I am inclined to the opinion that the policies which we outlined in our
telegram to Ambassador Winant are sound and that a deviation therefrom
would be unfortunate, particularly just now when we are endeavoring to
unite all forces opposed to the Axis on the primary task of defeating
the enemy.
In that telegram we took the position that the test of our good faith
with regard to the Soviet Union should not be our willingness to agree
to the recognition of extended Soviet frontiers at this time, but rather
the degree of determination which we show loyally to carry out our
promises to aid the Soviet Government with equipment and supplies.
I am sure that you will agree with me that by our actions we should make
it clear to the Soviet Government in the future to an even greater
degree that we are doing our utmost to live up to our promises.
[Enclosure]
[Washington,] February 4,
1942.
Memorandum
British-Soviet Negotiations Looking Forward to
the Conclusion of a Treaty of a Political Character With
Particular Reference to Soviet Suggestions That Certain
Territories Taken Over by the Soviet Union During the Period
September 1, 1939–June 22, 1941,
Be Recognized as Soviet Territory
Immediately upon the outbreak of the war between Germany and the
Soviet Union the British Government made it clear that it desired to
give the Soviet Union every possible military support. The Soviet
Government did not display any marked enthusiasm in accepting this
British support. It furthermore showed a tendency from the very
beginning to introduce matters of a political character into
conversations and negotiations relating primarily to military or
supply problems.
Within three weeks after the launching of the German attack upon the
Soviet Union, Stalin suggested to the British Government, that it
might be advantageous for the British and Soviet Governments to
enter into a treaty of a political character. The British Government
foresaw that certain complications might arise from an, attempt to
negotiate at that time a formal political treaty. It did, however,
on July 12, 1941 sign “an agreement for joint action” with the
Soviet Government which contained two provisions: (1) an undertaking
on the part of the two Governments to render each other assistance
and support of all kinds in the war against Hitlerite Germany and
(2) a mutual undertaking that during this war neither party would
negotiate or conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by
mutual agreement. It was understood between the two Governments that
this agreement might be supplemented by more detailed political and
military agreements at a later date.
When the Harriman mission27 was in Moscow in September 1941, Stalin suggested to
Beaverbrook that the two Governments might
[Page 506]
enter at once into a political agreement of a
more far-reaching character than the agreement for joint action of
July 12. Beaver-brook replied that he personally agreed and would
discuss the matter with other members of the British Cabinet upon
his return to London.
Apparently the British Government took no steps to follow up Stalin’s
suggestions during the months of October and November. In November,
however, Stalin displayed a spirit of bad temper, which contributed
to the decision of the British Government early in December to send
Eden to Moscow in order, as Mr. Eden informed Ambassador Winant, to
smooth out relations in general, to explore the possibility of some
kind of political agreement, and to discuss certain post-war
problems. It would appear that Stalin had been informed in November
that the British Government was planning to send two high-ranking
military officers to the Soviet Union to discuss military matters.
He had replied that he did not care to enter into such discussions
until certain political problems had been settled between the two
countries. Stalin’s irritation seemed in part to be due to the
failure of Great Britain to keep a promise to send a military
expedition of several divisions to points adjacent to the Soviet
frontier in order to assist in relieving pressure on the Soviet
Army. This promise had been made, apparently ill-advisedly, after
the departure of the Harriman mission from Moscow. Subsequent
consideration of the matter had made it clear that the dispatch of
such an expedition would be inexpedient.
Early in December Winant informed the Department regarding Eden’s
plan to go to Moscow and simultaneously submitted to the Department
a memorandum prepared by Eden setting forth the purposes of his
visit.28
Subsequent to the launching of the German attack on the Soviet Union
Stalin apparently had not broached to the British Government
questions of territorial concessions to the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, Eden’s memorandum contained no indication that the
British Government suspected that Eden while in Moscow would be
pressed to agree to such concessions. The Department, however, had
at no time been in doubt that Stalin’s references to the
desirability of entering into negotiations for a political agreement
with Great Britain were in fact part of a maneuver the purpose of
which was to place the British Government in such a position that it
would be embarrassing for it to reject Soviet demands that it
recognize certain Soviet territorial claims and that it promise to
agree to certain territorial adjustments on the European continent
and to other
[Page 507]
arrangements
which, would make the Soviet Union the dominating power of Eastern
Europe if not of the whole continent.
