832.248/466
The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to
the Secretary of State
No. 10613
Rio de
Janeiro, March 30, 1943.
[Received April
7.]
Sir: Referring to my strictly confidential
despatch No. 10604 of March 29, 1943,22
reporting that on Admiral Beauregard’s behalf I
[Page 625]
had taken up certain matters with President
Vargas, I have the honor to report that yesterday Admiral Beauregard
brought to my attention another letter from Admiral Ingram,23 in which he requested Admiral Beauregard to
endeavor to obtain from the Air Minister action in eight different
cases. With this in mind, Admiral Beauregard addressed a pertinent
communication to Dr. J. P. Salgado Filho in which the eight different
cases were set out in lettered paragraphs “a” to
“h”, a copy of which I transmit herewith.
In accordance with Admiral Beauregard’s desire, I shall bring this
memorandum also to the attention of President Vargas this afternoon.
Respectfully yours,
[Enclosure—Translation]
The Chief of the American Naval Mission
(Beauregard) to the Brazilian
Minister of Aeronautics (Salgado)
F
NOB Serial 501
Rio de
Janeiro, March 29, 1943.
Dear Mr. Minister: I have just received
from Vice Admiral Ingram a letter in which he sets forth the
following:
- (a)
- The urgent necessity for an officer of the F. A. B. to be
detailed to his staff, in order to achieve by this means
practical operations of the F. A. B. in the present
situation, which is critical.
- (b)
- The seven PBY’s should enter immediately into operations
against the enemy for the protection of Brazil
itself.
- (c)
- The two PBY’s delivered several weeks ago are not yet in
operating condition. They should be made ready.
- (d)
- Crews for the remaining five, not yet delivered, are not
ready or prepared. He himself should operate them, with his
own forces, because of the critical situation. This matter
should be settled urgently.
- (e)
- Combat training appears to be weak. He believes that
combat training should be given at Natal, and turned over to
the “Combat Wing Commander” at Natal.
- (f)
- Operational cooperation against the enemy is still
lacking; in order to achieve the desired results the F. A.
B. should operate vigorously under the orders of the Allied
Commandant in the South Atlantic.
- (g)
- The delay in connection with general authorization for the
use of dirigibles in Brazil, and for the necessary bases, is
prejudicing the arrival of these dirigibles which are so
necessary to combat the growing threat of the enemy.
- (h)
- He believes that the basing of some B–24’s on the Island
of Fernando Noronha is very important, and requests the
necessary authorization.
[Page 626]
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the expressions of my
high consideration and esteem.
A. T.
Beauregard
Rear Admiral,
USN