740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2245
Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | Secretary Stettinius:6 |
| Acting Secretary, Mr. Grew | |
| Secretary Stettinius; | |
| Assistant Secretary, Mr. Dunn | |
| Secretary Stettinius; Assistant Secretary, Mr. Clayton |
. . . . . . .
I then told the Secretary that Secretary Morgenthau had told me privately that at a luncheon at the White House the President had reopened the whole question of post-war treatment of Germany. I said that according to Secretary Morgenthau, the President wished to withdraw the directive he had given to Secretary Stettinius, and that the President did not remember signing the directive. The President called a meeting of the State, War and Treasury Departments to discuss the whole matter. I told Mr. Stettinius that, as he knew, there was a wide divergence between Treasury and ourselves, not so much with War. I asked the Secretary what attitude he wished me to take. Mr. Dunn then took the telephone and the Secretary told him that he had asked how much 1067 had been fundamentally changed and he had not been given a memorandum on that point. The Secretary added that he had understood that the general foundation was about the same. Mr. Dunn replied that this was our interpretation of it. The Treasury Department, Mr. Dunn added, said that the new March 10 directive reverses 1067 and that is not our view. The Secretary said he would like to know what our position is, and Mr. Dunn said that this is our position—that the March 10 directive does not reverse 1067. The March 10 directive gives greater emphasis than 1067 on the centralization of control, but it does not go as far as Mr. Morgenthau read it to go. The Secretary said he thought we should endeavor to see Morgenthau and say that we ought to get on with this matter since we have already been on it months and months and ask what Treasury feels has to be changed in view of the position the President has taken. The Secretary added that if he were there he could recall to the President’s memory the conversation he had had with him at luncheon a [Page 470] week ago Monday. There would be no question, he said, of the President’s having recollected his position. The Secretary said we should now see Morgenthau with Harry White and Mr. Clayton. Mr. Dunn said that the President had called Mr. Grew and Mr. Patterson and Mr. McCloy to the White House at 12:30 today and that he, the President, was now taking over. The Secretary said he didn’t understand that, and Mr. Dunn said that the President was taking over at the instigation of our “boy friend”. The Secretary said he thought Mr. Clayton should accompany me to the White House meeting, that we should tell the President that he had given us the directive and that we should be permitted to work it out. Mr. Stettinius said that Mr. Clayton ought to tell the President that we do not think that the March 10 directive reverses 1067, and that we are still following the general philosophy of 1067 in our treatment of Germany. Mr. Dunn said the only thing was that the War Department thought that 1067 should be revised.
Mr. Clayton then took the telephone and said that Mr. Stettinius’ position was all right as to what position we should take at the White House meeting, but that the President would undoubtedly say that he thought the matter should be reopened and studied again. Mr. Clayton wanted to know what position we should take in that event. The Secretary said he felt very strongly that we ought to stand by our original position. Mr. Clayton said that Morgenthau had sent over a memorandum7 containing the points he planned to make. Mr. Clayton stated that he would read only the first point since that was the one that outlined very clearly the sharp divergence we have with Treasury. (He added that the other points could be adjusted.)
- “1. We should avoid assuming responsibility for the functioning of internal German economy and its economic controls; the maintenance and rehabilitation of German economy is a German problem and should not be undertaken by us in order to collect reparations or for any other reason except the security of the occupying forces.”
The Secretary said that the above was simply impossible—that Hitler would not leave a successor. The Secretary said “if you want to say all right, reorganize it in any way that suits you and put in anybody you want, we will stick by our position”.
The Secretary concluded by saying he thought it would be wise to have Mr. Bohlen8 on hand at the 12:30 meeting since Mr. Bohlen had kept a record of Yalta and his presence would strengthen our hand.