751G.92/298: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 3—2 a.m.]
256. Embassy’s telegram No. 229, February 25, 2 p.m.33 The French Government decided last night in the face of Japanese threats of force to accept the Japanese mediation proposal.
Chauvel showed us this afternoon a number of telegrams which led to this decision. Arsène-Henry reported his conversation with Matsuoka wherein he informed him of the French rejection of the second Japanese proposal for settlement of the Thai-Indochinese dispute. Henry reported that Matsuoka, while “sympathetic to the French position” emphasized the need for settling the Thai dispute immediately and “remained unconvinced” by the French Government’s arguments. He urged Henry to telegraph at once asking the French Government to reconsider its decision and indicated, according to Henry’s telegram, that failure to accept the Japanese proposal would mean abrogation of the Franco-Japanese accord of August 30, 1940, and probable utilization of force against Indochina.
A telegram received from Garreau at Bangkok reported that our Minister’s efforts to persuade the Thais to take a less intransigent attitude had not been successful. The attitude of the British Minister, Crosby, on the contrary, read the telegram, was to urge the French to accept the Thai demands in the hope thereafter of drawing a satisfied Thailand away from Japanese influence. Garreau characterized this difference in policy between the British and ourselves in Thailand as most unfortunate and referred to Crosby’s maneuvers as a “disloyal” effort to sell the French down the river.
Chauvel also showed a telegram from the French Consul General at Batavia reporting Dutch regrets that there was no unified Anglo-American policy of firm resistance in the Far East to check Japanese intentions of further aggression in the South.
In the light of the foregoing three telegrams and probably even more because of German “intimations” at Wiesbaden, which Chauvel admitted they “felt”, the French Government “without any dissenting voice”, he said, had decided to bow to the Japanese demands. He read us the telegram sent last night to Ambassador Henry.
[Page 100]It began with an outspoken recital of French grievances against Japan’s attitude since last summer which included a statement that the French felt convinced that Thai aggression and territorial demands had been instigated by Japan, that Japan’s original mediation offer had become an arbitral award handed down with direct threats of Japanese force if not accepted, et cetera. The French, read the telegram, felt compelled to accept the Japanese ultimatum provided ultimatums [cessions?] of territory could be made to Japan for handing over to Thailand rather than direct cessions by Indochina to Thailand itself and secondly provided that there be certain clarifications and minor modifications in the area to be ceded and the setting up therein of some form of special administration. This last the French hoped may make it easier to regain this territory at some future date than if it is directly and simply incorporated in Thai territory (Matsuoka had also intimated that he would “try” to get the Thais to agree to the ten million ticales indemnity payment which was incorporated in the original Japanese proposal but omitted from the second. The French, however, show no interest in receiving any indemnity payment for a cession of territory which they consider rightfully theirs). Chauvel seemed to feel that the Japanese would be inclined to accept these French suggestions but it seems of course clear now that the French will not resist any Japanese demands backed by threats of force.
Chauvel then went on to explain the reasoning behind this French decision. From information from all their sources they are convinced that the Japanese threat of force is not an empty one and that they would proceed to direct hostilities against Indochina with at least six divisions which are now immediately available (mostly on Hainan). He said that the French had even considered the possibility of withdrawing from Tongking and Cambodia and attempting to defend Annam, inviting the Chinese into Tongking, but they had found it would be so difficult to supply and defend that area that any such move would be unfeasible. What the French are trying to do, he said, is at all costs to stay in Indochina. They feel that once they are forced out of the colony their chances of ever regaining possession of their rich colony would be slim indeed; that, consequently, it was decidedly preferable to remain there even under Japanese control and subject even to possible extreme demands in the future (including naval and air bases) than to be forced out altogether. They are consequently playing for time, hoping to draw out negotiations as far as possible and Chauvel seems to feel that the Japanese may now leave Indochina alone for another month or two. Even the Germans, he believes, would not favor Japanese occupation or annexation of Indochina. With the general situation both in Europe and the Far East as it is he said it is too soon for the French to “act”. The time may come, [Page 101] and he hopes it will, when the French will be able to play a useful role in the international situation in the Far East as well as elsewhere again but the moment has not yet arrived.
As to the sizeable arms sales and shipments by Japan to Thailand, he has now reached the obvious conclusion that the Japanese are merely using this method to build up strong armaments in Thailand for themselves as at least a potential threat against Singapore. He believes that Japanese interests will be directed toward Thailand rather than against Indochina as far as the immediate future is concerned. He is of the opinion (my telegram 57, January 15, 7 p.m.34) that the most likely place for Japanese aggression, if indeed they decide to move, is against Borneo. He finds, however, a certain Japanese “hesitation” to take any definite plunge to the south.