Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, Europe, Volume II

841.34553B/36: Telegram

The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State

Lisbon, December 24, 1943—midnight.
[Received 10:45 p.m.]

3067. For the Secretary, Under Secretary and Matthews. It might be helpful to set forth briefly my understanding of the situation regarding the Azores bases as a result of further conversations with the British Embassy.

1. The American position vis-á-vis the British Government may be summarized as follows:

(a) That an agreement has been reached as between the competent British and American authorities regarding American participation and use of all existing British facilities in the Azores with operations actually or nominally under British command.

(b) That the airfield at Lagens will have to be decidedly enlarged.

(c) That a suitable second base is desirable on Santa Maria or some other acceptable island.

2. The American position vis-á-vis the Portuguese Government may be summarized as follows:

(a) That we will be permitted full use of Lagens when we evolve a satisfactory formula covering such use under British aegis.

(b) The same formula should be applicable to effect such use of the emergency landing facilities at Santa Ana as the British have been able to obtain.

(c) That upon receipt of further instructions the granting of permission to construct and operate the Santa Maria airfield is to be sought.

3. (a) As regards 1 (b), the position is that the local Portuguese commander has gone as far as he feels able to go in requisitioning farm lands for extending the Lagens field. The requisite additions will require authorization from Salazar and the British Ambassador has asked London for instructions as to how Salazar should be approached and whether or not article VIII is if necessary to be invoked.

[b] As regards 2 (6) [(b)] Salazar has adhered to his position that Santa Ana field is a Portuguese Government airport and therefore direction and control must be in hands of Portuguese officials. However, he has been persuaded to interpret word “emergency” to admit of practice landings and installation of some additional equipment and British personnel to operate it. At same time Portuguese personnel is supposed to be learning how to operate equipment in expectation of relieving British personnel at some indeterminate date.

(c) As regards 1(c) position is not at all clear. In a telegram dated December 10 received by British Embassy, it is stated in paragraph 3 thereof that the Combined Chiefs of Staff expect an attempt to be made by me to obtain from Dr. Salazar permission for United States to construct Santa Ana airfield for Portuguese Government but presumably for direct use by American forces on completion. If Salazar refuses this proposal, then article VIII of the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement is to be invoked and British Government will ask for authority to construct and operate such an airfield, using American material and assistance under ostensible if not actual British control.

However, paragraph 1 of same telegram states that Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that American facilities shall be within framework of British agreement and paragraph 4 contains sentence that the second airfield when constructed would be under British command and aircraft using it would be subject to same conditions as those using Lagens. In this connection, Colonel Mason informs me that copies of Joint and Combined [apparent omission] discussed at Sextant²¹ and subsequent messages should arrive here in a few days from London and should give us background on this subject and help clarify any further instructions.

Norweb

21. Code name for Cairo Conferences held November 22–26 and December 2–7, 1943. For documentation relating to these Conferences, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.