Censorship Files
Memorandum of Conversation1
Present: | Colonel McCarthy | U. S. A. |
Colonel McClenahan | “ | |
Major Durno | “ | |
Mr. Ryan | M. I. M. E. | |
Mr. Shea | O. W. I. | |
Colonel Maunsell | S. I. M. E. | |
and for part of the time | ||
Mr. Sinclair | M. I. M. E. | |
Mr. Barnes | O. W. I. | |
Major Putman [Putnam?] | P. R. USAFIME |
The following conclusions were reached:
Still Photographs
Each party would process their own material in Cairo under Security conditions, would exchange material and send material to London and Washington under the usual arrangements.
Moving Pictures
The U. S. A. would send their material unprocessed to Washington (Public Relations Bureau, War Dept.). Copies of this material when treated would be sent back to Cairo for M. I. M. E.
British material would be processed under Security conditions in Cairo, and “lavenders”2 would be given to the U. S. A. authorities here.
The British material would subsequently be sent to London in the usual way.
Release for Pictures
It was agreed that no pictures of any kind should be released until the time of the final release date.
Credit Line
It was agreed, subject to confirmation on the one hand by Mr. Ryan and on the other by Col. McClenahan, that all pictures moving and still taken in connection with the Conference by any of the various official photographers or cinemen should be pooled for all parties concerned and should carry the credit line “United Nations Photographic Pool”.
Transmission by Air of Messages Not Yet Releasable
It was agreed that messages now being written by correspondents could be conveyed periodically by the air courier service to London (for the British correspondents) and Washington (for the American correspondents) subject to
- (1)
- Censorship here before despatch.
- (2)
- Consignment to the appropriate official authority in the respective countries for holding until the time of release.
- (3)
- Recensorship before release in the event of any new stops being imposed after the messages have left this country.
Arrangements for Final Release
Mr. Ryan explained the arrangements under consideration. These were:
(a) Release for publication to be at 23.30 hours G. M. T. on “X” day. This was the hour adopted as standard for important joint announcements [Page 357] London and Washington in the past. Mr. Ryan had been assured by the American correspondents that it was a suitable time for American release.
(b) It would be impossible for the cable service to carry a fraction of the correspondents’ messages within a reasonable time, (e. g. 24 hours) of the start of transmission. The volume of messages could only be handled within a period of 24 hours by wireless transmission and then only by making very special arrangements and suspending certain other normal transmission.
It was therefore proposed that release for transmission by wireless should be at 23.30 hours G. M. T. on X minus 1 day.
It should be realized that this was the moment at which security stopped. Axis monitoring stations would be able to pick up messages sent by this form of transmission.
The present view was that this interval of 24 hours between release for transmission and release for publication would be long enough to get the correspondents’ messages off but short enough to prevent any reproduction in the press or radio of broadcasts sent out by Axis stations based on their pick up of transmissions from Cairo.
(c) It is of the utmost importance that correspondents should have a minimum of 12 hours warning, if at all possible, of the time of release for transmission.
(d) These arrangements to be confirmed by Mr. Ryan (who is in consultation with the Ministry of Information, London) and Col. McClenahan.
Issue of Early Communiqué
If an early communiqué was issued and it was desired that there should be no reference to the location of the Conference, transmission by wireless would be out of the question and the cable service would have to be used.
There would have to be an interval between the release for transmission by cable and release for publication. This would require further investigation and Mr. Ryan undertook to get into touch with the cable company (The Hon. Cecil Campbell.)
Mr. Ryan felt considerable misgivings as to whether it would prove practicable to issue a communiqué on this basis without in fact “breaking” the story.
M. I. M. E.
27th November, 1943.