The Department was therefore inclined to believe that Stalin would
take advantage of Eden’s presence in Moscow in order to exert
pressure upon the British Government to give commitments of a
territorial nature which might prove embarrassing both to the
British and the American Governments during the period of the war
and which might handicap proceedings at the peace conference. For
this reason the Department on December 5, 1941 sent Winant a
telegram,29 which had
been approved by the President, instructing him to inform Eden that
it was the considered opinion of the American Government that “it
would be unfortunate were any of the three Governments now on common
ground in the Atlantic Charter to express any willingness to enter
into commitments regarding specific terms of the post-war
settlement”. In this telegram the Department expressed the opinion
that “the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is
the measure to which we fulfill the commitments our representatives
made in Moscow.… In so far as our post-war policies are concerned,
it is our belief that these have been delineated in the Atlantic
Charter, which today represents the attitude not only of the United
States but also of Great Britain and of the Soviet Union”. The
telegram also contained the following: “In order not to jeopardize
the aims we [shall] all share in common looking to an enduring
peace, it is evident that no commitments as to individual countries
should be entered into at this time. It would be unfortunate if we
should approach the peace conference thus hampered. Above all there
must be no secret accords”.
Ambassador Winant conveyed the views set forth in this telegram to
Eden who expressed his complete agreement with them. Eden left
London for Moscow on the evening of December 7. Almost immediately
after his arrival he had his first meeting with Stalin, which lasted
four hours. During the course of this meeting he presented to Stalin
a draft prepared in Great Britain of a proposed political agreement.
This agreement was of a general nature. It confirmed the Atlantic
Charter; it provided for collaboration of the two Governments in
every possible way until the German military power had been
completely broken; it provided for collaboration for restoring peace
at the end of the war and in maintaining the peace; it provided for
the joint carrying out of the task of the reconstruction of Europe
and for the safeguarding and strengthening of “the economic and
political independence of all European countries either as unitary
of [or] federated states”; and so forth.
Stalin, on his part, presented to Eden drafts of two treaties
proposed by the Soviet Government: namely, a “treaty of alliance and
[Page 508]
mutual military
assistance” and a “treaty concerning the creation of a mutual
understanding between the Soviet Union and Great Britain in regard
to the solution of post-war questions, and concerning their common
action to ensure security in Europe after the termination of the war
with Germany”. In general, the provisions of these two treaties were
not objectionable to the British. What was extremely important,
however, was a suggestion by Stalin which proved to be a
stumbling-block to the negotiations. This suggestion was that a
secret protocol be entered into relating to Soviet frontiers and to
the working out of arrangements for the future frontiers of Eastern
and Central Europe. His initial demand apparently was that the
Soviet frontiers of June 22, 1941 be recognized by Great Britain.
Such an act on the part of Great Britain would mean the British
recognition of Soviet acquisition during 1939 and 1940 of certain
territory and bases in Finland, of the whole territory of the three
Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, of more than
one-third of Poland,31 and of
Bessarabia and other parts of Rumania. In addition, Stalin desired
that Great Britain agree to the taking over by the Soviet Union
after the war of certain bases in Rumania. Among other suggestions
made by Stalin was an agreement for the restoration of Austria as an
independent state; the detachment of the Rhineland from Prussia; the
establishment of an independent Bavaria; the transfer of East
Prussia to Poland; the transfer of Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia;
the transfer of the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey; certain terriorial
adjustments in favor of Greece; the transfer to Turkey of certain
districts in Bulgaria and in Northern Syria, and so forth.
During the course of the first meeting and during other meetings that
followed, Eden informed Stalin that he could not enter into
agreements concerning commitments of a territorial nature without
consulting the Dominions and the United States. Eden pointed out in
particular that he had promised the Government of the United States
that while in Moscow he would not enter into commitments of the
nature requested.
