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The Acting Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the President 1

secret
[Washington,] November 15, 1944.

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Voting Procedure in the Security Council

Background

There are three issues involved in this connection, as follows:

1.
Size of majority
2.
Unanimity of permanent members
3.
Procedure in the event that one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute

The Russians took the position that the Council should make decisions by a simple majority vote; that unanimity of the permanent members should be required, except on procedural questions; and that the unanimity rule should prevail even when one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute.

The British took the position that the Council’s decisions should be by a two-thirds majority vote, except that procedural questions might be settled by a simple majority vote; that unanimity of the permanent members should be required on all substantive matters; and that parties to a dispute should not vote.

The Chinese position was similar to the British.

In accordance with your instructions, our delegation took a position similar to the British, except that we expressed our willingness to accept either a simple majority or a two-thirds majority.

In the course of the Dumbarton discussions, in order to meet the conflicting views, proposals were tentatively made that decisions should require the affirmative votes of seven members, rather than of six members, as would be the case under a simple majority rule, or of eight members, as would be the case under a two-thirds rule; [Page 51] and that unanimity of the permanent members should be required on all substantive matters, except that in decisions of the Council relating to pacific settlement of disputes (Section A of Chapter VIII) parties to a dispute should not vote. These proposals were not accepted, although they were favorably regarded by Sir Alexander Cadogan and his associates and by Dr. Koo and his associates.

Recommendation

It is recommended that

This government accept the formula embodied in the attached draft of a proposal on this subject and seek to obtain the acceptance of that formula by Soviet Russia and the United Kingdom.

The proposed formula is essentially along the lines of the compromise solution discussed at Dumbarton Oaks. It provides that parties to a dispute should abstain from voting in those decisions of the Council which relate to the investigation of disputes, to appeals by the Council for peaceful settlement of disputes, and to recommendations by the Council as to methods and procedures of settlement. It retains the unanimity rule for decisions relating to the determination of the existence of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace and to the suppression of such threats or breaches.

This proposal should be acceptable to this country, since no party to a dispute would sit as a judge in its own case so long as judicial or quasi-judicial procedures are involved, but would participate fully in procedures involving political rather than judicial determination. It should be acceptable to Soviet Russia because it meets her desire that no action be taken against her without her consent.

[Attachment]
secret
[Washington,] November 15, 1944.

Proposal for Section C of the Chapter on the Security Council

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Section VIII A and under paragraph 1 of Section VIII C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

  1. Printed from an unsigned copy typed in the Department of State; authorship not indicated.↩