741.6111/55/7
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called to see me this evening.
The Ambassador brought up the subject of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain.
The Ambassador read to me a telegram from Mr. Eden of which the following is a summary:
The Soviet Government had made it clear to the British Government, through Ambassador Maisky in London, that the Soviet Government is not willing to settle the question on the basis proposed by the President.76
Great Britain cannot neglect any opportunity offered to establish close and friendly relations with Stalin.
[Page 537]Stalin states to Great Britain that his views governing British recognition of Russia’s pre-1940 boundaries must be met before intimate relations can be established between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Mr. Eden cannot incur the danger of antagonizing Stalin, and the British War Cabinet has consequently determined that they would agree to negotiate a treaty with Stalin which will recognize the 1940 frontiers of the Soviet Union except for that portion which constituted the Polish-Russian frontier.
The proposed treaty is merely a paragraph in length, announcing that Great Britain and the Soviet Union reciprocally recognize the integrity of their territories prior to the acts of aggression undertaken by Hitler, and that neither country desires, in the post-war period, to intervene in the internal affairs of the other nations of Europe.
Mr. Eden states that if the President is unable to approve the conclusion of this treaty, he trusts that he will understand the imperative reasons which have caused Great Britain to negotiate this treaty, and furthermore that the President will refrain from undertaking any overt action in condemnation of the treaty.
There is no chance of the President being asked to subscribe to the treaty, nor will the treaty be kept secret. Mr. Eden then continues by stating that British public opinion must be considered. If Stalin were to adopt a policy hostile to Great Britain and were to state that this had come about as a result of the obstinacy of the present British Government in recognizing the 1940 frontiers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Eden believes the situation in Great Britain will be “catastrophic”.
Mr. Eden did not fail to observe that, in the President’s message to Stalin,77 he referred to the willingness of the United States to support the Soviet Union in seeking, in post-war adjustments, all legitimate measures necessary to insure the security of the Soviet Union. Mr. Eden states that he made the same offer to Stalin as a substitute for the treaty desired by Stalin, but that Stalin rejected his offer.
For twenty years the Soviet Union has not been on terms of confidence with any Western powers. It is essential for Great Britain, in her present situation, to establish such confidential relations with Stalin. Stalin takes the recognition by Great Britain of his 1940 frontiers as the criterion of British sincerity.
The adherence of Stalin to the Atlantic Charter was undertaken upon the understanding that the Soviet Union was to be regarded as being entitled to its 1940 frontiers, and that consequently the Baltic States were a part of Russian territory.
Under present conditions, Great Britain is unable to give military aid and assistance to Stalin in the sense of a second front, or even in the sense of any considerable supply of matériel. If Great Britain could undertake either of these two measures, it would be easier for Great Britain to take the position taken by the President, but in view of her inability to do so, and in view of the pressure of British public opinion, Great Britain is forced to conclude this treaty with Stalin as a political substitute for material military assistance. Mr. Eden believes that this is of inestimable value.
When the Ambassador had concluded reading the telegram above summarized, he stated that in his belief the reference by Mr. Eden to [Page 538] the “catastrophic” situation which might obtain in Great Britain, were Stalin to become hostile to the British Government and then let it be known that this was due to the obstinacy of the British Government in refusing to recognize his 1940 frontier, implied that, were the war situation to continue to go badly for Great Britain and Stalin were then either to negotiate a separate peace with Hitler or to demonstrate marked hostility to Great Britain, Mr. Churchill’s Government would probably fall and, in that event, Sir Stafford Cripps would replace him, with the probability that under such a government a frankly Communist, pro-Moscow policy would be pursued.
Lord Halifax stated that he was instructed to seek an interview with the President to discuss these issues. He asked if I would arrange to request the President that both of us might consult with the President on the basis of the information above set forth. I replied that I would inform the President immediately of the message the Ambassador had given me and that I would let him know as soon as the President was able to receive him.
- See supra. Regarding the statement of President Roosevelt that he would take up the question of frontiers directly with Stalin, see the memorandum of February 20, by Under Secretary of State Welles, and the aide-mémoire of the British Foreign Office of February 25, pp. 521 and 524, respectively. Welles also summarized for General Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister, the views of the President on frontier adjustments as already communicated to the British Government in his memorandum of March 25, p. 123.↩
- No copy of this message has been found in Department files or at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.↩