Stalin continued, however, to press for certain territorial
commitments on the part of the British Government. When Eden
insisted that he could not give the commitments desired, Stalin
demanded that in any event Great Britain immediately recognize the
Baltic States as a component part of the Soviet Union. He also
demanded that Great Britain recognize the Soviet position in Finland
and in Rumania. With regard to the frontier with Poland he said that
he hoped that Poland, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union would be
able to
[Page 509]
come to an
agreement. Generally speaking, the Soviet suggestion was that the
Polish-Soviet frontier would follow the Curzon Line with certain
modifications. It will be recalled that the Curzon Line does not
differ greatly from the line which Germany and the Soviet Union
agreed to consider as the boundary line between the Soviet Union and
German-Poland when they partitioned Poland in 1939.
When Eden continued to resist the pressure placed upon him by Stalin,
the latter displayed considerable irritation. Eden finally informed
Stalin as follows: “You would not respect me if I were to go back
upon my arrangement with President Roosevelt. I can get a decision
upon this point before the Soviet troops occupy the Baltic States,
even if they continued doing as well as they are doing now.”
It appears that in the end Eden gave Stalin to understand that he
would return to Great Britain with Stalin’s proposals, discuss them
with his own Government, with the Dominions, and with the United
States and let Stalin have a reply to them at a later date. Eden
went so far as to indicate that he would endeavor to obtain a
favorable decision if Stalin attached so great importance to the
matter. In the meantime, in order to smooth over the failure of the
two Governments to come to an understanding in Moscow with regard to
a treaty, it was agreed to issue a joint declaration regarding the
accomplishments of the visit and an innocuous statement of this
character was issued in the latter part of December.
Eden arrived in England in the early part of January and presented to
his Government memoranda of the discussions, together with Stalin’s
proposals. He also permitted Ambassador Winant to inspect certain of
the memoranda as well as copies of the draft treaties proposed by
Eden and by Stalin. The whole matter is now being considered by the
British Cabinet. It is likely that within a short time the British
Government will approach this Government on the subject. This
approach may be in the form of a request for a statement of the
position of this Government with regard to the making by the British
Government of certain territorial commitments to the Soviet Union or
it may be in the form of a request that this Government approve
certain commitments which the British Government may desire to
make.
This Government thus far has not recognized as Soviet territory any
of the areas which have been annexed to the Soviet Union since the
outbreak of the World War on September 1, 1939. The attitude of this
Government in that respect has been predicated on its general policy
not to recognize any territorial changes which have been made in
European frontiers since the outbreak of the World War and not to
enter into any commitments of a territorial nature in Europe which
might hamper the proceedings of the post-war Peace Conference.
[Page 510]
It is believed that it would be unfortunate if, at the present time,
an ally of the American Government of such standing as Great
Britain, which also has thus far refused to make any commitments of
a territorial nature on the European continent, should begin
bargaining with the Soviet Union or any other continental country
with regard to frontiers. There is little doubt that if the
principle is once admitted that agreements relating to frontiers may
be entered into prior to the Peace Conference, the association of
nations opposed to the Axis, which thus far has been based upon the
common aim of defeating the enemy, may be weakened by the
introduction among its members of mutual suspicion and by efforts of
various members to intrigue in order to obtain commitments with
regard to territory at the expense of other members.
Furthermore, it is believed that the assent at the present time to
any of the territorial demands of the Soviet Union would result in
only a temporary improvement of the relations between the Soviet
Union and Great Britain. If the British Government, with the tacit
or expressed approval of this Government, should abandon the
principle of no territorial commitments prior to the Peace
Conference, it would be placed in a difficult position to resist
additional Soviet demands relating to frontiers, territory, or to
spheres of influence which would almost certainly follow whenever
the Soviet Government would find itself in a favorable bargaining
position. There is no doubt that the Soviet Government has
tremendous ambitions with regard to Europe and that at some time or
other the United States and Great Britain will be forced to state
that they cannot agree, at least in advance, to all of its demands.
It would seem that it is preferable to take a firm attitude now,
rather than to retreat and to be compelled to take a firm attitude
later when our position had been weakened by the abandonment of the
general principles referred to above.
