Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume V

740.0011 P. W./125: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, February 24, 1941—4 p.m.
[Received 6:18 p.m.]

291. The substance of a telegram sent to London by my British colleague on February 20 follows below:

“Mr. Ohashi having again characterized as unfounded the recent alarm in regard to Japanese intentions in southeast Asia, I gave him in some detail my view as to grounds for the recent increase in tension.

(a) General speeding up of Japan’s southward expansion policy which appeared to be not only approved but promoted by the Japanese Government, Army and Navy. All this talk of ‘greater East Asia Area’ and a ‘co-prosperity zone’ was, in my opinion, most dangerous because these euphemisms cloaked a policy of political, economic, and perhaps military expansion which, if persisted in, must inevitably lead to a clash with powers possessing territory and interests in those regions. When the Japanese spoke of an area of 3000 miles away as ‘Japan’s lifeline’ they should remember that through this area passed our own lifeline, namely the communications of the rest of the Empire with Australia and New Zealand.

(b) Mr. Matsuoka’s recent speeches in the Diet and the extravagant claims by himself put forward in the Japanese press.

(c) Japanese occupation of Tongking and maneuvers to secure strangle hold on rest of Indochina.

(d) Persistent reports that a price was to be demanded for Japanese mediation in the Thai-Indochina dispute.

(e) Increasingly intimate relations with the Germans, who were working under ground to turn Japanese policy to Germany’s advantage, citing various examples of German fifth column activities.

2. I concluded that, as long as these activities continued, Japan was bound to come up against an increasingly strong opposition from other powers and would only have herself to blame if they landed her in serious difficulties. In such circumstances, it would be folly for us to neglect the normal and reasonable counter measures which we were taking and which were of a purely defensive character.

3. In reply Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs contended:

(a) Japan’s aspirations in these regions were essentially economic and, provided that they could be satisfied, no political or military question whatever need arise. To illustrate reasonableness of economic interest Vice Minister referred to recent proposals submitted to the Netherlands East Indies Government. If there had recently been an increase in the interest of Japanese public opinion in southward expansion, this was because recent measures being taken by the United States and Great Britain tended to cut Japan off from other valuable markets and sources of supply. There was a widespread feeling that Japan now had to face a deliberate attempt by Great Britain and the United States at encroachments and strangulation—a gradual but steadily increasing and remorseless pressure applies in regions under their control. It was this which had made economic expansion in East Asia and the South Seas a matter of life and death in Japan.

(b) Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs dismissed his Minister’s jeremiads in the Diet with a tolerant smile. Under Diet procedure notice of questions was not given in advance so that Minister had to reply on the spur of the moment to questions which were frequently couched in provocative language to catch the eye of electorate. Difficulty was increased by practice of the press in removing passages from their contexts and generally giving sensational and inaccurate accounts. Too much attention was being paid to these impromptu utterances in the Diet which should not be regarded as considered statements of government policy.

(c) This occupation had been arranged by agreement and presence of troops was purely [in connection?] with war in China.

(d) Minister for Foreign Affairs had categorically repudiated this suggestion in his last conversation with me.

(e) Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs believed I had an exaggerated idea of these alleged activities. In case, however, I suspected the existence of some secret clause obliging Japan to go to war in circumstances other than those contemplated in article 3,²⁴ he desired to give me positive assurance that no such secret clause existed. Japan had neither the obligation nor the wish to intervene in the European war by force except in the one case above mentioned.

4. In conclusion I observed that, if Japan abstained from language or acts aimed at a modification of the status quo in the areas we had been discussing, the general feeling of tension and disquiet in the Far East would rapidly disappear.”

Grew

24. Of the Tripartite Pact of September 27, 1940; Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 165.