Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943

741.671/11–1143

Memorandum by Mr. Kohler of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] November 11, 1943.

Memorandum of Conversation

Subject: Conversations Between the British and the Turks at Cairo

Participants:	Mr. Hayter, First Secretary, British Embassy
	Mr. Alling
	Mr. Kohler

Mr. Hayter called this morning and read two further telegrams which the Embassy had received regarding the conversations between the British and the Turks at Cairo.²

The first of these communications reported a conversation between the British Ambassador at Ankara, Knatchbull-Hugesson [Hugessen], and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Numan Menemencioglou, on November 7. The Ambassador called on Numan on his own initiative, saying that he had been perturbed by the results of the conversations which appeared to constitute a negative reaction on the part of the Turks both as regards the question of bases and that of the Turkish entry into the war this year. Numan replied that he had also been unhappy about the results of the discussions, but that he reported objectively to his Government, which must of course make the decision. The two then reviewed the conversations at some length. When Numan raised the question of continued supplies, the Ambassador said it would be very difficult for the British to continue to furnish such supplies if the Turks should refuse to enter the war. Plainly, if the Turks did not use the weapons which were being provided to them against the Germans, the Soviets could only believe that they were intended for use against Russia.

On November 8 Numan had a further (and apparently final) conversation with Mr. Eden during which he showed himself considerably more receptive.

Eden said that the Soviet desires and the present discussions seemed to him to offer an opportunity to establish Turkish-Soviet relations on a sound basis for the next twenty-five years. Numan replied that he realized that this was so; that he thought the Soviet question was being well handled and that he had entirely welcomed the Moscow decisions, which were much more favorable than could have been expected. However, he said that a decision as regards the demands on Turkey could of course only be taken by the Government. He said that the Turks had been very disturbed by Stalin’s references to Moldavia and Transylvania,³ It would be hard to explain to the National Assembly if Turkish assistance aided the establishment of Russia in Rumania and Bulgaria under the claim that such establishment was in the interests of those peoples.

Numan continued that he had been upset by Eden’s threatening tone, which had been used for the first time in the long relations between the two countries; and that he had the impression that Eden was acting as spokesman not just for Britain, but for Russia. Eden had asked Turkey to give bases and to come into the war without specifying exactly what would be expected of her, what Allied cooperation could be depended upon, and what assurances there would be as to the political results or implications. He said that today for her own safety Turkey must be as concerned about the situation in the Balkans as she was previously about the freedom of the Straits alone.⁴ Eden replied that they must face the facts; that Britain was an ally of Turkey but she was also an ally of Russia.⁵ He said that if Turkey came into the war she would inevitably become stronger through the supply of Allied arms. Numan recognized that this was so. Eden then drew a balance sheet on the familiar lines of the advantages and disadvantages to Turkey of participation. He suggested that the Turkish Government might wish to consider the matter and that its reply might well pose questions which it wanted cleared up regarding the military and political conditions of its collaboration. He said that a favorable reply would require conversations which could not very well be handled through usual diplomatic channels, and asked if Numan had any views as to where such conversations might be held. Numan said that if the Turkish reply should be favorable, conversations could be held anywhere and that Turkey would be more interested in political than in military talks. He had thought that it was a wise decision to hold the recent Allied conversations at Moscow and he would have no objection to holding the conversations there again. He added that if the Turkish response were negative he could only ask that it be received with the fullest understanding.

F[oy] D. K[ohler]

1. Alling sent copies of this memorandum to Stettinius, Berle, and Murray with a note of November 11, 1943, reading: “Here is the final installment on the Anglo–Turkish conversations at Cairo. In due course the British expect to hear the decisions of the Turks. It is expected that the Turks will endeavor to delay such a decision by every means. P[aul] H. A[lling]” Berle wrote on his copy, near the last sentence: “They usually succeed A. A. B[erle].” It is not clear whether Kohler’s memorandum was brought to the attention of Roosevelt and Hopkins prior to their departure from Washington on November 11.
2. See ante, p. 164.
3. In a number of his addresses Stalin had indicated his intention to regain Moldavia (Bessarabia) from Rumania. See Andrew Rothstein, Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1946?), vol. i, pp. 22, 38, 41, 50, 56, 70. No public reference by Stalin to Transylvania prior to the Cairo-Tehran Conferences has been found, but his intent to transfer the area to Rumania had been expressed to Eden privately in January 1942. See Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 629, and Hull, vol. ii, p. 1167.
4. Correspondence on Turkish policy respecting the Straits, the Montreux Conference of 1936 for Revision of the Regime of the Straits, and related matters is printed in Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. iii, pp. 503 ff. For a brief summary of pertinent developments in the early years of World War II, see The Problem of the Turkish Straits (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 36.
5. For the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance, signed at Ankara October 19, 1939, see the League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cc, p. 167; for the British-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, signed at London May 26, 1942, see ibid., vol. cciv, p. 353.