740.00119 EAC/5–745: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 7—8:11 p.m.]
4628. Cornea 230. At its May 3 meeting the European Advisory Commission began the detailed consideration of the US draft General Directive circulated as EAC 45/30 of April 6, with corrigendum of April 20.28 In opening the discussion Gousev and Strang stated emphatically their views that certain points in the General Directive are not in accord with the decisions of the Yalta Conference. I maintained that the General Directive is based on and drafted to fall within the scope of the Yalta decisions.
Paragraph 1. Gousev stated that this paragraph was incorporated in article 1 of the control machinery agreement and asked why any new statement was needed. Strang also felt that the control machinery agreement had said all that was necessary on this subject and saw no need for this paragraph. [I] replied that in a directive addressed to the Commanders in Chief it was helpful to have this paragraph included.
Strang contended that paragraph 1 was not in accord with article 3 of the control machinery agreement which states that the Control Council is “to initiate plans and reach agreed decisions”. He recalled that the expression “to formulate policy” used in paragraph 1 of the General Directive had been proposed during discussion of the agreement on control machinery and had been rejected. He asked whether a difference was intended. I stated that no difference was intended and offered to consider a redrafting of paragraph 1 to bring its wording into line with the control machinery agreement.
Strang pointed out that the second sentence of paragraph 1 goes beyond the control machinery agreement in that the latter does not provide specifically for the contingency of there being no agreed Allied policy. He recalled that in discussing the provision for unanimous decisions by the Control Council it had been informally understood that if the Control Council failed to reach an agreed [Page 505] policy the Commanders in Chief would refer the matter to their governments. Strang asked whether this sentence gives complete liberty of action to each government in its zone in absence of agreed policies and whether any one Commander in Chief would then be able to negate agreement in the Control Council and thus to obtain complete liberty of action in his zone.
Massigli29 felt that failure to agree in the Council would mean that the question in dispute would be referred to the governments and that action would meanwhile be suspended. Strang agreed with this interpretation in so far as it applied to “matters affecting Germany as a whole”. I emphasized that in many instances action could not be suspended and that in absence of an agreed policy the Commander would have to act in his zone on instructions from his own government. Massigli felt on the other hand that any matter of principle important enough to come before the Council would thereby require uniform action by all four Commanders.
Strang alleged one important difference between the control machinery agreement and the US General Directive; the former assumes agreed decisions while the latter postulates the case of no agreed decision. He concluded that the US General Directive was “less optimistic”. Massigli felt that the US Directive erred in not impressing on the Commanders the paramount necessity for reaching agreed decisions and reconciling divergent views. He proposed recording the second sentence to provide that the Commanders must, first, do everything possible to reach agreement in the Council and second refer disagreements to their governments; and, third, only later act independently in their zones.
Strang asked whether it was necessary to add anything to what had been said in the control machinery agreement. He proposed omitting paragraph 1 entirely, and leaving it to the Commanders in Chief to work the control agreement, consulting their governments in case they cannot agree. In view of Gousev’s rather marked non-participation in discussion of paragraph 1, I again stated at the close of this part of the discussion that the US Government gives full support of [to] the control machinery agreement as approved and that nothing in the General Directive is intended to contradict or weaken that agreement.
For further discussion of the US General Directive see my following telegram 4629,30 repeated to Paris for Murphy as my 249.
Sent to Department as 4628, repeated to Paris for Ambassador Murphy as my 248.
- In a memorandum by the United States Representative on the European Advisory Commission (Winant) dated April 20, 1945, transmitted to the Department in despatch 22568, April 21, from London, an omission in the text of the U.S. draft general directive on the treatment of Germany in the initial post-defeat period was corrected (740.00119 EAC/4–2145). As indicated in footnote 20, p. 480, the actual draft U.S. general directive introduced in the E.A.C. has not been printed since it was identical with the memorandum of March 23 approved by President Roosevelt except for the omission of the introductory paragraph. Therefore, paragraph references in this and the immediately following telegram from Ambassador Winant regarding paragraph 1 of draft general directive have reference to paragraph 2 of memorandum of March 23, paragraph 2 of the draft general directive would refer to paragraph 3 of the memorandum of March 23, etc.↩
- Rene Massigli, French Representative on the European Advisory Commission.↩
- Infra. ↩