Roosevelt Papers
Department of State Briefing Paper1
Civil Affairs in the Balkans
American planning for civil affairs in the Balkans is restricted to Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania on the theory that these will be liberated territory. No American participation in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary is contemplated in present plans, unless it is found that these countries have surpluses of foodstuffs or products useful in the war, for the handling of which American personnel in Allied missions might be desirable.
The U.S. Army has set up, under authorization of the President, a combined Anglo-American Military Headquarters for relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia, the American participation being limited to sixty-three, all officers, while British personnel will number several thousand. On our initiative an agreement has been made between UNRRA and the military authorities whereby UNRRA will serve as the agency of the combined military head quarters for the distribution of the supplies during the military period.2 In view of the American origin of the bulk of the supplies and [Page 213] the limited American military participation, this arrangement may serve to prevent the distribution from being controlled solely by [the] British military and for British political ends. Since these territories would be supplied by UNRRA after the military period, it also seems desirable to have UNRRA on the ground at once.
There has been some difference of opinion between the British and Americans as to the extent of UNRRA’s responsibility during the military period. The American position is that UNRRA should be given the maximum possible responsibility under the direction of the military headquarters. The British would prefer to limit UNRRA’s role principally to the furnishing of certain personnel who would, as individuals, advise and assist the military. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee is now trying to reach agreement on this point. The British plan for the distribution of supplies in Albania and Yugoslavia has contemplated delivery of supplies at ports, to the local authorities, with practically no control to assure their distribution in accordance with our policy of non-discrimination because of race, creed or political affiliation. The American plan urges agreements with local authorities providing for such non-discriminatory distribution, and sufficient personnel, either of UNRRA or the military, within the countries to make sure of compliance with this policy. We feel strongly that relief and supplies should not be used as a political weapon to help any one faction. Particularly in the case of Yugoslavia the scheme of de livery to the people easiest at hand would be sure to give to that faction a powerful implement in the civil strife within the country. It is to the American long-range interest that we should not become a party to such a program. A clear understanding with the British on this point is essential.
The British plan for Greece envisages a rather elaborate military organization to supervise distribution, restore port facilities, railroads and other utilities. This work will also be facilitated by the organizations already familiar with the problem and the trained personnel available.
We think the Russians should be fully informed of all these activities, through a representative who would be in close touch with the combined military headquarters. Suspicions would be allayed and a precedent established which might advantageously be used in reverse in other areas where Russia is primarily concerned. There has been a reluctance on the part of a number of British officials to agree to keeping the Russians fully informed.
One of the major problems is the lack of contact with the military authorities of the Governments in question. Agreements providing for their cooperation would be desirable with a view to securing both in formation and the utilization of the services, personnel and administration [Page 214] which will be under their control. In the case of Greece it has now been proposed that the Theater Commander be authorized to discuss these problems with the Greek authorities.
The Yugoslav Government presents a particular problem in this connection, since the reported unity established between the Government-in-exile and the Tito organization is of a very dubious nature, with the additional complication that neither of them has control or more than a claim to authority in Serbia, the heart of the country. It may, therefore, be necessary to continue the planning without much consultation with Yugoslav officials until there is some clarification of the authority and popular support of the respective groups. Unfortunately, the Yugoslav officials have been so preoccupied with their political troubles that they seem to have made no serious plans of their own. Actual relief operations may in fact have to be postponed while the civil strife continues.
In Albania there is no government with which to deal. Civil affairs operations will of necessity require considerable improvisation, but should present no major problems.
- Annex 7 to Hull’s memorandum to Roosevelt dated September 6, 1944, which was sent to the White House under cover of a further memorandum of September 8. See ante, p. 120.↩
- For the text of the agreement referred to, signed at Cairo, April 3, 1944, see George Woodbridge, UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), vol. iii, pp. 210–211.↩