It is likely that Stalin will make use of all the weapons at his
disposal in order to attain immediate recognition of at least some
of the territorial gains which the Soviet Union has achieved since
the outbreak of the war. He already has intimated that the failure
to extend such recognition shows a lack of good faith and
confidence. He may go further and refuse for a time at least to
cooperate with Great Britain and the United States in case he is
unable to gain his points. He may even insinuate that the Soviet
Union will not feel itself obligated not to enter into a separate
peace unless such recognition is granted. He will without doubt
cause the Communist Parties in the United States and Great Britain
to use all their resources and influential friends and sympathizers
in order to bring as much pressure as possible from the rear upon
the British and American Governments and upon officials of those
Governments. If, however, these Governments
[Page 511]
succumb to pressure of the type outlined
above, Stalin will be encouraged to resort to similar tactics later
in order to obtain further and more far-reaching demands.
Stalin’s insistence upon obtaining at least certain territorial
commitments at this time may be ascribed to his desires:
- 1.
- to break down the principle thus far observed by the
American and British Governments not to make any territorial
commitments prior to the peace conference;
- 2.
- to make use of the recognition of his territorial claims
as evidence of the justification of the Soviet Union in
invading Poland and the Baltic States and in making war on
Finland in 1939 and 1940;
- 3.
- to have promises now with regard to Soviet frontiers which
might be useful to him later at the Peace Conference in case
the war should end with a weakened Soviet Union not in
occupation of the territories which he has demanded.
The agreement by the United States and Great Britain at the present
time to Soviet territorial demands or such agreement by Great
Britain with the assent of the United States would be sure to have
an unfortunate effect upon the attitude of small countries
everywhere towards the United States and Great Britain and also upon
that of countries which are especially opposed to the spread of
Bolshevism. In case the commitments desired are made, Axis
propaganda would be quick to charge that the United States, which
has for years advocated high principles of international conduct,
began trafficking or at least assented to such trafficking in the
independence of small countries within a few weeks after it had
become involved in war. Resentment would certainly be aroused,
particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, among circles which have
thus far been extremely friendly to Great Britain and the United
States. Moreover the American Republics, always sensitive on matters
touching the rights of small countries, might well consider assent
on our part to Soviet territorial expansion at the expense of other
countries in Eastern Europe as a change in the policy of the United
States, and would note with anxiety, quite apart from the religious
aspects of the matter, such a departure from the principles the
United States has hitherto advocated. Likewise the Vatican,
according to reports which have reached us from Rome, has noted with
concern certain rumors to the effect that the United States and
Great Britain might be willing to recognize Soviet rights to
territories which did not belong to the Soviet Union prior to the
outbreak of the war.32
The recognition at this time of Soviet claims to the Baltic States
would be certain to have an effect upon the integrity of the
Atlantic Charter. Eden apparently was concerned in this regard when
in
[Page 512]
the course of one of
his conversations on the subject with Stalin he said:
“Under the Atlantic Charter, we have pledged ourselves to
take into account the wishes of the inhabitants. It may be
that in this case, they have been taken into account, but
that is a matter we must check upon before we arrive at a
decision.”
This remark contained a suggestion that certain British official
circles might be considering the advisability of taking the position
that the Baltic States had been annexed to the Soviet Union upon the
expressed wishes of the inhabitants of those States.
It must be clear to all intelligent people who take the trouble to
look into the matter that the Baltic States were invaded by Soviet
armed forces and that the population of these States at no time had
an opportunity freely to express their desires as to whether or not
they would like to remain independent. Our own statements33 issued at
the time showed that we had no doubt with respect to what was taking
place. If, therefore, the British and American Governments should
take the position that these States entered the Soviet Union in
accordance with the expressed desires of the population, every
Government in the world, irrespective of what might be its views
with regard to opportunism in this connection, would know, at least
privately, that the British and American Governments were guilty of
insincerity. It would be extremely unfortunate if the manner in
which the Soviet Union invaded the Baltic States and conducted the
ensuing plebiscites should be accepted as a mode of ascertaining the
wishes of a people with regard to their future. The establishment of
such a precedent would destroy the meaning of one of the most
important clauses of the Atlantic Charter and would tend to
undermine the force of the whole document.
