Matthews Files
The Secretary of the Treasury (Morgenthau) to the
Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)1
top secret
Washington, November 3,
1944.
Dear Ed: I am sending you herewith
Memorandum on the British Draft of Policy Directive for
Germany.
This was shown to the War Department, and with their
approval2 I gave a copy of it to Lord Cherwell just before he
left.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
top secret
[Washington
] November 1,
1944.
Memorandum on the British Draft of
Policy Directive for Germany*
1. Examination of the British document suggests that it was
intended as a long range program. We are not prepared to
make decisions on these long range issues at this time.
Moreover, the British document does not cover the major
questions involved. If, on the other hand, the British
document is only intended as an interim program it
prejudices the long range decision on important issues. In
any event, its 97 pages of detailed instructions, often on
unimportant points, is not a satisfactory medium for a high
level policy determination. The document confuses principles
with details of administration, and thus does not provide a
basis on which decisions can be readily reached through the
exchange of views. We feel strongly that we should confine
our discussions now to the major policy decisions needed for
the interim period and leave the details to be worked out at
a staff level.
2. The appropriate document for immediate discussion is the
American interim directive document.3
This document is to the large
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part a statement of principles which
after agreement would provide the basis for the preparation
of handbooks containing full details for administration. The
failure of the British Government to present its views on
this document is preventing further progress of combined
discussions on the treatment to be accorded Germany. We are
faced with the danger that the prolongation of the period in
which the military directive operates will seriously
prejudice the situation within Germany and limit the
effectiveness of long range policies which may be found to
be desirable by the three governments.
3. The following are some of the major policy issues which
the British document fails to deal with adequately and which
must be dealt with in any long range program:
- (a)
- The elimination or destruction of heavy industry
in Germany, specifically the metallurgical, chemical
and electrical industries in Germany.
- (b)
- Future boundaries of Germany.
- (c)
- Partitioning of Germany.
- (d)
- Disposition of the Ruhr through
internationalization or otherwise.
- (e)
- Restitution.
- (f)
- Reparations, including whether there will be
reparations in the form of recurring
payments.
- (g)
- A comprehensive educational program.
- (h)
- A positive program for political
decentralization.
- (i)
- The character of controls to be employed in
preventing reemergence of a powerful industrial
Germany.
- (j)
- Agrarian reform including the breaking up of the
Junker estates.
- (k)
- The punishment of war crimes and the apprehension
of war criminals.
- (l)
- The extradition of war criminals to the scene of
their crimes.
4. While it is difficult to evaluate the significance of the
detailed policy questions without an understanding of the
underlying objectives, the following comments on the British
group of directives may indicate the difference in approach:
- (a)
- Administrative convenience is frequently placed
above principle in dealing with problems of German
occupation.
- (b)
- In defining specifically certain of the powers
which the Occupation Commander will have, the
document tends to obscure the fact that the
Commander-in-Chief will have all the powers of
government and has the power to do whatever is
necessary to carry out the program determined by the
Allies.
- (c)
- In connection with the punishment of infractions
of regulations and instructions of the occupying
forces, there is a tendency in the directive to rely
on inadequate and indirect punishments and sanctions
when there is no occasion for avoiding direct
penalties.
- (d)
- The Allied Commanders are given too much
responsibility for the well functioning of the
German economy.
- (e)
- The list of persons to be detained and placed
under guard for political and security reasons is
totally inadequate and vests too
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much discretion in the
Allied Commander-in-Chief. It gives an appearance of
an attempt to shift responsibility.
- (f)
- There is too much political freedom given to the
Germans.
- (g)
- The program for keeping the German schools and
universities open at any cost ignores the need for a
fundamental reorientation of German educational
institutions.
- (h)
- We see no point in giving the Allied Military
Commander discretion in making it possible for the
German “police” to be able to retain tanks and heavy
weapons. This sounds like the beginning of the
rearmament of Germany.
- (i)
- If Austria is to be given substantially better
treatment than Germany, the treatment to be accorded
Austria should be dealt with in a separate set of
directives.
