- 1.
- Matsuoka’s instructions to the Ambassador here.
- 2.
- Statements of responsible Japanese leaders in regard
to the closeness of Japan’s relations with Germany and
Italy, exemplified in congratulatory message sent to
Mussolini.
- 3.
- Unwillingness to refer to the Secretary’s statement in
regard to our self-defensive attitude in reference to
the European hostilities.
- 4.
- Insistence on right to station
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Japanese troops in China to combat
communistic activities.
- 5.
- Tendency to support the Wang Ching-wei regime and to
regard Japan’s treaties with that regime as a model for
future treaties with the Chungking Government.
- 6.
- Question of non-dicrimination as related to China
(this might be worked out).
- 7.
- Question of Japanese troops in French Indochina and of
possible Japanese economic preferences there has not
been raised.
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- 1.
- Mildness of Japanese reaction to the reply of the
Netherlands East Indies Government in regard to economic
questions.
- 2.
- Indications that Germany does not like and is worried
by the discussions here.
- 3.
- Reports have come to Mr. Grew that most of the
Japanese Cabinet do not favor going to war with the
United States in the event that the United States should
become involved in the European hostilities; also, that
Matsuoka’s attitude and policy are not supported by the
most influential members of the Cabinet (these reports,
however, are all second- or third-hand).
|
