Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, General: Economic and Social Matters, Volume II

800.796/8–244

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)⁵⁷

[Washington,] August 2, 1944.

Yesterday, at the conversations with the Russian civil aviation officials, they produced the attached memorandum which undoubtedly was telegraphed them direct and verbatim from Moscow.

The Soviet scheme, as outlined, is virtually this:

The Soviet Union wants all operation of air routes in Soviet territory to be carried on by Soviet planes and Soviet fliers. They propose that international aviation across Russian territory shall be conducted by having the lines of other countries end at agreed points, at which points the Soviet planes and fliers will pick up the traffic. The traffic would then be carried into or across Soviet territory; and the Soviet line would then meet the lines of other countries at a point or points on the other side of Soviet territory. The international agreements would consist of arrangements to coordinate the arrival of American and other planes at the fixed points and the pick-up there of the traffic by the Soviet lines.

This, of course, amounts to a closed Soviet system.

Of added interest is the fact that, as the experimental line, they propose a United States–Moscow service in which the American line will end at Cairo, where the Soviet planes will pick up. Apparently the Soviet theory is that their lines will extend somewhat beyond their own borders in most cases, though this is not final. There are, it is true, certain loopholes in the Soviet memorandum, including a significant paragraph indicating that use of Soviet ports by foreign planes is still under study. But, reversing the general ideas of the air mission, Moscow apparently has opted for the closed system—not unlike the old Russian railroad system which had a different gauge for the railroads so that foreign trains could not run over them.

This is not fatal to a scheme of world aviation if all of the other countries get together, since it would be possible to make a reasonably satisfactory world aviation system with the Soviet Union left out, or rather, remaining as a great closed enclave. It happens that few lines need to cross Soviet territory. Even our Far Eastern line to China via the Aleutians could bypass Soviet territory by using the Japanese islands as transit ports on the way to Shanghai. The significance of the Soviet position, therefore, is rather political and general than technical. There is nothing to stop the other countries of the world from getting together on their aviation.

But the general significance seems to me very great. It suggests:

(a) That the Soviet Union still considers her major advantage to lie in a closed and self-conducted commercial system;

(b) That she has made a slight advance, but only a slight advance, in the direction of admitting the rest of the world to her territory in the fashion usual with other countries. It ought to be stressed that the suggestion of admitting passengers and cargo is a very real advance, since heretofore the Soviet Union has not invited this sort of entrance at all. But it still is a long way from the generalized system of free communication;

(c) On the territorial side, it is of interest that the Soviet Union considers her Near Eastern terminus at Cairo. In substance this would mean that no commercial plane headed for Russia would come east of Egypt. Possibly too much significance need not be attached to this; the point might be transferred north to Istanbul when the war is over provided the Turks were willing;

(d) It would appear that at present the Soviet Union is not interested in a northern contact. Too much significance perhaps need not be attached to this at present, since there is still a battle line stretching from Leningrad down the Baltic; but the possibility of an eventual service via Iceland and Stockholm to Moscow is, for the moment, dismissed.

In view of the very real importance which the Secretary attaches to non-autarchy, and the fact that we base much of our hope for the future on open trade and open relations, I rather feel that we ought not to accept this position of the Soviets as final. But it is clear that effective argument will have to be made in Moscow rather than in Washington. This suggests, for consideration, either that someone be empowered to go to Moscow or that Harriman be authorized to take matters up there. Naturally, if Molotov and the Secretary are to meet in the not distant future, these negotiations could be best handled directly between them.

Aside from registering our position (which ought to be done after general Departmental conferences), I think we should make no change in the general line of policy we have been following with regard to all other countries who, like ourselves, hope for open trade, though they equally hope for economic controls of one sort or another tending to favor their aviation lines. These last, it would seem, can be harmonized sufficiently to get a result. As matters stand now, the three positions are:

(1) The Russian position looking towards a closed area, but with agreements permitting entry of persons and goods (but not planes) into it.

(2) The British position calling for general transportation lines, controlled and allocated by international authority; and

(3) The American position looking [towards?] generalized rights of transit and landing, preferably under a regulated competitive system, conforming to our general commercial policy. In this last respect, we have kept the door open for regulatory controls, in view of the strong opposition in certain quarters in the United States to a truly open system.

A. A. B[erle], Jr.

[Annex—Translation]

Memorandum From the Soviet Delegation

Mr. Ambassador: Permit me, on behalf of the Soviet delegation to make the following declaration concerning the points of the agenda which we have examined at previous joint sessions:

The Soviet delegation declares that the Soviet Government will be able to give its agreement to the inclusion in the international network of air routes passing over the territory of the U.S.S.R. This inclusion of the airlines of the U.S.S.R. in the network of international airlines will insure to the interested countries the possibility of entry into the U.S.S.R. and transit across the U.S.S.R. of cargo and passengers.

The inclusion of the airlines of the U.S.S.R. in the international network will be possible only under the condition that the countries and air transport organizations interested therein will proceed from the fact that the transit carriage through the U.S.S.R. will be carried out only by Soviet planes and in addition, questions affecting the right of transit of goods and passengers will be regulated by special treaties and agreements between the U.S.S.R. and other interested countries.

In so far as the granting of the right of foreign aircraft to fly into the territory of the U.S.S.R. and also the right to use the airdromes on that territory are concerned, the Soviet delegation at the present stage of the conversations can not give answer since this question is being studied by the competent organs.

In regard to the establishment of international airlines connecting the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., it is expedient in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, during the present exploratory talks, to consider the principles of the organization of one of the most important post-war routes, i.e. Washington (or New York), Azores, Algiers, Cairo, Tehran, Astrakhan, Moscow. For the exploitation of this line, it might be possible either to organize by agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. a joint administration or company on a parity basis, or to agree on the coordination of operation of appropriate lines connecting with each other at definite points created for this purpose by the national aviation companies of each country.

For the purpose of assuring the development of civil aviation and the preparation of national aviation personnel and also taking into consideration the observations set forth above, the section of the route, Washington (New York)–Cairo, will be operated by American aviation personnel and American airplanes and the section, Moscow–Cairo by Soviet aviation personnel and Soviet airplanes.

In regard to sections of the routes which pass over the territory of third states, both parties will make arrangements with these states.

The Soviet delegation declares that the question of the utilization of airports on a non-exclusive basis requires further study. In regard to the question of air cabotage, the Soviet delegation has no objection to the principle in accordance with which air cabotage will be carried on within a country in the airplanes of that country.

At the same time, the Soviet delegation informs the American side that in the near future the Americans through customary diplomatic channels will receive our draft of an agreement which it will be expedient to consider through the medium of subsequent diplomatic negotiations between the two parties.

57. Addressed to James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, and Charles E. Bohlen, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs.