756D.94/138

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 5453

Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s telegram no. 172 of March 15, 5:00 p.m.,47 instructing the Embassy to submit by pouch certain information received in confidence from my Netherlands colleague concerning the status of the Netherlands East Indies-Japanese [Page 115] economic negotiations, and to outline below the information in question. Reference in this connection is also made to Embassy’s despatch no. 5363 of February 10, 1941,48 and telegrams referred to therein on the same subject.

Following a short interruption in the early part of February due to the necessity of clarifying certain statements of the Japanese Government in regard to the inclusion of the Netherlands East Indies in the “Greater East Asia Sphere” negotiations were resumed in Batavia between Mr. van Hoogstraten, head of the Commerce Department, and the Japanese Consul General in Batavia, Mr. Ytaka Ishizawa, as well as between Mr. Yoshizawa, head of the Japanese delegation and Mr. van Mook, chief of the Economic Ministry. Conversations were likewise resumed between the representatives of the Mitsubishi oil interests and the Dutch oil companies relative to the exploitation by Japanese of certain oil areas in the Netherlands East Indies. [Here follows account of the status of negotiations at the beginning of March.]

It is of special interest to note in regard to the above information that the element of hesitancy and caution in the implementation of present Japanese policy which was observable in Tokyo during February (reported in the Embassy’s strictly confidential telegram no. 259, February 18, 9 p.m.49 and further discussed in despatch no. 5444 of March 13, 1941) appears to have been reflected in the economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies. Any such manifestation, however, of a more reasonable attitude on the part of the Japanese should, it is believed, be viewed largely as a temporary expedient dictated by a sense of prudence engendered on the one hand by uncertainty as to the prospects of a German victory in Europe; and, on the other, by the aggravated risks of conflict with the United States.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew