Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

155. Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board⁰

Washington, June 10, 1946, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence
• Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, in the Chair
• Members Present
• Mr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence
• Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director of Intelligence, WDGS (Designate)
• Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
• Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
• Mr. D. M. Ladd (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
• Also Present
• Dr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Group
• Colonel Carter W. Clarke, G–2
• Captain R.K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
• Captain J.J. Rochefort, USN, O.N.I.
• Colonel E.P. Mussett, A–2
• Lt. Colonel F.K. Newcomer, G–2
• Colonel L.J. Fortier, Central Intelligence Group
• Captain W.B. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group
• Mr. L.L. Montague, Central Intelligence Group
• Colonel H.F. Cunningham, Central Intelligence Group
• Colonel C.P. Nicholas, Central Intelligence Group
• Colonel W.A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group
• Colonel T.J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group
• Secretariat
• Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence Authority
• Mr. J.K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

1. Provision of Monitoring of Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers (C.I.G. 1/1, C.I.G. 1/2, and C.I.G. 1/3)¹

Admiral Souers recalled that the proposals raised in C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2 had been considered provisionally in the previous meeting. In view of General Vandenberg’s suggestion that the operation of FBIS be assumed by State, that department had been asked to make a study of its capabilities. The State Department replied (in C.I.G. 1/3) that while they were keenly interested in having the monitoring service continue it would be impossible for the Department to assume administrative responsibility for FBIS during the next fiscal year. Admiral Souers felt that these developments justified the Members in approving C.I.G. 1/1, which in substance called for War Department operation of FBIS under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence as to collecting and distributing missions.

Dr. Langer underscored the reasons leading to State’s conclusions. These were chiefly technical and budgetary. For example, State estimated that the administrative costs of FBIS would mean a 50 per cent increase in the entire amount budgeted for State’s intelligence service—at a time when even the presently budgeted amounts had not been finally approved by Congress. There were also questions of the establishment of new stations in military zones, the transfer of some facilities now under British auspices, the procurement of new equipment, and the like—all of which he felt could be more effectively handled by the War Department at present.

General Vandenberg observed that an eventual alternative to State or War Department administration would be direct control by Central Intelligence, if C.I.G. were to obtain an operating appropriation of its own. But such considerations could not apply in the solution of the immediate problem.

In the course of the general discussion which followed it was brought out by Admiral Souers that the Central Intelligence Group at present could not accept a transfer of funds from War for direct administration of FBIS, since C.I.G. was not an authorized disbursing agency. It was therefore the consensus of the Members that the best immediate solution was operation by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department.

After concluding discussion,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved C.I.G. 1/1 subject to textual clarification to insure that the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority provided for operation of the monitoring function by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department. (Report to N.I.A. to be circulated as N.I.A. 5.)²

2. C.I.G. Weekly Summary

Admiral Souers invited discussion and criticism of the trial issue of the C.I.G. Weekly Summary circulated on 7 June.³ The discussion which followed centered on two issues developed by Dr. Langer: first, whether interpretive articles such as the Weekly contained could be prepared more effectively in C.I.G. Specifically, he asked Dr. Langer to arrange a means whereby political intelligence texts could be promptly checked when necessary with a State Department specialist. He transmitted further specific comments and suggestions from G–2 regarding the trial issue to Mr. Montague.

The Members of I.A.B. were in agreement with General Vandenberg’s proposal.

Commodore Rend commented that it was essential to commence regular publication of the Weekly, despite shortcoming that might be inevitable in early issues; and General McDonald and Mr. Ladd thought that, in view of all the circumstances, the reports staff should be congratulated on a good beginning.

3. Provisions for Coordinating the Acquisition of Foreign Publications (C.I.G. 9)⁴

Admiral Souers noted that replies had not yet been received from all Members regarding C.I.G. 9, which had been circulated for informal consideration. After brief discussion, during which it was agreed to reduce the classification of the paper to “Restricted”,

The Intelligence Advisory Board:

Approved C.I.G. 9. (Enclosures to be submitted to N.I.A. as N.I.A. 4.)

4. Remarks by Admiral Souers

Admiral Souers said he wanted to take occasion, on being relieved as Director of Central Intelligence, to express to all Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board his appreciation for the unstinted cooperation he had received from each one. He took great satisfaction in turning over his duties to General Vandenberg.

General Vandenberg, in an acknowledgment in behalf of all those present, expressed the hope that the work of Central Intelligence should be maintained at the standard set by Admiral Souers.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–281. Confidential. The meeting was held at the War Department.
1. None printed. (Dated respectively, April 26, May 8, and June 4; ibid., HS/HC–276) See the Supplement for all.
2. Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–243) NIA 5 was a slightly revised version of CIG 1/1. See footnote 1 above.
3. Not found.
4. Dated May 31. (Central Intelligence Agency Historical Files, HS/HC–276) In its final form the paper was issued as NIA Directive No. 6, July 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy Papers, No. 132) Both are in the Supplement.