794.00/245
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 2.]
Sir: With reference to the Embassy’s strictly confidential telegram No. 259, February 18, 9 p.m.,45 describing a sensed change in the Japanese attitude toward foreign policy, I have the honor to comment upon certain indications that the situation as regards Japanese-American relations has in Japan to some degree relaxed. The tone of the press, which in the first weeks of the year was aggressive in urging Japan to proceed fearlessly with plans for a southward advance, has become notably milder. Instead of proclaiming that Japan’s opportunity for bold action has come and that no effective [Page 110] resistance may be feared, emphasis is now placed on defending the policy of southward expansion, on explaining that it does not imply aggression and that its aims are economic and peaceful. It seems probable that this change of atmosphere may have resulted from the realization that the American attitude has stiffened and that aid to Britain need not imply that an American weather eye has been turned away from the Pacific. It may also be due to the delay in Germany’s attack on England and to a doubt of German victory, at least quick German victory.
The somewhat cautious policy which Japan has pursued both in the negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies and the mediation of the Thailand-French Indochina dispute is evidence that the Government is not now disposed to take positive action. Certainly the people, whose lives are already painfully circumscribed by wartime control, could not be expected to support cheerfully a policy which would mean war with the United States. It is admitted, of course, that untoward incidents or action by armed forces in the field are possible contingencies which would completely change the picture.
The change in emphasis in the Japanese attitude toward relations with the United States, principally as indicated in official statements and in the vernacular press, appears to center in the following three elements: admittance that one of the greatest obstacles to adjustment of Japanese-American relations is the policy of southward expansion, belief that a Japanese-American war can and should be avoided, and earnest desire to minimize tension in Japanese-American relations.
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It may then be concluded, on the basis of such indications as have been noted above and on the general feeling which can be sensed in Tokyo, that Japan has for the moment paused. Armed intervention, which was loudly threatened at the beginning of the Thailand-French Indochina difficulties, did not materialize although delays succeeded one another in the mediation parley and several “final” plans were submitted by the mediator. The dramatic moves into the Netherlands East Indies which were freely predicted a few months ago have not taken place and Japan’s terms in the economic sphere have apparently been considerably modified. There is increasingly evident in the press an insistence that Japan’s immediate problem is settlement of the China Incident and that her foreign policy should be canalized to that end. In spite of such books as If Japan and America Fight predicting an inevitable Japanese victory, no strong sentiment for challenging the United States can be detected. The attitude is rather one of defensive explanation of the pacific nature of Japan’s policy. These indications do not mean, however, that Japan’s long-run policies have been scrapped or that the South Seas [Page 111] are less alluring than before. They may suggest that Japan is awaiting the German signal, or that the leaders of the nation have become convinced that Japan’s present position, both internal and external, does not favor vigorous action, and that the wisest course is hesitation.
Respectfully yours,