Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, European Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, Volume III

740.00119 EW/5–1945

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

[Extract]⁴⁰

[Washington,] May 19, 1945.

Participants:	The Acting Secretary of State
	Mr. George Bidault, French Foreign Minister
	Mr. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador
	Mr. William Phillips
	Mr. Freeman Matthews

. . . . . . .

Germany

M. Bidault said that he would like to set forth his ideas with regard to the treatment of Germany. He said that he understood that the thinking of the United States and of the British on the long term treatment of Germany—he was not referring merely to the occupation period—had not crystalized but was still in a fluid state. He said that he himself had formerly thought that Germany should be divided up into a number of pieces but that he had revised his thinking on this. He has, however, some definite ideas: the Rhineland and the Ruhr and Westphalia should, he was convinced, be separated from the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there were certain definite objections to putting that whole area into a single state. He thought the separate parts of it should be treated differently:

(1) As to the Saar region, France did not desire to annex it but was determined to have the Saar coal.

(2) North of the Saar there is an agricultural area over which France feels she must have definite control for security reasons. This area included only the left bank of the Rhine up through Cologne and possibly one or two bridgeheads across the river. It was the area through which France had so often suffered military invasion. If it is placed in the hands of some international organization, the occupation of it might end by some “majority vote” against France. He emphasized that what France wanted was control and not annexation (though he did not define this difference). He said this would not mean slavery nor deportation for the population. While some elements of the population, such as Gestapo members or those who might preach a German resurgence and unification, might be deported from the area, it was his expectation that the local population would remain there. The French, he said, again wish to control this agricultural area north to Cologne without any restrictive international supervision.

(3) He then came to the Ruhr. This region, he said, was the source of power and wealth of Germany and he felt should be definitely placed under the control of an international regime.

If a single Rhineland-Ruhr-Westphalia state is created, M. Bidault said, the standard of living in that area would probably be higher than the rest of Germany, its population would be privileged and it would attract more people from other regions of Germany. It conceivably could become another Prussia or Piedmont and form the nucleus or rallying point for a new strong, unified Germany. Under an international control, if such control were set up, the Russians might not agree with the western Europeans as to the policy to be applied. Therefore, as he had said before, he was opposed to the creation of a single Rhine-Ruhr state under international control. Germany will, he believes, in the nature of things, look to the west for hope and particularly to the Rhine area and he does not wish to see a powerful state established which will play one country off against another in typical German fashion, thus dividing the Allies.

In reply to a question, M. Bidault said that it might not be necessary to distinguish between the Saar and his agricultural area on the left bank of the Rhine though apparently what he wants in the Saar is only the control or ownership of the mines, whereas he wants complete security control in the area north of it. He admitted that he has not yet thought out the details. He did not specify what the nature of the international regime to govern the Ruhr should be but he did say in reply to a question that he was opposed to Germany having heavy metallurgical and machine tool industries or any substantial chemical industry. He said the Germans should be allowed to have industries such as textiles and in general “enough to let them live”.

His views with regard to the treatment to be applied to the remainder of Germany have not developed. The German people, he said, are badly shocked and there will be no elements prepared to take over a government of the country. He believes that we should wait some months to see how conditions develop before deciding whether the country should be divided into one or more states.

In reply to a question as to whether France desired to utilize German labor as a form of reparation, he said that he had not definitely made up his mind. He thought, however, that a number of Germans, particularly those military elements who knew the job, should be utilized for clearing France of the many thousands of mines which have been laid throughout the country. He said that Dautry, the Minister of Reconstruction had estimated that it would cost ten billion francs, ten years labor and fifty thousand dead finally to clear France of mines.

In concluding his remarks on Germany, M. Bidault reiterated that he had merely wanted to present these strong views of his Government with regard to the Rhineland and he did not seem to expect an immediate answer as to the American position. He was told that, as he had intimated, our ideas on the long term territorial treatment of Germany have not yet crystalized.

. . . . . . .

Joseph C. Grew

40. This memorandum has been printed virtually in its entirety in Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945 (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1952), vol. ii, pp. 1507–1513.