoing it would seem advisable for us to agree in principle to such a treaty but to defer the date of its conclusion. Should this matter be raised at the Big Three meeting, or should we decide to take the initiative in doing so, we could indicate our willingness and intention to conclude such treaties at the appropriate time. We could point out:

1. That we are already proceeding to the de facto demilitarization of Germany.

2. That juridically the question is now covered by the terms of the Moscow declaration⁷⁸ which states, inter alia, that the signatories ‘will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy’ and that ‘they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy’.

3. That following the defeat of Japan and before such time as our troops of occupation are withdrawn from Germany and/or the Allied control of Germany is terminated, we intend to propose the conclusion of long term treaties providing for the demilitarization of both Germany and Japan.”

78. For text of the Declaration of Four Nations (United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China), on General Security, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, released to the press on November 1, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 755.