Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume V

740.0011 P. W./189

The First Secretary of the Australian Legation (Watt) to the Australian Minister (Casey)³⁵

Minister: Attachéd hereto is a list³⁶ of dates (7th to 20th February) together with a summarized record of events which occurred during that period. The only matters referred to in this record not obtained from Press sources are (a) the warning given by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador when the latter presented his credentials (February 14th) and (b) extract from the text of the personal message from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Foreign Secretary (February 17th).

2. While any conclusions reached after examination of this series of events must be somewhat speculative, it is suggested that they are consistent with the hypothesis that Japan intended to make a major thrust south, not earlier than the 14th February or later than the 20th February—probably about the 18th February.

3. It will be recalled that when President Roosevelt saw Viscount Halifax on 8th February, he told the British Ambassador that advices received suggested that the Japanese might be planning a move on 10th or 18th February. It is known from personal letters received from the Australian Legation in Tokyo, written towards the end of January that even at that time American sources in Japan were paying some special attention to 18th February as a possible date for Japanese action. It will be noted that Admiral Nomura’s arrival in America was so timed that he would be able to report to Tokyo his impressions of his first conversation with the President and the Secretary of State before 18th February (Admiral Nomura saw the Secretary of State on 12th February and the President on 14th February). Again, it is perhaps not entirely a coincidence that the new Japanese Ambassador to Germany arrived in Berlin on 17th February.

4. Assuming that Japan intended to act on or about 18th February (presumably against British or Dutch possessions only and on the assumption that Japan would not thereby be involved in a war with the United States), events which occurred between 10th and 18th were no doubt such as to cause her grave misgivings that her plans were known and would be opposed. In the first place, as early as 10th February action was taken in Singapore which suggested that that area was on the alert and expected trouble in the immediate future. The Australian Acting Prime Minister’s statement on 12th and 13th seemed to show that Australia had received sudden information of an impending clash and was bracing herself to oppose it. Most important of all, on 14th February President Roosevelt clearly warned Admiral Nomura, while on 15th the interviews between the British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, the Netherlands Minister and Mr. Cordell Hull must have suggested that America was consulting with Great Britain, Australia and the Netherlands with a view to completing plans designed to prevent a successful Japanese thrust southward. At the same time, the American Press showed intense interest in Far Eastern developments and the tone was such that Japan must have felt at least considerable doubt whether United States might not throw in her lot with the British Empire and the Netherlands should Japan attack only Dutch and British possessions.

5. It seems reasonably clear that Japan was giving serious consideration to the new situation which had arisen by the 15th February (see statement by Japanese Cabinet Information Bureau’s spokesman) and that by the 17th February Japan had decided to endeavour to establish her “peaceful” intentions (see message from Japanese Foreign Minister to British Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs).

6. It is of interest to note that in the official statements issued in Japan on 15th and 18th February great emphasis is laid on the supposed attitude of the American Government. The Japanese Foreign Minister’s statement on 18th February even refers to the “warlike preparations” of the American Government as well as of the British Government.

6. [sic] If Japan did in fact intend to move south about 18th February, it is submitted that a combination of the following factors deterred her from doing so:

(a) The realisation that her plans were probably known.

(b) The evident determination of the British Empire and the Netherlands Indies to resist any attack by Japan.

(c) The fear that America would not remain neutral even if Japan attacked only British and Dutch territory.

It is most probable that the third factor was by far the strongest.

7. If these conclusions are correct, it seems important not merely that the British Empire and the Netherlands should maintain vis-à-vis Japan an attitude of alertness and determination to resist, but also that Japan be given no shadow of a reason to assume that America would remain neutral provided American territory were not directly attacked. The events of February suggest that one of the most effective means of deterring Japan from a southward thrust (short of sending an American fleet to Singapore or the issue of a common Anglo-American declaration that the status quo in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies must not be interfered with) may well be to ensure that whenever a Japanese thrust south appears to be impending the “American spotlight” should be turned at once upon the area in question and that every official and unofficial indication should be given that America is unlikely to tolerate Japanese interference with the status quo.

A[lan] S. W[att]

[ Washington ,] March 6, 1941.

35. Date of receipt in the Department not indicated.
36. Not printed.