740.0011 European War 1939/9147

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

The British Ambassador called at my request.

I referred again to the very delicate relations between Great Britain and France and the danger of the situation getting out of hand. I [Page 126] said that this Government, as he knows, has devoted much time and effort to keep the French and British situation from drifting into a dangerous stage, and especially to induce the French never to turn over their Navy to Hitler for his military use; that the Darlan threat, whether it was in earnest or a bluff, seemed to be more a move to secure favor with Hitler than to get relief for the people of France. The one supreme purpose of the Laval-Darlan group seemed to be to whipsaw French sentiment around by utilizing the food relief question in a most dastardly way so that this group might get the upper hand at Vichy, and with the support of changed French sentiment turn the Navy over to Hitler, and in many other disastrous ways deliver the best interests of France to Germany, as was contemplated by Laval before he was discovered and thrown out by Marshal Pétain. I added that the Ambassador could readily observe the great concern of this Government and hence its repeated discussions with the British Government about the matter of food relief to unoccupied France under the most rigid supervision; that we had purposely not undertaken to stand for an important quid pro quo formula for the reason that Darlan might turn away and charge that the British were more interested in the pro than in the quid and seek to make large capital of it on the charge of lack of sympathy with and interest in the distressed people of France. This Government seeks to carry both propositions along on parallel lines based on a spirit of cooperation for mutually desirable settlement of various matters pending between the two Governments.

The Ambassador said that it would be agreeable for me to say to the French that real progress is being made with respect to the proposed two shipments of wheat to unoccupied France. He suggested that I should say that, of course, the British would like to see a similar spirit shown by the French Government by joining in a plan for rigid supervision to prevent the Germans from infiltrating into French Africa, and by bringing away from the French continental base their naval vessels and stationing them in French African ports. I said that I would, of course, be only too glad to bring these matters up under our plan of dealing with both French and British questions that are being raised by their respective Ambassadors.

I sought to repeat the attitude of this Government based on the policy that from the standpoint of aiding Great Britain in the war, this Government should keep in close relationship with France, and to this end my Government would collaborate fully with the British, offering its opinion freely relative to any question, such as the French food relief matter, but never carrying the matter to the point of friction or public disagreement. In case of disagreement, this Government [Page 127] might, if it thought the matter sufficiently important, continue to keep the British reminded of its views as it has done in the French relief situation. I recalled to the Ambassador that it was only twelve hours after my talk with him to this effect last week that Darlan made his threat, and that it was really unfortunate that we had not been able to announce virtual completion of the consideration of the request for food relief. The Ambassador said that his country had come around to this view very slowly, and I expressed my thorough understanding of the psychology in his country in view of their situation.

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