Roosevelt Papers
The Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the President
top secret
Malta, 30 January
1945.
Nr: No #.
Top Secret memorandum for the President.
Mr. Hopkins and Mr.
Law in their
memorandum of agreement concerning shipping for liberated
areas1 made
the recommendation that the military and civilian authorities of
the respective governments
[Page 535]
be ready to make recommendations to their
heads of government at the coming conference concerning the
allocation of shipping. The British Chiefs of Staff have twice
been asked to reaffirm the overall objective of bringing about
at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of
Germany and Japan and the overall strategic concept of beating
Germany first while simultaneously extending unremitting
pressure against Japan, followed by concentration of full U.
S.–U. K. resources on Japan. Twice the British Chiefs of Staff
have conditioned their continued acceptance of these basic
agreements with the statement that this acceptance is subject to
any decisions concerning shipping at the coming conference.
The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over
the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military
uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and
over the implied willingness of the British to consider
qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest
possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a
considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months.
The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present
estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated requirements of the
United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in
Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone;
perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we
are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as
possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been
computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans
attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch
with their new fast submarines.
The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The
decision lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating
Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to
non-military programs shipping essential to military operations.
Any compromise almost certainly means prolongation of the war.
Any unnecessary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and
demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The
overriding objection from the military standpoint to these
proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is
that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the
lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of
American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason
sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra
and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.
The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has
always been recognized and these are included under the theater
commander’s military priorities. There is no doubt that more
shipping and supplies are desirable for rehabilitation to help
out the liberated peoples.
[Page 536]
At best this could be only a trickle. The
sound and quickest step toward giving the aid wanted is to end
the war quickly. The Chiefs of Staff recognize that
considerations other than military may dictate some small
allocations of shipping to non-military purposes in a priority
above everything but urgent military necessity.
Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is
essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United
States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the
heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is
considered that material change in the spirit of these
principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the
costs consequent thereto.
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of
Staff
top secret
[Malta,] 30 January
1945.
C. C. S. 746/7
After considering C. C. S. 746/62 the United States Chiefs of Staff
agree that additional relief supplies and home
rehabilitation for liberated areas are most desirable. They
consider, however, the basic truth is that the best help we
can possibly give the populations of liberated territories
in Europe or elsewhere is to win the war as quickly as
possible following out the over-all objective which has been
agreed up to this time. The principles for allocation of
shipping proposed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board
Representatives in C. C. S. 746/6 can gravely lower our
military effectiveness and may jeopardize complete victory.
The vital military point involved to the United States
Chiefs of Staff is the cost in American lives which would
almost certainly result from placing non-military
requirements in a priority where they could compete with
military needs essential to ending the global war
successfully at the earliest date.
A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money
and resources to the United States resulting from any
prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our
maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much
more than the actual number of days’ delay to a particular
operation which would result from acceding to a demand for
resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose
our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses
and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost
in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the
British representatives of the combined military
transportation committee that cuts in estimates
[Page 537]
for operations can
be made without adverse effects on those operations, the U.
S. has already reviewed its military requirements and made a
major cut below the theater commander’s minimum estimates.
If anything the minimum U. S. military requirements may
prove to be higher than contained in the study to date.
The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military
necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the
liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under
which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs
supplies in his military priorities.
They recognize that there may be consideration other than
military so over-riding as to justify at times some small
allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated
areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but
however subject always to cancellation due to urgent
military necessity.
Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in
collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can
proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly
difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is
essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their
guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas
are concerned the following principle be recommended by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:
Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the
expense of current and projected operations to press the war
to its earliest successful conclusion.
It is further recommended that the following be presented to
the heads of government as guiding principles in working out
the details of shipping allocation:
A. First priority to
- (1)
- Military requirements (including civil relief)
vital to the successful conduct of current and
projected operations in accordance with agreed
strategic concepts. This may include military
lend-lease for existing forces engaged in
operations.
- (2)
- Increasing the fighting forces of the United
Nations in order to apply greater pressure against
the Axis powers.
- (3)
- Civilian requirements that are vital to the
maintenance of the war making capacity of the United
Nations.
B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not
essential to the war making capacity of the United Nations.
This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that
envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to
the war making capacity of the United Nations.
C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for
stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or
projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.
[Page 538]
D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only
indirectly affect the war effort.
3 [E]. Requirements in higher
priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower
priorities.
F. So long as military requirements are not met in full
shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without
prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.
G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as
practicable within the above guidance in order that the
incidence of limited shipping availability on programs
essential to the military effort may be minimized.
H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority
classification of military requirements. Appropriate
civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of
civilian requirements.
