751G.92/411
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 17.]
Sir: With reference to Embassy’s telegrams nos. 387, March 11, noon,50 389, March 11, 7 p.m., and previous telegrams concerning the negotiations under Japanese mediation between the representatives of French Indochina and Thailand held in Tokyo from February 7 to March 11, 1941, I have the honor to set forth below for the records of the Department, a brief account of the proceedings and results of these negotiations.
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One aspect of the proceedings of the conference strongly emphasized by a member of the French delegation was that Mr. Matsuoka was not the master of the situation which he pretended to be, and on a number of occasions was clearly acting as the puppet of Japanese militarists, concerning whose immediate intentions in regard to the conference he appeared to be in ignorance.51 It was also evident that Mr. Matsuoka was less concerned with the details of the territorial settlement than with achieving some form of agreement as speedily as possible in order to permit his departure for Europe.
Conclusion.
In reviewing the results and probable consequences of the agreement reached at this conference, it must be admitted that in so far as the territorial settlement is concerned Japan appears to have acted in a more or less impartial manner, and did not as was generally anticipated give wholehearted support to Thai maximum demands. Even the [Page 117] territorial settlement, however, cannot be considered as the result of mediation, as it was from all evidence dictated by the Japanese with little regard to the interests or desires of the parties concerned. The apparent fairness of the territorial settlement, therefore, may be regarded as indicating that the Japanese were less interested in that aspect of the negotiations than in the commitments and undertakings contained in the exchange of letters with Thailand and Indochina.
It may be stated here that neither Thailand nor Indochina appears to be satisfied with the results of even the territorial settlement. My French colleague and members of the French delegation point out in this connection that the loss of the city of Battenbang [Battambang] and its adjoining territory in Cambodia represents a very real economic loss to Indochina, while from all reports, Thailand is utterly disappointed at the failure of Japan to give more vigorous support to the Thai claims. It is in the contents of the letters exchanged by the Japanese Foreign Minister with the chief delegates of French Indochina and Thailand that the real results and potential significance of this conference lie. By virtue of the commitments and undertakings contained therein, Japan has at least laid the groundwork for the political, economic, and presumably eventual military control of Indochina and Thailand. The commitment binding Indochina and Thailand not to enter into any agreement with third countries contrary to Japanese interests, affords Japan the opportunity of exercising a large measure of control over the foreign relations of Indochina and Thailand, and the positive undertaking to develop “closer economic ties” with Japan provides the basis for Japanese economic penetration of these areas. Finally, the Japanese guarantee of the execution of the agreement and the presence of Japanese-controlled commissions to be set up for that purpose in the ceded areas, will afford almost unlimited opportunity for Japanese political and even military penetration and control.
The position of Indochina, already seriously threatened by the establishment last August of Japanese forces in its territory, is rendered even more precarious as a result of the Tokyo conference. Genuine concern has been voiced by my French colleague and members of the French delegation as to the effects of the humiliating cession of territory on the stability of French rule in Indochina. It is feared that it might with Japanese instigation lead to serious agitation on the part of the native population against white rule, which could and would be then utilized by the Japanese as a pretext for occupying the entire colony on the grounds of restoring order.
The position of Thailand, on the other hand, is in many respects even worse, since it should be apparent even to the most pro-Japanese [Page 118] officials in that country as a result of the Tokyo conference, that Japan was and is merely utilizing the territorial claims of Thailand for its own ends. Indeed, as my French colleague pointed out with some cogency, the commitments contained in the exchange of letters constitute a more serious impairment of sovereignty in the case of Thailand than Indochina, in that Thailand is ostensibly an independent country, whereas Indochina is a colony whose ultimate status in the last analysis depends on the fate of France.*
It is of some interest in this connection to note that the chief Thai delegate, Prince Varavarn, went to great lengths to attempt to persuade the Tokyo correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune that Thailand’s independence of action had been in no way affected by the commitments given; that Thailand did not consider itself as forming part of the “East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” and was quite free to conclude with England or the United States a similar agreement not to enter into a pact directed against these countries. The somewhat obvious “face-saving” purpose of Prince Varavarn’s statements is revealed by the information contained in Bangkok’s undated telegram no. 16252 that the Thai Prime Minister had refused to give to Great Britain an undertaking similar to that given to Japan on the grounds that the commitment to Japan constituted a “special case.”
The probable effects of this settlement on the British position in Burma and Malaya as a result of this agreement and the opportunities it affords to Japan for anti-British agitation in these areas will form the subject of a separate despatch.
The benefits accruing to Japan from the Tokyo conference are sufficiently obvious as to require little elaboration. Apart from the diplomatic success involved, the result undoubtedly constitutes an important step in the furtherance of Japan’s southward advance. Japan is now in a position, gradually if necessary and by more vigorous and aggressive action if the situation is propitious, through its increased influence in both Indochina and Thailand, to acquire complete dominance in these areas whose importance to the defense of Singapore and British Malaya cannot be overestimated. Whether or not, and to what extent, Japan will utilize for this purpose the opportunities afforded by the Tokyo agreement will, it is believed, depend on considerations of major Japanese policy based on Japan’s estimate of the correlations of forces both in Europe and the Far East and the consequent risks involved.
Yours respectfully,
- Not printed.↩
- In a memorandum dated May 10, the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) suggested that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, whether acting independently or as a puppet of the military element, played a role during the negotiations which “indicates how unreliable a negotiator Matsuoka may be.”↩
- See Embassy’s telegram no. 423, March 17, 11 p.m. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- This telegram was dated March 18, 4 p.m., not printed.↩